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Abstract
This thesis analyses firm exporting behaviour and trade policy in China. China’s aston-
ishing export growth is largely driven by pure exporting behaviour and low priced goods.
Therefore this thesis focuses on the firm pure exporting behaviour and firm quality spe-
cialization between a poor country and a rich country. Moreover, this thesis explores the
roles of trade policy in Chinese trade. A commonly used and frequently adjusted policy
of value-added tax rebates (VATRs) for exporters is analysed.
Chapter 2 introduces heterogeneity in productivity, entry cost and demand in both do-
mestic and foreign markets to explain pure exporters. Pure exporters face lower demand-
adjusted foreign entry cost than demand-adjusted domestic entry cost. The presence of
pure exporters makes the average productivity of exporters be lower or higher than non-
exporters. The pure exporting products are analysed under a multiproduct firm framework
in chapter 3. The study develops a general equilibrium model which allows for hetero-
geneity in productivity and fixed export cost across products. We find high productive
firms can manage more products in export than in domestic market due to pure exporting
products. Both chapters investigate the effects of trade and trade liberalization on pure
exporting behaviour.
Chapter 4 analyses the quality specialization pattern between a poor and a rich coun-
try in international trade. In the model, there is one to one relationship between income of
consumers and quality they buy. The model shows a home market effect on quality spe-
cialization. When a poor country trades with a rich country, low (high) qualities are com-
pletely specialized in the poor (rich) country, while medium qualities are incompletely
specialized, i.e. produced by both countries and exported to each other. Furthermore, this
chapter also provides some empirical evidence.
Chapter 5 assesses the trade policy of VATRs in China. Based on the correction for
potential endogeneity of VATR adjustments, the estimation suggests one percentage point
increase of VATR does not affect export price significantly while increasing export quan-
tity by 1.15%. 1.43% more firms are induced to export the adjusted product while the
number of destinations the product exported is raised by 0.77%. Furthermore, firm wel-
fare measured as the net profit is increased by 2.15%, which translates into $2.14 in rev-
enue for a $1 additional rebate from government
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This thesis analyses firm exporting behaviour and trade policy in China. China’s aston-
ishing export growth is largely driven by pure exporting behaviour and low priced goods.
Therefore this thesis focuses on the firm pure exporting behaviour, i.e. pure exporters
(chapter 2) and pure exported products (chapter 3). This thesis also studies firm quality
specialization between a poor country and a rich country to shed light on why China may
export low priced goods (chapter 4). Moreover, this thesis studies a commonly used and
frequently adjusted policy in China, value-added tax rebates (VATRs) (chapter 5), i.e. ex-
ports are exempt from VAT and input VAT for production, distribution and sales is fully
or partially refunded to exporters.
In this chapter, I introduce the motivation of this thesis, from which the importance
and necessity of this study are shown. Moreover, I describe the structure of this study.
Furthermore, I summarize the contributions of this thesis.
1.1 Motivation
1.1.1 China’s Export
China has experienced a nearly 30-year-long period of high economic growth rate. With-
out any doubt, international trade plays a very important role, which has been supported
by numerous literatures from Chinese scholars and international scholars. According to
China Statistical Yearbook, in average export accounts 23.5% of GDP from year 1990 to
2013. Meanwhile export in average contributes to 26.6% of the total economic growth
from year 1990 to 2000 (Lin and Li, 2003).
With accession to WTO, in 2002 China ranked the fourth of the exports to the world
below USA, Germany and Japan. Since then, the export share of Japan, USA and Ger-
many are decreasing in general, though share is increasing for USA (Germany) was
slightly increased after 2011 (2012). On the contrary, the export share of China has in-
creased from 5.1% in 2002 to 13.1% in 2014. As shown in Figure 1.1, China exceeded
1
Janpan in 2004, USA in 2007 and Germany in 2009. Since 2009, China has been the
largest exporter in the world.
Note: The data is from UN comtrade database.
Figure 1.1: Export share of top four countries
China’s export is not only important for China’s economic growth, but also accounts
large share of world trade. Therefore, to investigate China’s export is not only of its own
interest, but also meaningful for the world. China’s astonishing export growth is largely
driven by pure exporting behaviour and low priced goods. Trade policy in China also
plays an important role in the growth of export.
This thesis studies these contributing factors to export growth in different chapters,
e.g. pure exporting behaviour in chapter 2 and 3, quality specialization (low priced goods)
in chapter 4 and trade policy in chapter 5. By assembling these chapters together, this
thesis presents a comprehensive framework to understand China’s export.
1.1.2 Pure Exporting Behavior
In a dominant part of the literature on international trade it is assumed that firms serve the
domestic market (non-exporters) or serve both the domestic market and the foreign market
(ordinary exporters). However, some firms serve exclusively the foreign market (pure
2
exporters). Likewise, some products are purely exported by the firms. In China, around
90 percent of exports are under “ordinary trade (OT)”, “processing trade with purchased
materials (PTPM)” or “processing trade with supplied materials (PTSM)”. PTPM, also
known as import-assembly trade, refers to “business activities in which the operating
enterprise imports materials/parts by paying foreign exchange for their processing and
exports finished processed products for sale abroad”. PTSM, also known as pure assembly
trade, refers to “the business activities in which the imported materials are supplied by the
overseas enterprise, and the operating enterprise need not pay foreign exchange for the
import, but just carries out processing or assembling in accordance with the requirements
of the overseas enterprise, and charges for the processing, with the finished products being
marketed by the overseas enterprise”. According to these definitions, it is obvious that
PTPM and PTSM are among the forms of pure exporting behaviour. In Fig 1.2, we draw
the share of export under ordinary trade, processing trade (PTPM and PTSM) and other
trade. As shown, processing export accounts for a very large share of total export. From
2006 to 2010, export share of processing trade is higher than export share of ordinary
trade. From 2006 to 2014, the average export share of processing trade is 45.45%, which
is very close to the export share of ordinary trade 46.70%.
Note: The data is from Report on International Trade of China by comprehensive department of
Ministry of Commerce (http://zhs.mofcom.gov.cn/article/cbw/201511/20151101156345.shtml
accessed on 26 April, 2016).
Figure 1.2: Export share of processing trade
3
From the analysis of export share of processing trade, it is evident that pure exporting
behaviour is very important in China’s export. With Chinese firm-level data, we can
further see the role played by pure exporters. In China 6.7% of all firms and 27.4% of
all exporting firms are pure exporters. Pure exporters exist in 88.4% of all sectors and
90.5% of all exporting sectors. Moreover, pure exporters contribute 29.1% of the total
exports and 8.7% of total employment. Furthermore, pure exporters have larger average
value of exports than ordinary exporters. The existence of pure exporters is not restricted
to China. World Bank Enterprise Surveys offers an expansive array of economic data on
130,000 firms in 135 countries. More than 90% of the countries are developing countries.
From the survey, pure exporters account at least 7% of all firms in more than 25% of the
countries, and account at least 19% (10%) of all exporters in more than 50% (75%) of the
countries.
Pure exporting behaviour is non-trivial both in China and in large range of developing
countries. However, the studies on pure exporting behaviour are far behind. Chapter 2
and 3 are aiming to fill this gap.
1.1.3 Quality Specialization
Besides pure exporting behaviour, another mark of China’s export is that goods produced
by China (here we are not talking about the products that are assembled in China, e.g.
iPhone, which fall into pure exporting behaviour) are low priced. “Made in China” has
been a mark of low price and low quality.
Note: The figure is from Schott (2008). This figure displays mean natural log OECD / China unit
value ratio across products in noted industry, by year. Log unit values for each year and industry
are significantly different from zero at the 1 percent level in almost all cases.
Figure 1.3: China/OECD log unit value ratios, 1980-2005
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Schott (2008) compares the relative price between China and OECD countries. The
results are shown in Fig 1.3. All log ratios are less than zero, which means China export
price is lower than OECD countries in chemicals, manufactured materials and machinery
from 1980 to 2005. Moreover, the ratio is decreasing, especially for machinery (from
90% in 1984 to 25% in 2005).
The price of China exort is lower than price of OECD export. Though the price has
been used as a proxy for product quality in numerous research, some papers are trying to
directly estimate the quality across countries. From these studies, we can compare China’s
export quality to the export quality to other countries. Pula and Santaba´rbara (2012) find
that China’s export quality is much lower than Japan, US and EU countries. Moreover, as
shown in Fig 1.4 from Hallak and Schott (2011), China quality is lower than developed
countries and it is even lower than Thailand. More surprisingly, it is almost not upgraded
at all in the past decades.
Note: The figure is from Hallak and Schott (2011). Index is normalized by the mean across
countries. If the log index is zero, the quality is equal to the mean.
Figure 1.4: China’s export quality
Chapter 4 studies the quality specialization between a poor country and a rich country,
in order to explain why China may export low qualities. Moreover, as shown in Manova
and Zhang (2012) China’s exporting prices across destinations within firm-product pair is
positively correlated with the income per capita of the destinations, which suggests that
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quality differentiation is related to income. Therefore chapter 4 focuses on the demand
side determinants of quality specialization. However, to use income per capita for each
country is silent on the explanation of quality differentiation within a country and quality
specialization across countries. Therefore chapter 4 assumes a general distribution for
each country to investigate the roles of income distribution in quality specialization.
1.1.4 Trade policy
China’s astonishing export performance is partially attributed to several trade policies.
The major policy instruments that significantly influence China’s international trade in-
clude reform and opening up, southern tour, accession to WTO, regional agreement and
VAT rebates (VATRs).
Started in December 1978, the wind of Reform and Opening Up flowed all over China
quickly. Before 1978, there is nearly no statistics about international trade in China’s pub-
lic database or yearbook. After the reform and Opening Up, central government estab-
lished some institutions that can export and import, and granted export licenses to some
firms as well. China’s international trade, as well as foreign direct investment, took off
from then. However the product varieties are strictly limited and controlled.
In the spring of 1992, the starter of reform and opening up, Xiaoping Deng made his
famous southern tour of China. He visited Guangzhou, Shenzhen, Zhuhai and spent the
New Year in Shanghai. During his tour, he stressed the importance of economic reform.
The southern tour pushed the opening up to a new stage facilitating international trade.
At the beginning of 1993, there is a huge decrease of varieties subject to export license.
By the end of 1993, only a very small portion of export varieties were under control.
At the end of 2001, China became a member of WTO and from 2002, China began to
reduce the tariffs and other trade barriers, with the overall tariff rate falling from 15.3% in
2001 to about 12% in 2002, 11.3% in 2003, 10.5% in 2004, and 10% in 2005. Depicted in
picture 1.5, both export and import grew rapidly from 2002. Access to WTO is the most
important trade policy in China’s history.
As for regional agreement, the most important regional agreement for China is China-
ASEAN Free Trade Area, which is a free trade area among the ten member states of the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and China. The agreement was signed
in 2002 and came into effect in 2010. There is a long time period between the two dates,
therefore to analyse the effects of the agreement might be biased by the anticipation effect.
China’s export VATRs was introduced in 1985. In 1994, China reformed its tax sys-
tem with VAT becoming a major tax since then. The current VATRs system stems from
this reform but has experienced a number of adjustments over the years. After the shock
of the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, rather than depreciating its currency, the government
chose to increase VATRs to help stabilize exports. From January 1998 to December 1999,
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Note: The value of export and import are deflated by CPI index with the base year 1978. The
data is from National bureau of statistics of China.
Figure 1.5: China’s export and import
VATRs was adjusted more than 10 times. From 2003 to 2007, China’s VATRs experi-
enced adjustments more than 10 times as well. During this period, the main aim of these
adjustments was to upgrade the economy structure, optimizing resource consumption and
reducing environmental pollution. VATRs was increased for agricultural products, high-
tech equipment and IT products. During 2008 and 2009, China’s export was influenced
by the global financial crisis. Consequently, VATRs for the products whose exports were
significantly affected were increased, which included textiles, clothing, furniture, toys
and electromechanical products. China’s initial adoption of VATRs was to promote ex-
ports. After these increases in exports were achieved, further adjustments of VATRs were
primarily aimed at upgrading the economy structure and responding to external export
shocks.
Chapter 5 focuses the trade policy of export VATRs in China. One reason is that
VATRs is product specific and frequently adjusted in China. Therefore the variations of
VATRs across time and products give rise to the possibilities to dissect the VATRs to
different margins of export. Another reason is that trade policy of VATRs is far under-
studied in international trade. Chapter 5 is the first study to analyse the VATRs at a very
7
disaggregated level.
1.2 Structure
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows. In chapter 2 exporting behavior as pure
exporters is analysed while pure exported products are studied in chapter 3. In chapter 4,
export quality and export price distribution are investigated. In chapter 5, export VATRs
as the trade policy is assessed. Chapter 6 is the concluding remarks.
In chapter 2, under a single-product firm framework, the study introduces heterogene-
ity in productivity, entry cost and demand in both domestic and foreign markets to explain
pure exporters. This chapter builds a general static equilibrium model, and then character-
izes the properties of the equilibrium, including that the presence of pure exporters makes
the average productivity of exporters be lower or higher than non-exporters. After charac-
terization of the equilibrium, this chapter studies the effects of trade liberalization: from
autarky to trade, a decrease in foreign entry cost and a decrease in variable export cost.
And then this chapter analyses the effects of innovation as well. A decrease in foreign
entry cost and innovation are studied by shifting the conditional distribution of foreign
entry cost and productivity respectively. The last section is the conclusion.
In chapter 3, the pure exported products are analysed under a multiproduct firm frame-
work. The study develops a general equilibrium model which allows for heterogeneity in
productivity and fixed export cost across products. This chapter starts with the equilib-
rium model of closed economy and then takes the model to the open economy. Then this
chapter studies the effects of trade liberalization on pure exported products: from autarky
to trade, a decrease in foreign entry cost and a decrease in variable export cost. The last
section is the conclusion.
In chapter 4, the study analyses the quality specialization pattern in international trade.
This chapter starts with a model of closed economy, where the impacts of income distri-
bution on quality and price distribution are shown. Then the chapter introduces the open
economy where two countries trade with each other. In the open economy, the chapter
firstly characterizes the incomplete specialization and complete specialization of qualities,
and then proceeds to the equilibrium that determines which qualities are under incomplete
specialization or complete specialization. This chapter also provides a section with some
empirical evidence. Two pieces of evidence are shown: income-quality relationship and
link between income distribution and export price distribution. The last section is the
conclusion.
In chapter 5, the study assesses the trade policy of export VATRs in China. This chap-
ter firstly introduces the history and implementation of China’s export VATRs. Then the
chapter provides a simple model of VATRs to motivate the empirical implementations.
After describing the constructed data, this chapter discusses the empirical results of VA-
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TRs effects on export price, quantity, extensive margins and firm welfare. A robustness
check follows before the conclusion.
Chapter 6 is the concluding remarks. This chapter describes the results of the thesis.
Moreover, the policy implications are discussed. Last but not least, the chapter proposes
some future studies.
1.3 Contributions
This thesis contributes to research on international trade in various aspects both in theo-
retical and empirical views. The contributions of each chapter are summarized as follows.
The contributions of chapter 2 on pure exporters include: 1) the chapter builds a gen-
eral model of pure exporter which can be applied to a wide range of countries; 2) a wider
range of firm heterogeneity including productivity, market entry cost in domestic and for-
eign market as well as demand shocks in domestic and foreign market is introduced; 3)
the presence of a large portion of pure exporters can make the average productivity of
exporters lower than average productivity of non-exporters; 4) depending on the portion
of pure exporters, the effect of trade on average productivity can be positive or negative;
5) entry and exit of firms are significantly affected by pure exporters; 6) Innovation and
trade liberalization in terms of a decrease of foreign entry cost are analysed by shifting
the distribution of firms.
The contributions of chapter 3 on pure exported products are: 1) the model of mul-
tiproduct firms allows the heterogeneity of firms and products within a firm; 2) within a
firm, learning by exporting is represented as the decrease of fixed export cost; 3) a high
productive firms manage pure exported products because of the ability of decreasing fixed
export cost; 4) trade will increase the extensive margin of high productive firms due to
pure exported products; 5) trade liberalization generates reallocation between and within
firms.
The contributions of chapter 4 on quality and export price distribution include: 1)
the model features a non-homothetic preference; 2) instead of income per capita, this
chapter introduces a general income distribution into the model; 3) the chapter delivers a
one to one income-quality relationship, thereby endogenously determining a continuum
of qualities; 4) quality specialization in international trade follows home market effect,
i.e. the low (high) qualities are completely specialized in the poor (rich) country while
medium qualities are incompletely specialized; 5) the chapter builds a link between export
price distribution and destination income distribution which is supported by the empirical
evidence.
The contributions of chapter 5 on trade policy of export VATRs are: 1) this chapter is
the first study to dissect VATRs effects into different margins of export, i.e. price, quantity
and extensive margins; 2) the chapter provides a simple model of VATRs where VATRs
9
affects both marginal revenue and marginal cost of firms; 3) the potential endogeneity of
VATRs is corrected by choosing period when VATRs adjustments are not responses to
export shocks and including fixed effects to control sectoral demand shocks; 4) VATRs
significantly contributes to export growth mainly through extensive margin; 5) VATRs
significantly increases firm welfare, and the more intensively the firms use imported ma-
terials the smaller the effect is.
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Chapter 2
The Impact of Trade with Pure
Exporters
The present chapter introduces heterogeneity in productivity, entry cost and demand in
both domestic and foreign market to show how firms choose to be pure exporters serv-
ing solely foreign markets. Pure exporters face lower demand-adjusted foreign entry cost
than demand-adjusted domestic entry cost. The presence of a large portion of pure ex-
porters can make the average productivity of exporters lower than average productivity of
non-exporters. It is also found that depending on the portion of pure exporters, the effect
of trade on average productivity can be positive or negative. However, the effect of trade
on welfare is positive because of the access to more varieties. Furthermore, this chapter
explores the effects of trade liberalization and innovation. In particular, a decrease of for-
eign entry cost or innovation across firms pushes some pure exporters and non-exporters
out of the market and some ordinary exporters to become pure exporters or non-exporters.
2.1 Introduction
In a dominant part of the literature on international trade it is assumed that firms serve
the domestic market (non-exporters) or serve both the domestic market and the foreign
market (ordinary exporters). However, some firms serve exclusively the foreign market
(pure exporters). As shown in table 2.1, in China 6.7% of all firms and 27.4% of all
exporting firms are pure exporters. Pure exporters exist in 88.4% of all sectors and 90.5%
of all exporting sectors. Moreover, pure exporters contribute 29.1% of the total exports
and have larger average value of exports than ordinary exporters. The existence of pure
exporters is not restricted to China. As shown in Fig 2.1, according to the World Bank
enterprise surveys in 135 countries, pure exporters account for at least 7% of all firms in
more than 25% of the countries, and account for at least 19% (10%) of all exporters in
more than 50% (75%) of the countries. The present chapter provides a general model of
11
pure exporters and studies the impact of trade with the presence of pure exporters. The
results suggest that depending on the portion of pure exporters the average productivity
of exporters can be lower or higher than the average productivity of non-exporters. The
presence of pure exporters makes average productivity with trade lower or higher than in
autarky, though welfare with trade is higher than in autarky.
Note: The data is from World Bank Enterprise Surveys, which offers an expansive array of
economic data on 130,000 firms in 135 countries. More than 90% of the countries are developing
countries. The pure exporters are defined as the firms that export more than 90% of total output
as in Defever and Rian˜o (2012). Fig 2.1 shows that a large portion of pure exporters exist in a
wide range of countries. In particular, pure exporters account at least 7% of all firms in more
than 25% of the countries, and account at least 19% (10%) of all exporters in more than 50%
(75%) of the countries.
Figure 2.1: Percentage of pure exporters across countries
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We consider a general equilibrium model with a continuum of heterogeneous firms
and identical countries. However firm heterogeneity is not restricted to differences in
productivity as in Melitz (2003). Indeed firms also have heterogeneous entry cost for
foreign marke (e.g. Schmitt and Yu, 2001; Jørgensen and Schro¨der, 2006, 2008; Das et al.,
2007; Arkolakis, 2010; Krautheim, 2012; Kasahara and Lapham, 2013). In this chapter
firms face idiosyncratic shocks with respect to productivity, entry cost for domestic market
as well as foreign market and demand in domestic as well as foreign market as in Eaton
et al. (2011). We focus on firm’s selection between the domestic and foreign market, and
more importantly we study the impact of trade with pure exporters. Instead, Eaton et al.
(2011) study the pattern of firm entry and sales across foreign markets. In the present
chapter, shocks on productivity and market entry costs as well as demands are jointly
drawn from a common probability distribution. Based on their shocks firms choose to
be pure exporters, non-exporters, ordinary exporters, or non-active. Hardly surprising we
find that: a pure exporter faces lower demand-adjusted foreign entry cost than demand-
adjusted domestic entry cost; and, its productivity allows it to earn profit in the foreign
market, but its productivity is not high enough for it to earn profit in the domestic market.
On the contrary, a non-exporter faces lower demand-adjusted domestic entry cost than
demand-adjusted foreign entry cost and can only earn profit in the domestic market given
its productivity. A ordinary exporter earns profit in both domestic and foreign market
given its productivity, while a non-active firm cannot make profit in any market.
Lower demand-adjusted foreign entry cost than demand-adjusted domestic entry cost
has two possible sources, i.e. relatively low foreign entry cost compared with domestic
entry cost and relatively high foreign demand compared with domestic demand. Taking
China as an example, provinces (and in some cases even cities) compete with provinces
building barriers to protect their firms (Young, 2000). Therefore the domestic market is
quite segmented. As a consequence firms in some markets face relatively high domestic
entry cost. Moreover firms participating in the global production fragmentation can face
relatively low foreign entry costs because of their experiences. Relatively low domes-
tic demand can happen for some firms when they locate in a small or developing country.
Inevitably, there are connections between pure exporters and processing firms, where pro-
cessing firms simply produce final products or intermediaries for foreign firms. However
pure exporters are not necessarily processing firms and processing firms are not neces-
sarily pure exporters. In Defever and Rian˜o (2012) it is found that 51.6% of processing
firms are pure exporters and 37.0% of pure exporters are processing firms. In our model
all firms transform inputs to outputs, so there is no role for processing firms. However,
the model can potentially explain why processing firms become pure exporters because
the logic behind the decision to become a processing firm should be the same as the logic
leading firms to become pure exporters, namely profit maximization. Since firms sell their
production to other multinational firms that may allocate the sales across the world, they
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face low demand-adjusted foreign entry cost, i.e. low foreign entry cost and (or) high
foreign demand.
In Theorem 1 we show that there is a unique equilibrium. In Corollary 1 we observe
that non-exporters, pure exporters and ordinary exporters co-exist in equilibrium. The dis-
tribution of firms determines the portion of pure exporters. Therefore, as the distribution
of firms changes, portion of pure exporters varies as a result. Though we observe a small
portion of pure exporters now, it is very likely that distribution of firms may entitle a large
portion of pure exporters in some countries or in some future time. This chapter studies
the impact of trade given a distribution that generates a large portion of pure exporters.
For any given demand-adjusted domestic entry cost, the productivity of pure exporters
is lower than productivity of non-exporters. In Theorem 2 we show that the average
productivity of exporters can be lower than the average productivity of non-exporters
given a large portion of pure exporters. Exploring the impact of trade on equilibrium we
next study a move from autarky to trade. The move on the one hand pushes firms with
low productivity and high demand-adjusted foreign entry cost out of the market; on the
other hand induces some firms with even lower productivity and low demand-adjusted
foreign entry cost into the market as pure exporters. Therefore given a large portion of
pure exporters the move from autarky to trade can result in lower average productivity as
we show in Theorem 3. However trade is welfare improving as shown in Theorem 4. The
reason is that a greater variety of goods are available with trade than in autarky.
We study the effects of trade liberalization interpreted as changes of the conditional
distribution of foreign entry cost and variable export cost. Similarly we study the ef-
fects of innovation interpreted as a change of the conditional distribution of productivity.
A decrease in foreign entry cost raises the minimum productivity needed to serve both
domestic and foreign market. Therefore among firms with any given combination of
demand-adjusted domestic and foreign entry costs, the least productive firms (pure ex-
porters or non-exporters) are pushed out of the market while the least productive ordinary
exporters become pure exporters or non-exporters. This result is described in Theorem
5. A decrease in variable export cost raises the minimum productivity needed to serve
the domestic market and decreases the minimum productivity needed to serve the foreign
market. Hence some non-exporters are pushed out of the market, some non-active firms
and ordinary exporters become pure exporters as described in Theorem 6. Innovation has
the same effects as an decrease in foreign entry cost as described in Theorem 7. The ef-
fects of trade liberalization and innovation are channelled through labor markets, where
competition for labor becomes more intensive resulting in higher real wage a` la Melitz
(2003).
Lu (2010), Defever and Rian˜o (2012) and Lu et al. (2014) provide different theoreti-
cal explanations for the existence of Chinese pure exporters. In Lu (2010) pure exporters
have a comparative advantage in the foreign market. In Defever and Rian˜o (2012), most
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of Chinese pure exporters are located in the special economic zones and are entitled to
a preferential tax scheme. Therefore in their model, pure exporters sacrifice the domes-
tic market in return for the tax advantage. However, there are still 5.22% of the pure
exporters that fall out of the scheme, as shown in Table 2.2. Moreover, a large portion
of pure exporters exist in a wide range of countries. Our model is not relying on the
tax scheme, and thus can apply to other countries. In Lu (2010) pure exporters have a
comparative advantage in the foreign market. Lu et al. (2014) explain pure exporters as
the exporters with large foreign demand corresponding to large foreign demand shock in
our model. There is a rich literature on productivity of exporters and non-exporters in-
dicating that exporters are more productive than non-exporters. See Bernard and Jensen
(1999), Bernard et al. (2003), De Loecker (2007), Lileeva and Trefler (2010) and Bustos
(2011). However, using Chinese firm-level data, Lu (2010) and Dai et al. (2011) find
that productivity of exporters is lower than productivity of non-exporters while Ma et al.
(2014) find the same pattern in terms of capital labor ratio. These findings are compatible
with our analysis where the average productivity of exporters compared with the average
productivity of non-exporters depends on the portion of pure exporters.
Table 2.2: Composition of pure exporters
percentage of pure exporters among all exporters
PTE FIE Neither All
In a FTZ 52.63 34.67 22.49 36.04
Outside 35.56 27.85 16.85 21.93
ALL 51.62 33.74 20.79 33.58
percentage of firms among pure exporters
PTE FIE Neither All
In a FTZ 35.47 36.95 16.13 88.55
Outside 1.54 4.69 5.22 11.45
ALL 37.01 41.64 21.35 100
This table is derived according to Defever and Rian˜o
(2012), where pure exporter is defined as exporter that
exports more than 90% output abroad. PTE means pro-
cessing trade enterprises, FIE means foreign invested
enterprises and FTZ is free trade zone. From the ta-
ble, 51.6% of processing trade enterprises are pure
exporters and 37.0% of pure exporters are processing
trade enterprises.
A large and established literature has documented that trade forces the least productive
firms exit markets and the overall productivity is increased consequently (e.g. Pavcnik,
2002; Melitz, 2003; Trefler, 2004; Bernard et al., 2011; Melitz and Ottaviano, 2008;
Mayer et al., 2014). The finding is compatible with our model provided the distribution
of shocks results in a small portion of (or no) pure exporters. In addition we find that the
low productive firms with low demand-adjusted foreign entry cost can survive by solely
16
serving the foreign market.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 is the set up of the model.
In section 3 we describe the properties of the equilibrium. In section 4 we explore the
effects of trade liberalization. In section 5 we study the effects of innovation. Section 6 is
the conclusion.
2.2 Set Up
We consider an economy with two identical countries. The two countries have the same
labor and wage. Labor is the only input factor of firms and fixed in both countries. Con-
sumers and firms face domestic and foreign market. Firms pay entry cost whereby they
learn their characteristics. Based on these characteristics they choose to serve the do-
mestic market, foreign market or both markets. Firms have to pay entry costs to enter
domestic and foreign market. There are demand shocks in both markets. At every date
a portion of the firms die but the same amount of new firms successfully enter. There
is a dynamic process of firm entry and exit to keep the distribution of firms stationary.
Therefore profits are zero in the equilibrium.
2.2.1 Commodities
There are labor and a continuum of goods. Let Ω be the set of goods with ω ∈ Ω. The
price of labor (wage) is normalized to one.
2.2.2 Consumers
There is a continuum of identical consumers with mass one in both countries. Every
consumer has one unit of labour, that is supplied inelastically, and a CES utility function:
U((q(ω))ω∈Ω) =
(∫
ω∈Ω
[A(ω)q(ω) ]ρ dω
) 1
ρ
with 0 < ρ < 1. For every good ω all consumers in a country have the same taste shock
A(ω), but consumers in different countries can have different taste shocks. In addition
consumers have shares in firms. However, since there is free entry, average profit of
firms is zero so ownership of firms can be disregarded. The problem of a consumer is to
maximize utility subject to the budget constraint.
Let σ = 1/(1−ρ) so σ > 1 because 0 < ρ < 1. The price index P and the quantity
index Q are defined as follows:
P =
(∫
ω∈Ω
[
p(ω)
A(ω)
]1−σ dω
) 1
1−σ
and Q =
(∫
ω∈Ω
[A(ω)q(ω) ]ρ dω
) 1
ρ
.
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The solution to the consumer problem derives the aggregate demand (q(ω))ω∈Ω:
q(ω) = A(ω)σ−1 Q
(
p(ω)
P
)−σ
. (2.1)
Let r(ω) = p(ω)q(ω) for all ω and R = PQ =
∫
ω∈Ω r(ω)dω .
2.2.3 Firms
Firm ω uses labor to produce good ω . Firms face identical entry cost Fe > 0. If a firm
enters, then its cost parameters and demand shocks are revealed. The cost parameters
and demand shocks are (ϕ,Fd,Fx,Ad,Ax) where: ϕ is the productivity; Fd the domestic
entry cost; Fx the foreign entry cost; Ad demand in the domestic market; and Ax demand
in the foreign market. Therefore a firm is characterized by its productivity, market entry
costs and demands (ϕ,Fd,Fx,Ad,Ax). We assume that the parameters are drawn from a
common probability distribution with density ξ :R5+→R++ and cumulative distribution
Ξ : R5+→ [0,1].
There is a continuum of active firms. Let Ω be the set of active firms with ω ∈Ω.
Production
Every firm has probability δ > 0 of dying at every date. Let fd = δFd and fx = δFx be the
amortized per date market entry costs. In the sequel we use amortized per date market en-
try costs and calculate profit per date rather than market entry costs and expected lifetime
profit. Clearly the density λ : R5+→ R++ on productivity, amortized entry costs and de-
mand shocks is defined by λ (ϕ, fd, fx,Ad,Ax) = ξ (ϕ, fd/δ , fx/δ ,Ad,Ax) with cumulative
distribution Λ(ϕ, fd, fx,Ad,Ax) = Ξ(ϕ, fd/δ , fx/δ ,Ad,Ax).
In order to supply q> 0 units of good ω to the domestic market the firm uses fd+q/ϕ
units of labor. There is a variable export cost τ ≥ 1, so in order to supply q > 0 units of
the good to the export market the firm uses fx+qτ/ϕ units of labor.
There is monopolistic competition in both countries. Therefore for given price and
quantity indices, every firm faces the demand function described in (4.5). A firm supply-
ing the domestic market maximizes its profit on that market:
max
p
pAσ−1d Q
( p
P
)−σ − 1
ϕ
Aσ−1d Q
( p
P
)−σ
The solution is pd(ϕ) = 1/(ρϕ), the total revenue is rd(P,ϕ,Ad) = R(PAdρϕ)σ−1 and
the profit is pid(P,ϕ, fd,Ad) = rd(P,ϕ,Ad)/σ − fd . A firm supplying the foreign market
maximizes its profit on that market:
max
p
pAσ−1x Q
( p
P
)−σ − τ
ϕ
Aσ−1x Q
( p
P
)−σ
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The solution is px(ϕ) = τ/(ρϕ), the total revenue is rx(P,ϕ,Ax) = R(PAxρϕ/τ)σ−1 and
the profit is pix(P,ϕ, fx,Ax) = rx(P,ϕ,Ax)/σ − fx.
Behavior
Firms can be: non-active firms; non-exporters; ordinary exporters; or, pure exporters. For
every combination of market entry cost and demand shocks ( fi,Ai), there is a pair of cut-
off productivities ϕ∗i (P, fi,Ai) with i ∈ {d,x} such that a firm is active in market i if and
only if ϕ ≥ ϕ∗i (P, fi,Ai). The cut-off productivities are determined by pii(P,ϕ∗i , fi,Ai) = 0.
Therefore for Θ= (σ/R)1/(σ−1)/ρ the cut-off productivities are:
ϕ∗d (P, fd,Ad) =
Θ
P
f 1/(σ−1)d
Ad
ϕ∗x (P, fx,Ax) =
τΘ
P
f 1/(σ−1)x
Ax
.
(2.2)
Hence the behavior of a firm (ϕ, fd, fx,Ad,Ax) can be characterized as follows:
Non-active firm: A firm is non-active provided
ϕ < ϕ∗d (P, fd,Ad) and ϕ < ϕ
∗
x (P, fx,Ax).
Non-exporter: A firm is a non-exporter provided
ϕ∗d (P, fd,Ad) < ϕ < ϕ
∗
x (P, fx,Ax).
Ordinary exporter: A firm is an ordinary exporter provided
ϕ > ϕ∗d (P, fd,Ad) and ϕ > ϕ
∗
x (P, fx,Ax).
Pure exporter: A firm is a pure exporter provided
ϕ∗x (P, fx,Ax) < ϕ < ϕ
∗
d (P, fd,Ad).
Equation (2.2) shows that cut-off productivities are linear in demand-adjusted market
entry costs zi = f
1/(σ−1)
i /Ai with i ∈ {d,x}. Fig 2.2 illustrates the different kinds of
behavior in the demand-adjusted market entry costs and productivity space. There are two
hyperplanes of cut-off productivities defined by ϕ = ϕ∗d (P, fd,Ad) and ϕ = ϕ
∗
x (P, fx,Ax)
as in equation (2.2). The two planes divide the space into four parts: non-exporters (NE),
ordinary exporters (OE), pure exporters (PE) and non-active firms (N).
Behavior is illustrated in Fig 2.3 for given demand-adjusted market entry costs: in Fig
2.3.a for given demand-adjusted domestic entry cost; and in Fig 2.3.b for given demand-
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Fig 2.2: Firm behavior based on market entry costs and demand shocks
adjusted foreign entry cost. For given demand-adjusted domestic entry cost, pure ex-
porters are characterized by low productivity and low demand-adjusted foreign entry cost.
Indeed pure exporters have lower productivity than non-exporters. For given demand-
adjusted foreign entry cost, pure exporters are characterized by higher productivity and
demand-adjusted domestic entry cost than non-exporters.
Firm Entry and Exit
At every date a fraction δ of firms die, making the expected profit of entry positive. New
firms enter until the last entrant earns zero profit. Since there is an unlimited amount of
potential entrants, the dead firms are replaced by new firms. Therefore entry and exit do
not affect the distribution of firms.
2.2.4 Stationary Equilibrium
We consider a stationary equilibrium where all aggregate variables are constant over time.
In equilibrium consumers maximize their utilities, firms maximize their profits and mar-
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Fig 2.3: Firm behavior for given demand-adjusted market entry cost
kets clear. Since there is free entry, the expected lifetime profit of firms is equal to the
entry cost. Let Π be the expected profit per date, then the zero profit condition is:
Π
δ
= Fe. (2.3)
2.3 Equilibrium
There is a unique equilibrium in which all aggregate variables are constant over time.
Theorem 1 There is a unique equilibrium.
Proof: Let η = ( fd, fx,Ad,Ax) to ease notation. For price index P and parameters (ϕ,η)
let pi(P,ϕ,η) be the profit per date. Then the expected profit per date is:
Π(P) =
∫
ϕ,η
pi(P,ϕ,η)λ (ϕ,η)d(ϕ,η) =
∫
η
pi(P |η)λ (η)dη (2.4)
where λ (η)=
∫
ϕ λ (ϕ,η)dϕ is the marginal density of η and pi(P |η)=
∫
ϕ pi(P,ϕ,η)λ (ϕ |η)dϕ
is expected profit conditional on η . λ (ϕ |η) = λ (ϕ,η)/λ (η) is the distribution of pro-
ductivity conditional on η . The profit pi(P,ϕ,η) consists of profit from the domestic
market pid(P,ϕ, fd,Ad) and profit from the foreign market pix(P,ϕ, fx,Ax):
pi(P |η) =
∫ ∞
ϕ∗d (P, fd ,Ad)
pid(P,ϕ, fd,Ad)λ (ϕ |η)dϕ+
∫ ∞
ϕ∗x (P, fx,Ax)
pix(P,ϕ, fx,Ax)λ (ϕ |η)dϕ
(2.5)
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Therefore for Φ : R+→ R+ and k : R+→ R+ defined by
Φ(x) =
(
1
1−Λ(x |η)
∫ ∞
x
ϕσ−1λ (ϕ |η)dϕ
) 1
σ−1
(2.6)
k(x) = (1−Λ(x |η))
((
Φ(x)
x
)σ−1
−1
)
(2.7)
where Λ(x |η) is conditional cumulative distribution, the expected profit conditional on η
is
pi(P |η) = fdk(ϕ∗d (P, fd,Ad))+ fxk(ϕ∗x (P, fx,Ax)) (2.8)
Finally we prove that Π(P) is an increasing function of P. From equation (2.6) and
(2.7), k′(x) = (1− σ)∫ ∞x ϕσ−1λ (ϕ |η)dϕ/xσ < 0. According to Equation (2.2), the
derivatives of the cut-off productivities with respect to P are negative, i.e. ∂ϕ∗d (P, fd,Ad)/∂P<
0 and ∂ϕ∗x (P, fx,Ax)/∂P< 0. Hence pi ′(P |η)> 0 soΠ′(P)> 0. Moreover limP→0Π(P)=
0 and limP→∞Π(P) = ∞. Thus there is a unique P such that Equation (2.3) is satisfied. 2
Corollary 1 In equilibrium non-exporters, pure exporters and ordinary exporters co-
exist.
Given the distribution λ (ϕ,η) where η = ( fd, fx,Ad,Ax), the firms which can afford
both demand-adjusted domestic and foreign entry costs will become ordinary exporters.
The firms that can only cover demand-adjusted domestic entry cost will become non-
exporters, while those that are only able to cover demand-adjusted foreign entry cost will
be pure exporters. Pure exporters present due to either relatively lower foreign entry cost
than domestic entry cost and (or) higher foreign demand than domestic demand. Fig 1
has illustrated all the combinations of parameters for different firm behavior.
Clearly all endogenous variables, including the portion of non-exporters, ordinary
exporters and pure exporters are determined in equilibrium (See Appendix A.1 for full
details). The profit earned by incumbents is equal to the entry cost of the entrants, there-
fore the total revenue is equal to the total labor R = L. The total revenue is fixed as the
total labor.
Fig 2.2 shows that some pure exporters have lower productivity than non-exporters.
Whether the average productivity of exporters is higher or lower than the average pro-
ductivity of non-exporters depends on the portion of pure exporters, which is further
determined by the distribution of firms. In Theorem 2 we show by use of an example
that the average productivity of exporters can be lower than the average productivity of
non-exporters.
Theorem 2 Average productivity of exporters consisting of ordinary exporters and pure
exporters can be lower than average productivity of non-exporters.
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Proof: To quantitatively see that the average productivity of exporters can be lower than
non-exporters, we simplify the calculation by using a specific form of the distribution
as an example. Given a distribution λ (ϕ,η) such that 1) marginal density distribution
of productivity ϕ is g(ϕ), 2) demand-adjusted foreign entry cost zx is under distribution
γ(zx) and 3) demand-adjusted domestic entry cost zd is under distribution ψ(zd).
As widely used, productivity distribution is Pareto distribution on (ϕ,∞), with density
distribution g(ϕ) = θϕθϕ−θ−1 and cumulative distribution G(ϕ), where ϕ is assumed
very small and θ > 1. We also assume that distribution ψ(zd) = βZdαz−α−1d with support
on (Zd,∞) and γ(zx) = βZxβ z
−β−1
x with support on (Zx,∞), α > 1 and β > 1. These
distributions tend to give a high portion of pure exporters, thereby more likely giving
lower average productivity of exporters than non-exporters. Then in the equilibrium,
average productivity of exporters and non-exporters are (see Appendix A.2 for proof):
Ψe =
θ
θ −1
θ +β
θ +β −1
Θ
P
τZx
Ψne =
θ +β
θ +β −1
θ +β +α
θ +β +α−1 ·
Θ
P
Zd
Therefore, the ratio between average productivity of exporters and non-exporters is:
Ψe
Ψne
=
θ
θ −1 ·
θ +β +α−1
θ +β +α
· τZx
Zd
.
The ratio is an increasing function with τZx/Zd . And we can see:
Ψe
Ψne
< 1 provided
τZx
Zd
<
1+(β +α)/θ
1+(β +α)/(θ −1) < 1.
The portion of pure exporters is a decreasing function of the ratio Zx/Zd . Therefore
there are distributions such that average productivity of exporters is lower than average
productivity of non-exporters. 2
2.4 Trade Liberalization
2.4.1 From Autarky to Trade
In autarky, all firms are non-exporters by definition, therefore foreign entry cost and for-
eign demand play no role on firms’ profit and cut-off productivity. In order to do compar-
ative study between autarky and trade, we firstly prove a unique equilibrium in autarky
and lower price index with trade than in autarky. To see that, the average profit of firms
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conditional on η in autarky is determined as:
pi(Pa |η) =
∫ ∞
ϕ∗d (Pa, fd ,Ad)
pid(Pa,ϕ, fd,Ad)λ (ϕ |η)dϕ = fdk(ϕ∗d (Pa, fd,Ad))
where Pa is the price level in autarky. The expected profit in autarky Π(Pa) is :
Π(Pa) =
∫
η
fdk(ϕ∗d (Pa, fd,Ad))λ (η)dη (2.9)
Since k′(·) < 0 and ϕ∗d (Pa, fd,Ad) is monotonically decreasing with Pa, Π(Pa) is an in-
creasing function. limPa→0Π(Pa) = 0 and limPa→∞Π(Pa) = ∞. Therefore according to
equilibrium equation (2.3), there is a unique price level Pa.
The expected profit in autarky Π(Pa) in equation (2.9) is less than the expected profit
with trade Π(P) determined by equations (2.4) and (2.5). Since Π(·) is a monotonically
increasing function, we have P < Pa.
Because P < Pa, the cut-off productivity for the domestic market in equation (2.2)
become higher with trade than in autarky. Therefore the plane ϕ∗d (Pa, fd,Ad) is underneath
the plane ϕ∗d (P, fd,Ad) shown as Fig 2.4. From Fig 2.4, we see trade not only forces some
low productive firms with relatively high demand-adjusted foreign entry cost (τzx > zd)
out of the market, as shown in O space, but also induces some less productive firms
with relatively low demand-adjusted foreign entry cost (τzx < zd) into the market as pure
exporters, shown as in PE space. The effect of trade on average productivity can be
positive or negative.
Theorem 3 Moving from autarky to trade can lower average productivity.
Proof: Using the same distributions of productivity and demand-adjusted market entry
costs as in the proof in Theorem 2, the average productivities in autarky and trade are (see
Appendix A.3 for proof):
Ψa =
θ
θ −1 ·
θ +α
θ +α−1 ·
Θ
Pa
·Zd
Ψ=
θ
θ −1 ·
θ +β
θ +β −1 ·
α(θ−1)
θ+β+α−1Zd(
τZx
Zd
)
θ+β
+βτZx
αθ
θ+β+α (
τZx
Zd
)
θ+β
+β
· Θ
P
Therefore the ratio between overall productivity after trade and autarky is:
Ψ
Ψa
=
θ +β
θ +β −1
θ +α−1
θ +α
α(θ−1)
θ+β+α−1(
τZx
Zd
)
θ+β
+β ( τZxZd )
αθ
θ+β+α (
τZx
Zd
)
θ+β
+β
· Pa
P
It is straightforward that
lim
τZx/Zd→0
Ψ
Ψa
= 0
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Fig 2.4: Firm behavior from autarky to trade
As τZx/Zd becomes lower, there are higher portion of pure exporters, leading to lower
overall productivity with trade than in autarky. Because Pa/P is larger than 1, average
productivity after trade can easily be higher than in autarky as the portion of pure exporters
decreases. 2
With trade the competition for labor is more intensive than in autarky. Therefore the
real wage is higher with trade than in autarky. As shown in Fig 2.4, medium productive
firms can afford the new wage and will serve the domestic market solely (NE). High pro-
ductive firms will serve both markets (OE). Low productive firms cannot afford demand-
adjusted domestic entry cost because of the high wage. Hence part of them are pushed
out of the market (O), while rest of them are pushed to become pure-exporters because of
low demand-adjusted foreign entry cost (S). Furthermore, some non-active firms with low
demand-adjusted foreign entry cost are induced into the market as pure-exporters (PE).
The effect of moving from autarky to trade on productivity is ambiguous. The outcome
depends on distribution λ (ϕ,η), which determines the portfolio of firms that are pushed
out of and induced into the market.
Theorem 4 Moving from autarky to trade leads to higher welfare.
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Proof: Welfare, equal to utility, is defined as:
W =
R
PL
=
1
P
Welfare in autarky Wa and with trade W are:
Wa =
1
Pa
and W =
1
P
(2.10)
From the inequality P < Pa, it follows that Wa <W . 2
The effect of trade on the average productivity can be positive or negative, but the
welfare gains from trade is positive. This indicates that the dominant source of trade
gains here is the access to more varieties.
2.4.2 A Decrease in Foreign Entry Cost
Trade liberalization in form of lower foreign entry cost can be interpreted as a change of
the conditional distribution of foreign entry cost. An example is the enlargement of EU
in 2004 that standardized the regulatory environment for a lot of European firms leading
to lower foreign entry cost. Fig 2.5.a illustrates a possible decrease in foreign entry cost.
Fig 2.5: Shift of distributions
In order to analyse the effects of a decrease in foreign entry cost, we assume that
for two distributions of characteristics, the conditional distributions of foreign entry cost
fx of the marginal distributions on (ϕ, fx,Ad,Ax) can be ranked by first-order stochastic
dominance:
Lower Foreign Entry Cost (LFEC) For two distributions of characteristics λ and λ ′, λ
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has lower foreign entry cost than λ ′ provided Λ( fx |ϕ,Ad,Ax) ≥ Λ′( fx |ϕ,Ad,Ax) for all
(ϕ,η).
Suppose that for two distributions of characteristics, the conditional distributions of for-
eign entry cost fx can be ranked by first-order stochastic dominance. Then the conditional
distributions of foreign entry cost of the marginal distributions on (ϕ, fx,Ad,Ax) can be
ranked by first-order stochastic dominance too. Anyway with LFEC, the effects of a de-
crease in foreign entry cost are summarized as in following theorem.
Theorem 5 Suppose LFEC is satisfied. Then lower foreign entry cost pushes some pure
exporters and non-exporters out of the market and some ordinary exporters to become
pure exporters or non-exporters.
Proof: Instead of cut-off productivities ϕ∗i (P, fi,Ai), pii(P,ϕ, fi,Ai) = 0 can alternatively
determine cut-off market entry costs f ∗i (P,ϕ,Ai), i ∈ {d,x}. In particular, f ∗d (P,ϕ,Ad) =
(PAdϕ/Θ)σ−1 and f ∗x (P,ϕ,Ax) = (PAxϕ/(Θτ))
σ−1. Then the firms with market entry
cost lower than the cut-off will serve the markets. The profit in the domestic and foreign
market are pid(P,ϕ, fd,Ad) = f ∗d (P,ϕ,Ad)− fd and pix(P,ϕ, fx,Ax) = f ∗x (P,ϕ,Ax)− fx re-
spectively.
Let λ (ϕ,Ad,Ax)=
∫
fd , fx λ (ϕ,η)d( fd, fx) be the marginal distribution and pi(P |ϕ,Ad,Ax)
conditional profit on (ϕ,Ad,Ax), then the expected profit determined as in equation (2.4)
can be expressed alternatively as
Π(P) =
∫
ϕ,Ad ,Ax
pi(P |ϕ,Ad,Ax)λ (ϕ,Ad,Ax)d(ϕ,Ad,Ax)
Let λ ( fd |ϕ,Ad,Ax) =
∫
fx λ (ϕ,η)d fx/λ (ϕ,Ad,Ax) be the conditional distribution of do-
mestic entry cost on (ϕ,Ad,Ax) and λ ( fx |ϕ,Ad,Ax) =
∫
fd λ (ϕ,η)d fd/λ (ϕ,Ad,Ax) con-
ditional distribution of market entry cost.
pi(P |ϕ,Ad,Ax) =
∫ f ∗d (P,ϕ,Ad)
0
( f ∗d (P,ϕ,Ad)− fd)λ ( fd |ϕ,Ad,Ax)d fd
+
∫ f ∗x (P,ϕ,Ax)
0
( f ∗x (P,ϕ,Ax)− fx)λ ( fx |ϕ,Ad,Ax)d fx
Here a decrease in foreign entry cost will shift conditional distribution λ ( fx |ϕ,Ad,Ax)
while leaving λ ( fd |ϕ,Ad,Ax) and λ (ϕ,Ad,Ax) unchanged. With property LFEC, the
decrease of foreign entry cost will increase the conditional profit pi(P |ϕ,Ad,Ax) (See Ap-
pendix A.4). As a result, Π(P) is higher. We have shown that Π(P) is an monotonically
increasing function. Therefore price level P is decreased, leading to higher cut-off pro-
ductivity for both domestic and foreign market. As shown in Fig 2.6, among firms for any
given combination of demand-adjusted domestic and foreign entry cost, the least produc-
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tive firms (pure exporters or non-exporters) are pushed out of the market, while the least
productive ordinary exporters become pure exporters or non-exporters. 2
A decrease in foreign entry cost across firms raises average profit and intensifies the
competition for labor. Hence real wage is increased. As a result, some low productive
non-exporters and pure exporters are forced out of the market and some ordinary exporters
are pushed out of the non-profitable market. After a decrease in foreign entry cost, average
productivity is increased as some low productive firms are pushed out of the market.
Meanwhile, according to equation (2.10), welfare is improved because price level P is
decreased.
Fig 2.6: A decrease in foreign entry cost
2.4.3 A Decrease in Variable Export Cost
In this part, we study the effects of a decrease in variable export cost. The effects are
summarized in the following theorem.
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Theorem 6 A decrease in variable export cost τ pushes some non-exporters out of the
market or to become ordinary exporters, some non-active firms and ordinary exporters to
become pure exporters.
Proof: As variable export cost τ is decreased, the profit from the foreign market pix(P,ϕ, fx,Ax)
is increased. Therefore conditional profit pi(P |η) in equation (2.5) is increased. It is fol-
lowed that Π(P) is increased. We have shown that Π(P) is an monotonically increasing
function. Hence price index is decreased. This raises cut-off productivity in the domestic
market to pushes some non-exporters out of the market and some ordinary exporters to
become pure exporters.
To see the effect of τ on cut-off productivity of the foreign market, we assume r =
P/τ , equation (2.2) becomes ϕ∗d (P, fd,Ad) = ϕ
∗
d (r, fd,Ad) = Θ/(rτ) · f 1/(σ−1)d /Ad and
ϕ∗x (P, fx,Ax) = ϕ∗x (r, fx,Ax) = Θ/r · f 1/(σ−1)x /Ax. Equilibrium determination (2.3) can be
written as Π(r,τ) = Feδ . Hence we have dr/dτ =−(∂Π(r,τ)/∂τ)/(∂Π(r,τ)/∂ r).
Equation (2.8) becomes a function of r, pi(P |η) = pi(r,τ |η). Therefore, we have
∂pi(r,τ |η)
∂τ
= fdk′(·)
∂ϕ∗d (r, fd,Ad)
∂τ
> 0
∂pi(r,τ |η)
∂ r
= fdk′(·)
∂ϕ∗d (r, fd,Ad)
∂ r
+ fxk′(·)∂ϕ
∗
x (r, fx,Ax)
∂ r
> 0
Hence ∂Π(r,τ)/∂τ > 0 and ∂Π(r,τ)/∂ r > 0. We have dr/dτ < 0. Therefore, the cut-
off productivity of the foreign market is decreased by a decrease in variable export cost,
pushing some non-active firms to be pure exporters and some non-exporters to be ordinary
exporters. 2
A decrease in variable export cost will make firms that serve the foreign market get
more profit, thereby increasing the demand for labor. The real wage will be higher. As
shown in Fig 2.7, the plane of cut-off productivity for the domestic market is shifted up.
Therefore, some low productive non-exporters are pushed out of the market and become
non-active. Low productive ordinary exporters with relative low demand-adjusted foreign
entry cost become pure exporters. However, even though the real wage is higher, the
exporters still benefit from a lower variable export cost. The plane of cut-off productivity
to export becomes lower to induce more firms to export. In particular, the low productive
firms with relative low demand-adjusted foreign entry cost, which are otherwise non-
active, will become pure exporters.
2.5 Innovation
Innovation in form of higher productivity can be interpreted as a change of the conditional
distribution of productivity. An example is the digitalization starting in the 1980s. Fig
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Fig 2.7: A decrease in variable export cost
2.5.b illustrates a possible increase in productivity. In order to analyse the effects of
an increase in productivity, we assume that for two distributions of characteristics, the
conditional distributions of productivity ϕ can ranked by first-order stochastic dominance:
Higher Productivity (HP) For two distributions of characteristics λ and λ ′, λ has higher
productivity than λ ′ provided Λ(ϕ |η)≤ Λ′(ϕ |η) for all (ϕ,η).
With HP, the effects of an innovation can be summarized in the following theorem.
Theorem 7 Suppose HP is satisfied. Then innovation pushes some pure exporters and
non-exporters out of the market and some ordinary exporters to become pure exporters or
non-exporters.
Proof: Rearrange equation (2.7) to get:
k(x) =
∫ ∞
x
((ϕ
x
)σ−1
−1
)
λ (ϕ |η)dϕ
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With property HP innovation will increase k(x) (See Appendix A.5), i.e. k(ϕ∗d (P, fd,Ad))
and k(ϕ∗x (P, fx,Ax)) become higher. According to equation (2.8), pi(P,ϕ |η) becomes
higher, so does the expected profit Π(P). Therefore, price level is decreased, leading to
the same effects as a decrease of foreign entry cost in Theorem 5. 2
Innovation will increase the average productivity of incumbents and increase the av-
erage profit, thereby intensifying the competition for labor. Real wage is increased. Some
low productive pure exporters and non-exporters will be forced out of the market, while
some low productive ordinary exporters will become pure exporters or non-exporters. The
effects of innovation are channelled through active firms. The distribution of non-active
firms, i.e. firms with productivity lower than ϕ∗d (P, fd,Ad) and ϕ
∗
x (P, fx,Ax), makes no
difference to the results.
2.6 Conclusion
In the present chapter we have studied what pushes firms to become pure exporters, or-
dinary exporters and non-exporters as well how trade liberalization and innovation push
firms to change the markets they serve (Theorems 5, 6 and 7). Two important finding
were that given a large portion of pure exporters, the average productivity of exporters
consisting of pure exporters and ordinary exporters can be lower than productivity of
non-exporters (Theorem 2) and that moving from autarky to trade can lower average pro-
ductivity (Theorem 3). Despite the ambiguous effect of moving from autarky to trade on
productivity, such a move leads to higher welfare because the variety of goods goes up
(Theorem 4).
In the chapter there are no processing firms producing inputs or goods for other firms
and there is monopolistic competition between firms. In order to enrich our understanding
of pure exporters or exporters with high export intensity, it would be interesting to allow
firms to become processing plants for other firms, thereby lowering their market entry
cost in possibly more competitive markets.
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Chapter 3
Multi-product Firms, Pure Exported
Products and Extensive Margin of
Export
The present chapter develops a general equilibrium model of heterogeneous multi-product
firms in international trade. The model allows for heterogeneity in productivity and fixed
export cost across products within a firm. Firms endogenously choose the number of
products sold domestically and exported. High productive firms can manage more prod-
ucts in foreign market than in domestic market due to pure exported products. Exposure to
trade induces reallocation across firms and within firms: least productive firms exit; least
productive products are dropped from domestic market, but high productive firms switch
some (or all) of them to pure exported products; the most productive firms introduce new
products as pure exported products. This chapter also explores the effects of trade lib-
eralization. In particular, more firms manage pure exported products and low productive
firms reduce the number of products but high productive firms manage more products.
3.1 Introduction
Multi-product firms are of growing interest of both empirical and theoretical research in
international trade. Existing theoretical literature concludes that a portion of firms export a
subset of their products (e.g. Bernard et. al., 2011). This implies that the extensive margin
(number of products) of export is lower than the extensive margin of domestic market. In
fact, there are exporters which export the full set of their products and there are also
exporters which manage more products in foreign market than in domestic market. On
the other hand, in current literature assumption that products within a firm only differ in
productivity ignores the ‘learning-by-exporting’ effect. Indeed firms benefit from existing
exported products to export a new product. This chapter develops a general equilibrium
33
model of multi-product firms, which allows for heterogeneity in productivity and fixed
export cost across products within a firm. The chapter takes into account ‘learning-by-
exporting’ effect by assuming a continually decreased fixed export cost across exported
products. We find that high productive firms export, while low productive firms serve
domestic market only. Across exporters, low productive firms export a subset of their
domestic products while high productive firms export all their domestic products and
introduce new products as pure exported products. The extensive margin of export is
higher than of the margin domestic market for high productive exporters.
This chapter examines the reallocation across firms and within firms from autarky to
trade. Exposure to trade forces the least productive firms out of the market, and induces
high productive firms to export. All firms drop the least productive products from domes-
tic market under trade. Across exporters, low productive exporters export a subset of the
left products. Medium productive exporters export all left products and export the dropped
products as pure exported products. All these firms manage less products after exposure
to trade. However, high productive exporters export all left products and dropped prod-
ucts and introduce new products as pure exported products. High productive exporters
manage more products from autarky to trade. In general, international trade decreases
the number of products managed by low productive firms but increases the number of
products managed by high productive firms.
This chapter explores the impacts of trade liberalization in terms of decreasing fixed
and variable export cost on the number of products produced and exported. Decreasing
fixed and variable export cost have the same effects. Least productive firms are forced out
of the market while more firms are induced to export. More firms manage pure exported
products, which means more firms have higher extensive margin of export than the margin
of domestic market. For low productive firms trade liberalization decreases the number
of products managed while for high productive firms it increases the number of products.
This chapter contributes to the theoretical studies on multi-product firms in interna-
tional trade. We introduce heterogeneity of products within a firm and firms are differen-
tiated by productivity. Baldwin and Gu (2009) develop a multiproduct model to analyse
the impacts of trade on firm diversification, but their model assumes that firms are homo-
geneous and products are identical within a firm. Alternatively, Feenstra and Ma (2007)
and Nocke and Yeaple (2006, 2008) develop models with heterogeneous firms, but their
models assume the products within a firm are homogeneous. This is not consistent with
the empirical findings about the prevalence of product churning within firms (e.g. Gold-
berg et. al., 2008; Bernard et. al., 2010; Iacovone and Javorcik, 2010). This assumption
ignores the novelty of multi-product firms that they can reallocate resources across prod-
ucts within firms. To acknowledge the heterogeneity of products within a firm, Eckel and
Neary (2010) build a model, where the products are differentiated by productivity. The
product that use the core competence of the firm has the highest productivity, the products
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that are further away have lower productivity 1. However their framework assumes that
the firms are homogeneous2.
In terms of simultaneous heterogeneity of firms and products within a firm, Arkolakis
and Muendler (2010), Bernard et. al. (2006,2011) and Mayer et. al. (2014) are close
to ours. However, Arkolakis and Muendler (2010) focus on the partial equilibrium with
export market without considering the domestic market. In Bernard et. al.(2011), prod-
ucts are assumed stochastic and continuous in ‘expertise’, while in Mayer et. al. (2014)
products are ranked by the productivity. In these two papers, exporters export a subset
of products. To include the pure exported products, we also introduce a heterogeneity of
fixed export cost in addition to productivity across products within a firm. We show that
high productive exporters export all their products and even export more products than in
domestic market due to pure exported products.
The present chapter shows a positive relationship between intensive margin (output
per product) and extensive margin (number of products) of export, which is also shown in
other studies (Arkolakis and Muendler (2010), Bernard et. al. (2006,2011) and Mayer et.
al. (2014)). However, this relationship is negative in Feenstra and Ma (2007), Nocke and
Yeaple (2006, 2008) and Eckel and Neary (2010). In Feenstra and Ma (2007), adding a
product decreases the aggregate price level and decreases the demand of other products;
while in Eckel and Neary (2010), there are cannibalization effects to add a new product.
In the setting of Nocke and Yeaple (2006, 2008), the more products a firm manages,
marginal cost is higher for all the products and consequently output is smaller.
This chapter is also related to chapter 2 on pure exporters. In chapter 2, we introduce
heterogeneity in productivity, entry cost and demand in both domestic and foreign market
to show how firms choose to be pure exporters. A pure exporter faces lower demand-
adjusted foreign entry cost than demand-adjusted domestic entry cost, and its productivity
allows it to earn profit in the foreign market, but its productivity is not high enough for it
to earn profit in the domestic market. In this chapter, we apply this finding into products
within a firm. There are two dimensions of heterogeneity across products within a firm:
productivity and fixed export cost. If firms can decrease the fixed export cost, some
products will have the combination of low productivity and low fixed export cost (lower
than domestic fixed cost). These products cannot earn profit in domestic market. However
they can realize positive profit in foreign market and become pure exported products.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 is the set up of the model.
In section 3 we describes equilibrium of closed economy. In section 4 we study the open
economy. In section 5 we discuss the impact of trade liberalization. Section 6 is the
1Eckel et. al. (2015) considers a multiproduct firms that products within a firm may differ in quality.
Higher quality need higher cost produce, therefore the core competence means biggest marginal cost and
lowest productivity.
2They also assume that there is no free entry of firm. Though they can relax both assumptions, they do
not give an equilibrium with both assumptions relaxed.
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concluding remarks.
3.2 The Model
In our model, a firm randomly draws a marginal cost (in terms of productivity) when en-
tering the market and then select to exit, manage one product or multi products. Products
within firms are heterogeneous in terms of marginal cost and fixed export cost. Free entry
and exit drives overall profit to zero.
3.2.1 Consumers
There are a continuum of products which are normalized to the interval [0,1].For each
product, there is a continuum of firms produce differentiated varieties of the product. The
utility form is:
U =
(∫ 1
0
∫
ωεΩ
q(ω)ρdωdi
) 1
ρ
where i indexes products, ω indexes varieties and Ω is the set of varieties. The elasticity
of substitution between any two varieties is denoted by σ = 1/(1−ρ), and σ > 1 since
0 < ρ < 1. Wage is normalized to one. Consumers maximize utility under limited budget.
The aggregate quantity index and price index are denoted as:
Q =
(∫ 1
0
∫
ωεΩ
q(ω)
σ−1
σ dωdi
) σ
σ−1
P =
(∫ 1
0
∫
ωεΩ
p(ω)1−σdωdi
) 1
1−σ
The demand is denoted as:
q(ω) = Q
(
p(ω)
P
)−σ
(3.1)
The total expenditure R is determined by R = PQ =
∫ 1
0
∫
ωεΩ q(ω)p(ω)dωdi.
3.2.2 Firms
The dynamics of firm entry and exit follows Melitz (2003). Prior to entry, firms are
identical. A firm pays an entry cost fe to enter the market and draws productivity ϕ from
a common cumulative distribution G(ϕ) for the production of the first product. If the
firm cannot get profit from this first product, it exits the market; otherwise the firm stays
in the market and tries to add the second product. The firm will not produce the second
product if it cannot generate profit; otherwise the firm produces the second product and
tries to add the third product. Every firm proceeds this product ladder until it cannot get
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profit from adding a new product. I assume that the first product uses the firm’s core
competence, so the first product has the highest productivity. The second product has a
lower productivity. The further way the added product is from the core product, the lower
productivity it has. For each product, firms pay identical fixed cost f to sell. Labor is the
only input factor.
Product Ladder
In closed economy, the fixed cost to sell in domestic market is denoted as fd . The output
of the first product is denoted as:
l1(ϕ) = fd +q/ϕ
where l1 is labor used for the first product. With demand from equation (4.5), in order to
maximize the profit the price of first product is:
p1(ϕ) =
1
ρϕ
The revenue and the profit for the first product are denoted as:
r1(ϕ) =
R
(ρP)1−σ
ϕσ−1 pi1(ϕ) =
r(ϕ)
σ
− fd
Above equation shows that the ratio of revenue for any two varieties is solely determined
by their relative productivity:
r(ϕ)
r(ϕ ′)
=
(
ϕ
ϕ ′
)σ−1
If pi1(ϕ)< 0, the firm exits from the market immediately; otherwise firm is active and
tries to add the second product with lower productivity ϕ2. The output of second product
is determined as l2(ϕ) = fd +q/ϕ2. The price of second product is p2(ϕ) = 1ρϕ2 . So the
profit of second product is denoted as:
pi2(ϕ) =
r(ϕ2)
σ
− fd = ϕ2
σ−1
ϕσ−1
r1(ϕ)
σ
− fd
If pi(ϕ2) < 0, firm will not produce the second product; otherwise firm produces the
second product and tries to add the third product with productivity ϕ3. Firm proceeds this
product ladder until it cannot get profit for the added product. To simplify the situation,
we assume that the ratio of productivity for two neighbour products is fixed as α , :
α =
ϕi+1
ϕi
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where α < 1. The profit for the i− th product is determined as:
pii(ϕ) =
r(ϕi)
σ
− fd = β i−1 r1(ϕ)σ − fd
where β = ασ−1. The profit is decreasing as the number increases. The higher productiv-
ity first drawn is, the more products can the firm manage. The number of products Nd(ϕ)
is determined as:
Nd(ϕ) =
{
0 if pi1(ϕ)< 0
max{i|pii(ϕ)≥ 0 and pii+1(ϕ)< 0} if pi1(ϕ)≥ 0
(3.2)
The cut-off productivity ϕ∗ is determined by pi1(ϕ) = 0 (So ϕ∗ also can be denoted as
ϕ∗1 , hereafter ϕ
∗ = ϕ∗1 ). If the firm draws a productivity lower than ϕ
∗, they immediately
exit. The cut-off productivity for i− products firm ϕ∗i is determined by pii(ϕ) = 0. As we
know pi1(ϕ∗) = 0, so r1(ϕ∗) = σ fd . pii(ϕ∗i ) = 0, so r1(ϕ∗i ) =
σ fd
β i−1 . So the relationship
between cut-off productivity for i− products (i ≥ 2) firms and cut-off productivity is
denoted as:
ϕ∗i
ϕ∗
=
(
1
β i−1
) 1
σ−1
= α1−i (3.3)
Fig 3.1 gives an example of the product ladder and how the number of products is
determined. If a firm draws a productivity ϕ0 between ϕ∗5 and ϕ
∗
6 , it will produce 5
products. The firm produces the first product with productivity ϕ0 and produces the fifth
product with productivity β 4ϕ0.
Aggregate Output and Profit
Firms choose the number of products based on the productivity. The total output of the
firm with the productivity ϕ can be denoted as:
l(ϕ) =
i
∑
j=1
( fd +
q j
ϕ j
) = i fd +
(∑ij=1 q
σ−1
σ
j )
σ
σ−1
(∑ij=1β j−1)
1
σ−1ϕ
ϕ ∈ [ϕ∗i ,ϕ∗i+1)
If the output of the first product is assumed as q, (∑ij=1 q
σ−1
σ
j )
σ
σ−1
= (∑ij=1β j−1)
σ
σ−1 q.
So the firm with the productivity ϕ managing i products can be represented by the firm
with ‘representative productivity’ ϕ˜(ϕ) = (∑ij=1β j−1)
1
σ−1ϕ producing a single product
with i times of fixed domestic cost fd .
The total profit by a firm with the productivity ϕ ∈ [ϕ∗i ,ϕ∗i+1) is denoted as pi(ϕ˜) =
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Fig 3.1: The number of products and product ladder
r(ϕ˜)
σ − i fd = ( ϕ˜ϕ∗ )σ−1 r(ϕ
∗)
σ − i fd . So the total profit by a firm is determined by:
pi(ϕ) =
{
0 if ϕ < ϕ∗(
∑ij=1β j−1k(ϕ)− i
)
fd if ϕ ∈ [ϕ∗i ,ϕ∗i+1)
(3.4)
where k(ϕ) = (ϕ/ϕ∗)σ−1.
Free entry
We assume that there is a probability δ that active firms are forced out of the market due
to external shocks. The average profit conditional on successful entry is denoted as pi , so
pi =
1
1−G(ϕ∗)
∞
∑
i=1
∫ ϕ∗i+1
ϕ∗i
pi(ϕ)g(ϕ)dϕ (3.5)
The expected value of entry ve is determined as:
ve =
1−G(ϕ∗)
δ
pi (3.6)
where G(∗) is the cumulative function of g(ϕ) and 1−G(ϕ∗) is the ex ante probability of
successful entry. Under free entry, the expected value of entry equals the entry cost, such
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that profit is zero.
ve = fe (3.7)
3.3 Closed Economy Equilibrium
Equilibrium of closed economy is solely described as the set {ϕ∗,ϕ∗i }. ϕ∗i is functions of
ϕ∗ and all other variables are functions of the vector of these elements. With equations
(3.4), (3.5), (3.6) and (3.7), we can determine the equilibrium.
Theorem 8 There exists a unique equilibrium.
Proof: : see Appendix B.1. 
The average revenue r is determined as:
r =
fd/σ
1−G(ϕ∗)
∞
∑
i=1
∫ ϕ∗i+1
ϕ∗i
i
∑
j=1
β j−1k(ϕ)g(ϕ)dϕ
So the number of incumbent firms M is determined by M = R/r = L/r, where L is the
total labor in the market. If we assume the number of entrants is Me, in equilibrium, the
number of firms exit equals the number of successful entrants as δM = (1−G(ϕ∗))Me.
The labor used by the incumbent firms is assumed as Lp and labor used by the entrants as
Le.
Le = Me fe =
δM
1−G(ϕ∗) fe = Mpi =Π
Therefore labor market clears because L = R = Lp+Le = Lp+Π.
3.4 The Open Economy
In this section, I explore the multi-products firms in open economy within a framework of
two symmetric countries. As literature has assumed, there is a fixed cost and an iceberg
variable cost to export. The variable export cost τ is assumed to be identical across firms
and products, where τ > 1 units are shipped but only one unit arrives at destination. Fixed
export cost fx for the first product is assumed to be identical across firms. However, within
a firm fixed export cost is heterogeneous across products. This is due to the fact that firms
can learn from export or simply share export distribution channel to decrease the fixed
export cost of added products.
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3.4.1 Product Ladder for Export
With the demand equation (4.5) in order to maximise the export profit, firms set the price
of the first product for export as:
p1,x(ϕ) = τ p1,d(ϕ) =
τ
ρϕ
where subscript x denotes ’export’ and d denotes ’domestic’. Firms export from the core
product to fringe product. If pi1,x(ϕ)< 0, firms will not export; otherwise firms will export
the first product and try to export the second product. Firms proceed the product ladder
until they cannot get extra profit from exporting the new product. Fixed export cost of
added product is decreasing due to. I assume fixed export cost for i− th product is:
fi,x =
{
fx if i = 1
(β i−1+ γ) fx if i≥ 2
(3.8)
where β + γ < 1. The boundary of fixed export cost is γ fx. The profit from export of the
i− th product is:
pii,x(ϕ) =

r1,x(ϕ)
σ
− fx if i = 1
ri,x(α i−1ϕ)
σ
−β i−1 fx− γ fx = β i−1pi1,x(ϕ)− γ fx if i≥ 2
If pii,x(ϕ) ≥ 0, the i− th product is exported. The number of products exported is deter-
mined as:
Nx(ϕ) =
{
0 if pi1,x(ϕ)< 0
max
{
i|pii,x(ϕ)≥ 0andpii+1,x(ϕ)< 0
}
if pi1,x(ϕ)≥ 0
(3.9)
The cut-off productivity for export is assumed as ϕ∗x (also can be denoted as ϕ∗1,x, hereafter
ϕ∗1,x = ϕ
∗
x ), and the cut-off productivity for exporting i product is assumed as ϕ∗i,x. ϕ∗x is
determined by:
pi1,x(ϕ∗x ) =
r1,x(ϕ∗x )
σ
− fx = τ1−σ r1,d(ϕ
∗
x )
σ
− fx = 0
The cut-off productivity for domestic is still determined by r1,d(ϕ
∗)
σ − fd = 0. So the rela-
tionship between the cut-off productivity for domestic market and export is denoted as:
ϕ∗x
ϕ∗
= τ
(
fx
fd
) 1
σ−1
(3.10)
We assume fx > τ1−σ fd as Melitz (2003) to assure that ϕ∗x > ϕ∗. There must be a
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cut-off productivity for domestic market ϕ∗λ to allow ϕ
∗
x ∈ [ϕ∗λ ,ϕ∗λ+1).
λ = int
(
1+
ln(τ1−σ fd/ fx)
lnβ
)
The firms that draw productivity lower than ϕ∗x do not export and can produce λ products
at most. ϕ∗i,x (i≥ 2) is determined by:
pii,x(ϕ∗i,x) = β
i−1pi1,x(ϕ∗i,x)− γ fx = β i−1τ1−σ
r1,d(ϕ∗i,x)
σ
−β i−1 fx− γ fx = 0
The relationship between cut-off productivity for export i− products (i ≥ 2) firms and
cut-off productivity for export is denoted as:
ϕ∗i,x
ϕ∗x
=
(
γ+β i−1
β i−1
) 1
σ−1
(3.11)
Pure Exported Products
Firms can export added product with a lower fixed export cost than existing products. If a
firm first draws a high productivity and manges a big number of products, the fixed export
cost of some products may even lower than fixed cost to sell in domestic market. For
these products, firm cannot get profit from domestic market but can get profit in foreign
market. From equations (3.3), (3.10) and (3.11), we can get:
ϕ∗i,x
ϕ∗i
= (γ+β i−1)
1
σ−1 τ
(
fx
fd
) 1
σ−1
(3.12)
There exists the number θ , such that ϕ∗θ ,x ≥ ϕ∗θ and ϕ∗θ+1,x < ϕ∗θ+1:
θ = int
(
1+
ln(τ1−σ fd/ fx− γ)
lnβ
)
If firms first draw productivity higher than ϕ∗θ , the number of exported products is
no less than number of products sold in domestic market (Nx ≥ Nd), otherwise Nx ≤ Nd .
There are firms that export all their products (Nx = Nd), which need the conditions:
ϕ∗ξ < ϕ
∗
ξ ,x < ϕ
∗
ξ+1 if ξ < θ
or ϕ∗ζ ,x < ϕ
∗
ζ < ϕ
∗
ζ+1,x if ζ ≥ θ
The firms which draw productivity between ϕ∗ξ ,x and ϕ
∗
ξ+1 or between ϕ
∗
ζ and ϕ
∗
ζ+1,x
export all their products as Nx = Nd . With equation (3.12), we can get θ1 ≤ ξ < θ and
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θ ≤ ζ ≤ θ2, where:
θ1 = int
(
1+
ln(τ1−σ fd/ fx− γβ )
lnβ
)
θ2 = int
(
1+
ln(τ1−σ fd/ fx− γ/β )
lnβ
)
We assume γ/β < τ1−σ fd/ fx to assure θ , θ1 and θ2 all exist.
The firms which draw productivity lower than ϕ∗ exit. The firms which draw produc-
tivity between ϕ∗ and ϕ∗x only serve the domestic market and can produce λ products at
most. The firms draw a productivity higher ϕ∗x export. Across exporters, low productive
exporters export only a subset of their products while high productive exporters man-
age pure exported products, thereby managing more products in export than in domestic
market. Fig 3.2 gives how the number of products produced and exported are determined.
Aggregate Profit
A firm that draws productivity ϕ ∈ [ϕ∗i,x,ϕ∗i+1,x) can export i products. The total profit by
a firm from export is determined as:
pix(ϕ) =
{
0 if ϕ < ϕ∗x(
∑ij=1β j−1kx(ϕ)− (i−1)γ
)
fx if ϕ ∈ [ϕ∗i,x,ϕ∗i+1,x)
(3.13)
where kx(ϕ) = (ϕ/ϕ∗x )
σ−1−1. The average profit for export is denoted as:
pix =
1
1−G(ϕ∗x )
∞
∑
i=1
∫ ϕ∗i+1,x
ϕ∗i,x
pix(ϕ)g(ϕ)dϕ (3.14)
If the average profit from domestic market is denoted as pid , which is determined by
equation (3.4)and (3.5), the combined average profit from domestic market and export is
determined as:
pi = pid + pxpix (3.15)
where px =
1−G(ϕ∗x )
1−G(ϕ∗) is ex-post probability that active firms export, and it is also the frac-
tion of export firms out of all active firms.
3.4.2 Equilibrium
In open economy, equilibrium is solely described as the set {ϕ∗,ϕ∗i ,ϕ∗x ,ϕ∗i,x,}. ϕ∗i is
functions of ϕ∗ and ϕ∗i,x is functions of ϕ∗x . All other variables are functions of the vector
of these elements. With equations (3.6), (3.7), (3.13), (3.14) and (3.15), we can determine
the equilibrium.
Theorem 9 There exists a unique equilibrium in open economy.
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Fig 3.2: The number of products exported and product ladder
Proof: : See Appendix B.2. 
The average revenue r is determined as:
r =
fd/σ
1−G(ϕ∗)
∞
∑
i=1
∫ ϕ∗i+1
ϕ∗i
i
∑
j=1
β j−1k(ϕ)g(ϕ)dϕ
+
fx/σ
1−G(ϕ∗)
∞
∑
i=1
∫ ϕ∗i+1,x
ϕ∗i,x
i
∑
j=1
β j−1 (kx(ϕ)+1)g(ϕ)dϕ
So the number of incumbent firms M is determined by M = R/r = L/r. The number
of export firms is Mx = pxM. In equilibrium, the number of firms that exit the market
equals the number of successful entrants. δM = (1−G(ϕ∗))Me. Labor market clears as
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L = R = Lp+Le = Lp+Π.
Theorem 10 There is a positive relationship between intensive and extensive margins of
export.
This argument follows Bernard et. al. (2011). The more productive firms are larger
exporters, not only because they can produce more in a given product but also because
they can expand along extensive margin to export more products.
3.5 Trade Liberalization
3.5.1 From Autarky to Trade
Exposure to trade drives up cut-off the productivity (see Appendix B.3 for proof), thereby
leading to: least productive firms exit from the market; low productive firms serve do-
mestic market only, they drop least productive products and manage less products; high
productive firms become exporters. However the effects are heterogeneous across ex-
porters, which are stated in the following theorem.
Theorem 11 Under trade, low productive exporters export a subset of products, high
productive exporters manage pure exported products.
Low productive exporters export a subset of the left products and manage less prod-
ucts. Medium productive exporters export all left products and switch products that are
dropped from domestic market to pure exported products. High productive exporters ex-
port all left products, switch all domestic-dropped products to pure exported products, and
introduce new products as pure exported products. Therefore, under trade, low productive
firms manage less products while high productive firms manage more products.
To simply and clearly show the effect from auturky to trade, we draw Fig 3.3 to depict
all the above arguments. The curves Nd , N′d and Nx denote the number of products sold
in domestic market in autarky, the number of products sold in domestic market after trade
and the number of products exported after trade. The interaction circles denote the over-
lapping area as shown in Fig 3.2 between ϕ∗θ1,x and ϕ
∗
θ2+1,x. The bold black curve depicts
the number of products managed in autarky. The bold red curve depicts the number of
products under trade.
Exposure to trade gives an extra profit opportunity for high productive firms and in-
creases the competition of labor market. The real wage rate is pushed up to force least
productive firms out of market (A area). The higher real wage rate also force the least
productive products exit from domestic market, shown as Nd > N′d .. So low productive
firms (B area) cannot afford the fixed export cost and serve domestic market only. All
firms with productivity higher than ϕ∗x become exporters. Low productive exporters (C
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Fig 3.3: The extensive margins of firms
area) drop least productive products from domestic market and export a subset of left
products, shown as Nd > N′d > Nx. Middle productive exporters (D area) drop the least
productive products from domestic but some of these domestic-dropped products are ex-
ported. These middle productive exporters manage pure exported products and have a
higher extensive margin of export than of domestic market, shown as Nd > Nx > N′d . This
is because that after trade firms can decrease the fixed export cost for added products. The
fringe products of these middle productive exporters have a lower fixed export cost than
fixed cost to sell in domestic market. High productive exporters (E area) drop least pro-
ductive products from domestic market, but all of these domestic-dropped products are
exported. These exporters even introduce new products as pure exported products, shown
as Nx > Nd > N′d . High productive exporters can manage more products and can have
a lower fixed export cost for the added fringe products. These products can not be sold
in domestic market but only be exported. After trade, high productive exporters manage
more products while other low productive firms manage less products, as shown by the
bold black and red curves.
3.5.2 Decrease in Export Cost
In this subsection, we try to study the impact of trade liberalization on extensive margin
of export and of domestic market. Two channels of trade liberalization are investigated:
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decrease in variable export cost τ and decrease in fixed export cost fx. Both channels have
similar effects on extensive margin of export.
Decease in fixed or variable export cost drives up cut-off productivity for domes-
tic market and reduces the cut-off productivity for export (see Appendix B.4 for proof).
Therefore least productive firms exit and least productive products are dropped from do-
mestic market. Meanwhile, trade liberalization induces firms to export more products.
As a result, some products that are dropped in domestic market become pure exported
products. Moreover, if the firms have high productivity, they can introduce new exported
products. This leads to the following theorem.
Theorem 12 Trade liberalization makes more exporters manage pure exported products
and increase the extensive margin of exporters.
Because the least productive products are dropped from the domestic market, the low
productive firms that solely serve domestic market will manage less products. However,
because the high productive firms can introduce new pure exported products, they manage
more products. This leads to the following theorem.
Theorem 13 Trade liberalization makes low productive firms manage less products and
high productive firms manage more products.
I use prime to denote the variables after decrease in fixed or variable export cost.
Fig 3.4 depicts how the number of products in the equilibrium changes. Nd denotes the
number of products exported and Nx denotes the number of products sold in domestic
market. The black and red bold curves are the number of managed products.
Due to opportunity for more profit from foreign market, the increased competition for
labor drives up the real wage rate. The cut-off productivity for domestic market goes up
from ϕ∗ to ϕ ′∗, forcing firms with productivity between ϕ∗ and ϕ ′∗ out of market. The
higher real wage rate make firms sell less in domestic market and force firms drop the
least productive products from domestic market (curve N′d is below Nd ). For exporters,
even though real wage rate is higher, they can still benefit from decreased fixed or variable
export cost. The cut-off productivity for export is lower, inducing more firms into export.
Exporters export more of a given product and export more products (curve N′x is above Nx
).
Before trade liberalization, the exporters with productivity higher than ϕ manage pure
exported products (Nx > Nd). After trade liberalization, the lower productive exporters
with productivity between ϕ ′ and ϕ can manage pure exported products. Similar to the
effect from autarky to trade, some of domestic-dropped products are switched to pure
exported products for firms with productivity from ϕ ′ to ϕ . All firms with productivity
lower than ϕ manage less products due to trade liberalization. For the exporters with pro-
ductivity higher than ϕ , they switch all the domestic-dropped products to pure exported
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Fig 3.4: Decrease in trade cost
products, and introduce new pure exported products. These firms manage more products
after trade liberalization. This argument is quite different from the previous literatures,
which is derived from the assumption of decreasing fixed export cost for added products.
3.6 Conclusion
Multi-product firms are getting more and more attention in international trade. This chap-
ter builds a general equilibrium model to allow for heterogeneity in productivity and fixed
export cost. The model takes account ‘learning-by-exporting’ effect with the decreasing
fixed export cost across products. Firms add a new product with a lower productivity and
export a new product with a lower fixed export cost. The model captures pure exported
products, managed by high productive exporters which has great potential to expand the
product ladder and decrease fixed export cost. The pure exported products are relevant es-
pecially in developing countries but not explained theoretically in trade under framework
of multi-product firms.
The model provides some interesting and even surprising results. Transition from
autarky to trade makes low productive exporters export a subset of products and high
productive exporters manage pure exported products. Trade liberalization makes more
exporters manage pure exported products and increase the extensive margin of exporters.
Moreover trade liberalization makes low productive firms manage less products and high
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productive firms manage more products.
Our framework where firms endogenously decide the number of products produced
and exported is highly tractable. One further extension might be to introduce multiple
countries with different fixed export cost, which would add another export margin for
firms to adjust under exposure to trade and trade liberalization. Another extension might
be to introduce a increasing productivity across products to include ‘quality ladder’ within
firms. Multi-product firms climb quality ladder from low productive product to high pro-
ductive product, which would be a novelty in research of trade.
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Chapter 4
Export Quality, Price and Income
Distribution
This chapter develops a general equilibrium model with non-homothetic preference over
product quality. The model delivers a one to one relationship between income of con-
sumers and quality they buy. This income-quality relationship is subject to income distri-
bution. The chapter further studies how qualities are specialized between the poor country
and the rich country in international trade, and finds a quality specialization pattern that
follows the home market effect. In particular, the low (high) qualities are completely spe-
cialized in the poor (rich) country, while medium qualities are incompletely specialized,
i.e. produced by both countries and exported to each other. Furthermore, the model shows
that export price distribution is related to destination income distribution, and provides the
empirical evidence.
4.1 Introduction
Literature has associated quality differentiation, mostly inferred with price variation, across
countries of exporters and importers to the income per capita (e.g. Schott, 2004; Hallak,
2006; Verhoogen, 2008; Bastos and Silva, 2010; Manova and Zhang, 2012). This sug-
gests the demand-side factor is non-trivial in shaping the trade pattern on quality. Un-
fortunately, relatively little is known on the quality specialization between countries (e.g.
Made in China vs Made in Germany) driven by demand. This chapter applies the income
distribution to shed light on quality differentiation within a country and quality specializa-
tion between countries, on which to use income per capita for each country is silent. We
find a one to one relationship between income of consumers and quality they buy that is
subject to income distribution. Moreover we find a quality specialization pattern between
countries that follows the home market effect.
This paper develops a general equilibrium model with non-homothetic preference over
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product quality. The model incorporates both horizontal differentiation and vertical dif-
ferentiation by quality. Within each quality, there is a continuum of horizontally differen-
tiated varieties, which are consumed as a composite. A consumer chooses one quality and
consumes one unit of the composite. Therefore, rich consumers buy high quality. Given
a continuum of qualities, the model gives a one to one relationship between income of
consumers and the quality they buy. Another interesting property of this income-quality
relationship is that it is subject to income distribution. Given a different distribution,
the number of consumers that choose a quality is different, leading to different number
of firms producing this quality. Consequently, the reprieved price of composite of this
quality is different. Therefore consumers will adjust the quality they buy. Our income-
quality relationship on the one hand departures from the one in Fajgelbaum et al. (2011),
i.e. consumers with higher income have higher probability to buy higher quality; on the
other hand is different from the one in Choi et al. (2009), which is not subject to income
distribution.
Firms are under monopolistic competition. There is fixed cost to produce. The firms
producing the varieties of the same quality share identical marginal cost and set identical
prices. In the open economy, every firm incurs variable cost to export. However, we
do not assume fixed export cost, as we are not aiming to explain the selection of firms
into export. In order to focus sharply on quality specialization driven by demand, we
assume both countries have the same cost to produce every quality, i.e. no comparative
advantage. Therefore, in this model the countries are differentiated only by total labor
supply and income distribution. We consider two countries, a poor country and a rich
country. We assume that the ratio of number of consumers that choose a quality in the
rich country to the poor country, i.e. the relative demand of a quality, is increasing with
quality.
We find a quality specialization pattern between countries that follows the home mar-
ket effect, the quality is specialized in the country with relatively large demand. In par-
ticular, If the relative demand is very high (low) compared with the trade cost across all
qualities, all qualities are completely specialized in the rich (poor) country, i.e produced
in the rich (poor) country and exported to the other. If the relative demand is neither high
enough nor low enough across all qualities, all qualities are incompletely specialized, i.e.
produced in both countries and exported to each other. If the relative demand is increas-
ing from low enough to high enough, there is a mixed specialization. That is, low (high)
qualities are completely specialized in the poor (rich) country, while medium qualities
are incompletely specialized. This quality specialization pattern is purely demand-driven,
and consistent with supply-side explanations, e.g. rich countries have comparative advan-
tage in high qualities (e.g. Flam and Helpman, 1987; Bergstrand, 1990; Stokey, 1991;
and Matsuyama, 2000). Furthermore, besides the quality specialization pattern, which
qualities are specialized in which country is also revealed in the model.
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This model shows that export price distribution and destination income distribution
are strongly related. The reason is twofold. On the one hand, income distribution affects
affects income-quality relationship, and consequently affects the number consumers that
pay a certain price. On the other hand, under mixed quality specialization, the export qual-
ities are consumed by a part of consumers in the destination from the truncated income
distribution. For example, the high qualities are completely specialized in rich country,
therefore the qualities exported from the poor country to the rich country are bought by
the consumers who are not the richest.
In the empirical part, this chapter provides two pieces of supporting evidence. The
first evidence is that rich people do choose high quality and pay high price. It is not ob-
servable which consumers choose which products in the trade data, however the pattern
can be investigated with domestic survey. The chapter uses UK Living Cost and Food
Survey, which maps the expenditure and consumption to the household income. It is
found that indeed richer people pay higher price for bread and wine. This result is robust
when controlling the quantity of consumption, expenditure on potential substitutes and
potential measurement on prices. The second evidence is that export price distribution is
strongly related to destination income distribution. This chapter applies quantile regres-
sion and show that Chinese export distribution to EU countries is significantly affected
by destination income distribution. In particular, when income is shifted from the rich
(poor) people to the poor (rich) people, export prices of low (high) quantiles are increased
(decreased) while export prices of high quantiles decreased.
This chapter relates to research that studies the roles of income distribution on interna-
tional trade, e.g. on firms’ quality selection into different markets (Garcia-Marin, 2014),
on bilateral trade (e.g. Eppinger and Felbermayr, 2015) and on trade pattern on quality
(Fajgelbaum et al., 2011). This chapter is also related to research that explains trade pat-
tern with demands (e.g. Mitra and Trindade, 2005; Foellmi, Hepenstrick, and Zweimuller,
2010; Auer, 2010; Fajgelbaum et al., 2012). Fajgelbaum et al.(2012) provides a similar
trade pattern to this chapter, i.e. the rich country is the net exporter of high quality while
the poor country is net exporter of low quality. Most of the dynamics in their paper builds
on the case where there is only two qualities, i.e low and high. Therefore, coexistence of
complete specialization and incomplete specialization of qualities is not studied. More-
over, because there is no income-quality relationship, the model provides very limited
support for the relationship between export price distribution and income distribution.
This chapter also relates to the literatures on the relationship between export prices and
moments of income distribution, including income per capita (e.g. Schott, 2004; Hallak,
2006; Bastos and Silva, 2010; Gorg et al. 2010; Manova and Zhang, 2012, 2013), in-
come inequality (Bekkers et al., 2012; Latzer and Mayneris, 2012; and Flach and Janeba,
2016) and income distribution similarity (Choi et al., 2009). The effect of income per
capita on export price is positive while effect of income inequality is not conclusive.
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Bekkers et al.(2012) find a negative relationship between export price and destination
income inequality while Mayneris (2012) and Flach and Janeba (2016) find a positive re-
lationship. The present chapter shows that income-quality relationship and consequently
export prices to different countries are affected by destination income distributions, but
how income inequality affects export prices is ambiguous. Choi et al.(2009) also have a
income-quality relationship under perfect competition and zero trade cost. Their income-
quality relationship is not subject to income distribution. Furthermore, absence of trade
cost makes their paper silent on the trade pattern. Choi et al. (2009) also give some em-
pirical evidence that export price and destination income distribution are related. They
find that the pairs of importers whose income distributions look more similar have more
similar import price distributions.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. The model and its equilibrium in
closed economy is described in section 2 while the open economy is studied in section
3. Some empirical evidence are provided in section 4. Section 5 is the conclusion of the
chapter.
4.2 The model
4.2.1 Consumers
There are a homogeneous product and mass of differentiated products in the market. Dif-
ferentiated products are vertically differentiated by a continuum of qualities. For each
quality, there are a continuum of horizontally differentiated products. The consumer
makes discrete choice from a continuum of qualities while the homogeneous product
can be consumed in any positive amount. Similar to Garcia-Marin(2014), horizontally
differentiated products with the same quality can only be consumed as a composite. And
the composite of differentiated products gives utility for the first unit. This is similar to
the spirit that consumer only consumes one unit of quality-differentiated product (e.g.
see Shaked and Sutton, 1982; Flam and Helpman, 1987; Flach and Janeba, 2014; and
Fajgelbaum et al., 2012).
Utility of consuming z units of homogeneous products and a continuum of differenti-
ated products with quality q is given as:
U = q · z (4.1)
Utility (4.1) features complementarity between quantity of homogeneous product and
quality of differentiated product (e.g. see Shaked and Sutton(1982), Flam and Help-
man(1987), Fajgelbaum et al. (2012) and Garcia-Marin(2014)). With this form, con-
sumers’ marginal utility of quality is increasing with quantity of homogeneous products,
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i.e., consumers with higher income value higher quality products. This generates a non-
homothetic aggregate demand.
The composite of differentiated products with quality q is defined as:
Xq =
[∫
ω∈Ωq
x(ω)(σ−1)/σdω
]σ/(σ−1)
where Ωq > 1 denotes the set of products with quality q and σ > 1 is elasticity of sub-
stitution between products. Let p(ω) denote the price of the product ω , and the price of
homogeneous product is normalized to one. The problem of the consumer with income w
is solved by:
max
q,x(ω),z
U
s.t.
∫
ω∈Ωq
p(ω)x(ω)dω+ z = w
Xq = 1.
To solve the first order conditions, the consumer with income w will choose the quality
that:
Pq+qP′q = w (4.2)
where Pq =
[∫
ω∈Ωq p(ω)
(1−σ)dω
]1/(1−σ)
is the aggregate price index of quality q. Here
we assume the price index is continuous and differentiable. After choosing the quality, the
demand is x(ω) = Pσq p(ω)−σ . Consumer will then buy z = qP′q units of homogeneous
products, therefore price index must be a increasing function, i.e. P′q > 0. To ensure
that the optimality is the maximum, second order condition has to be met.Therefore the
condition is
2P′q+qP
′′
q > 0 P
′
q > 0 (4.3)
Price index is endogenously determined in equilibrium, and then we will verify this condi-
tion. Equation (2) determines a function between income and quality, i.e. income-quality
relationship, which is equivalent to:
w(q) = (qPq)′ (4.4)
And equation (3) is then equivalent to:
w′(q)> 0
The total labor in the country is L. Wage is normalized to one, therefore the income of
each labor is the efficient labor she can supply. The density distribution of income is
denoted as φ(w) over [wmin,wmax] while cumulative distribution Φ(w). wmin can be zero
while wmax can be infinity. We will discuss the type of income distributions as follows:
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Income distribuion distribution: There is one point w=w∗ that φ ′(w∗) = 0. If φ(wmin) 6=
0 and(/or) φ(wmax) 6= 0, φ(w) is continuous and differentiable around wmin and(/or) wmax.
Examples of the type of distribution include lognormal, gamma, beta, Weibull, and
etc. Uniform distribution and Pareto distribution are not of this type. We put the analysis
of these two types of distributions in the Appendix (See C.3 and C.4). Pareto distribution
fits well in the wealthy part of consumers, while across all levels of income, gamma
distribution fits better than lognormal (Salem and Mount, 1974).
We know that each consumer with income w will spend Pq on one unit of composite
of differentiated products and left income (qP′q) on homogeneous product. Therefore, the
aggregate quantity index of quality q is the number of consumers that choose this quality,
Qq = Lφ(w(q)). The aggregate expenditure on quality q is then total income of these
consumers, Eq = Pq ·Qq = Lφ(w(q))Pq. The demand of the product ω with quality q is
x(ω,q) = Lφ(w(q)) ·
(
p(ω)
Pq
)−σ
(4.5)
The demand is strongly related to the income distribution.
4.2.2 Firms
There is no cost for firms to choose qualities, but firms producing products with same
quality share identical marginal cost. The larger the quality is, the higher the cost to
produce. Let c(q) denote the marginal cost to produce the quality q, f the fixed cost.
Both cost are paid with labor. The Output is denoted as y(q), so
l(q) = f + c(q)y(q)
Firms are under monopolistic competition. With the demand from equation (4.5), the firm
producing any product ω with the quality q will set the following price to maximize the
profit:
p(q) =
σ · c(q)
σ −1
The profit of the firm is:
pi(q) =
c(q)
σ −1 · y(q)− f
4.2.3 Equilibrium
Free entry and exit drive firm profit to zero, thus the output of the firm is:
y(q) =
f · (σ −1)
c(q)
(4.6)
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The product market clearing pins down the number of firms for each quality. Labor
market clears automatically within each quality. Market clearing means x(q) = y(q).
Combine the equation (4.5) and (4.6), we have:
Lφ(w(q)) ·
(
p(q)
Pq
)−σ
=
f · (σ −1)
c(q)
(4.7)
Let δ =
(
(σ−1)σ−1
f
) 1
σ
. According to equation (4.4), the above equation can be rearranged
to get the income-quality differential equation:
w′(q) =
φ(w(q))
qφ ′(w(q))
(
σ +(σ −1)qc
′(q)
c(q)
− δw(q)(Lφ(w(q)))
1
σ
c(q)
σ−1
σ
)
(4.8)
if φ ′(w(q)) 6= 0. This is a first order differential equation of income-quality relationship:
w′(q) = F(q,w(q)). The existence of solution with a certain initial value is provide by
Picard’s existence theorem (See Appendix C.1). A necessary condition to have a solution
is that both w′(q) and w
′(q)
∂w are continuous functions defined around the initial value.
However, only the solutions that meet the condition (4.3) are feasible. It is very hard to
verify this condition as there is no reduced form of solutions w(q) for general forms of
the income distribution and the marginal cost. However, if using Pareto distribution and
cost structure c(q) = ϕqθ , θ > 0, there will be many solutions that meet the condition.
For general forms of distribution and cost, this chapter assumes:
Assumption 1 Given φ(w) and c(q), there is a non-null set O such that a initial value
from set O gives a solution to income differential equation that meet the conditions P′q > 0
and w′(q)> 0.
In the remain of this chapter we do the analysis given that assumption is satisfied.
Moreover, wherever I use certain initial value to find a solution to a differential equation,
this initial value is assumed to belong to this set O.
Theorem 14 There exists a unique equilibrium. And in the equilibrium, quality consumed
by consumer with income w∗, denoted as q∗, is pined down as
δw∗(Lφ(w∗)
1
σ =
(
σ +(σ −1)q
∗c′(q∗)
c(q∗)
)
c(q∗)
σ−1
σ
Proof: See Appendix C.2 
Because φ ′(w∗) = 0, both w′(q) and w
′(q)
∂w will be continuous functions only if quality
chosen by the consumers with income w∗ is q∗. Therefore, (q∗,w∗) serves as the initial
value of the differential equation (4.8). With assumption 1 satisfied, this initial value
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guarantees the existence of solution to equation (4.8) that meets the condition P′q > 0 and
w′(q)> 0.
With the solution to income differential equation w(q), the price level Pq is deter-
mined by equation (4.7), then the number of firms producing quality q is determined
as nq =
(
(σ−1)Pq
σc(q)
)1−σ
. The labor used in differentiated products of quality q is then
Lφ(w(q))Pq. The labor used in homogeneous products that are consumed by consumers
choosing quality q is Lφ(w(q))(w(q)−Pq). Therefore labor market clears. The equilib-
rium is completely characterized.
4.2.4 Price Distribution
The quality consumed by consumers with income q(w) is a reverse function of w(q),
which is related to income distribution. The price paid by consumers is then determined
as p(w) = σc(q(w))σ−1 . Therefore this model predicts that the consumers with same income
choose a different quality and pay a different price under a different income distribution.
The price distribution is then derived as:
ϒ(p) =Φ(w(p))
where w(p) is the reverse function of p(w). The model predicts that the price distribution
is strongly related to income distribution.
4.3 The Open Economy
Instead of comparative advantage, i.e. cost difference across countries, this chapter aims
to study the roles of income distribution in international trade. Therefore, this chapter
assumes the same cost c(q) across countries. The countries are differentiated by total
labor and income distribution. That is to say, this chapter focuses sharply on international
trade driven by demand-side difference rather than supply side difference. For simplicity,
there are two countries in the world, the poor country (P) and the rich country (R). The
preferences are identical in both countries. There is additional cost for firms to export,
iceberg variable export cost τ > 1. The prices for domestic market and export are:
pzd(q) =
σc(q)
σ −1 p
z
x(q) =
στc(q)
σ −1
where z ∈ {P,R}. This chapter is not aiming at explaining the selection of firms into
export, therefore the chapter does not assume fixed cost to export. The wage in the two
countries are driven to be the same. Total labor is denoted as Lz. Income distribution is
φz(w) over [0,∞), and φ ′z(w∗z ) = 0. This chapter defines Incomplete Specialization and
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Complete Specialization as in Fajgelbaum et al.(2012), i.e. qualities that are produced
in both country and exported to each other are under incomplete specialization while
qualities that are produced in one country and exported to the other are under complete
specialization.
4.3.1 Incomplete Specialization
Under incomplete specialization, the qualities are produced in both countries and exported
to each other. Therefore, market clearing means:
Lzφz(wz(q)) ·
(
pzd(q)
Pzq
)−σ
+ τLz˜φz˜(wz˜(q)) ·
(
pzx(q)
Pz˜q
)−σ
=
f (σ −1)
c(q)
where {z, z˜} ∈ {P,R}. To solve the two equations for any incompletely specialized quality,
we have:
Lzφz(wz(q)) ·
(
pzd(q)
Pzq
)−σ
=
f · (σ −1)
(1+ τ1−σ )c(q)
(4.9)
The demand in foreign country is proportional to domestic country, as in Fajgelbaum et
al.(2012). Let the number of firms producing each quality is nqz , then Pzq
1−σ = nzq p(q)1−σ+
nz˜q(τ p(q))1−σ . To solve the number of firms:
nzq =
(
σ −1
σ
)1−σ Pzq1−σ
c(q)1−σ
(
1− (τPz˜q/Pzq)1−σ
1− τ2(1−σ)
)
To have positive number of firms in both countries, we need 1/τ < Pzq/Pz˜q < τ . Let Dzg =
Lzφz(wz(q)) and Dz˜g = Lz˜φz˜(wz˜(q)) be the demand in z and z˜ country respectively, we have
relative demand condition according to equation (4.9):
τ−σ < Dzg/D
z˜
g < τ
σ (4.10)
This inequality means the relative demand in two countries is neither too high nor too low.
To rearrange this equation, we have the income-quality differential equation for qual-
ities under incomplete specialization:
w′z(q) = F(q,wz(q))
=
φz(wz(q))
qφ ′z(wz(q))
σ +(σ −1)qc′(q)
c(q)
− δwz(q)
(
(1+ τ1−σ )Lzφz(wz(q))
) 1
σ
c(q)
σ−1
σ

(4.11)
if φ ′z(wz(q)) 6= 0.
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4.3.2 Complete Specialization
Under complete specialization, the qualities are produced by one country and exported to
the other. For qualities that are specialized in country z, Pz˜q = τPzq . Market clearing means:
Lzφz(wz(q)) ·
(
pzd(q)
Pzq
)−σ
+ τLz˜φz˜(wz˜(q)) ·
(
pzx(q)
τPzq
)−σ
=
f (σ −1)
c(q)
To rearrange this equation, we have:
(Lzφz(wz(q))+ τLz˜φz˜(wz˜(q))) ·
(
pzd(q)
Pzq
)−σ
=
f · (σ −1)
c(q)
(4.12)
We assume both countries want to produce heterogeneous products and trade with each
other. Therefore, if the relative demand condition holds, quality will be incompletely
specialized. However, if the relative demand condition is violated, i.e. Dzg/D
z˜
g > τσ or
Dzg/D
z˜
g < τ−σ , the quality will be under complete specialization. It can be shown that Pzq
and Pz˜g are smaller under incomplete specialization in z (z˜) country than in z˜ (z) country
or in if relative demand Dzg/D
z˜
g > τσ (< τ−σ ). Therefore the quality will be completely
specialized in the country with large relative demand.
Because wz(q) = (qPzq)
′, wz˜(q) = τwz(q) if the qualities are completely specialized in
z country. The above equation gives income-quality differential equation:
w′z(q) =
fz(w(q))
q(Lzφ ′z(wz(q))+ τ2Lz˜φ ′˜z(wz˜(q)))
(
σ +(σ −1)qc
′(q)
c(q)
− δwz(q) fz(w(q))
1
σ
c(q)
σ−1
σ
)
(4.13)
if Lzφ ′z(w)+ τ2Lz˜φ ′˜z(τw) 6= 0 where fz(w(q)) = Lzφz(wz(q))+ τLz˜φz˜(wz˜(q)).
4.3.3 Equilibrium in the Open Economy
We can now characterize the equilibrium in the open economy. Suppose that there is
mixed specialization, i.e. some qualities are under complete specialization and some
qualities are under incomplete specialization. As quality varies, quality specialization can
switch from complete specialization in one country to incomplete specialization and vice
versa. However, quality specialization cannot switch from complete specialization in one
country to complete specialization in the other country, because the continuity of price
indices in both countries cannot allow the ratio of price index jump from τ to 1/τ or from
1/τ to τ . We assume that
Assumption 2 φR(τw)φP(w) and
φR(w/τ)
φP(w)
are increasing functions of w.
Assumption 2 means that the relative demand of the rich country than the poor country
DRq/D
P
q is increasing for the qualities under complete specialization regardless of which
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country it is specialized. For example, if the qualities are specialized in the rich coun-
try, wR(q) = wP(q)/τ , then the relative demand DRq/DPq = LRφR(wp(q)/τ)/LPφP(wp(q))
is increasing with quality. Likewise if the qualities are specialized in the poor country,
relative demand is increasing as well. Provided that assumption 2 is satisfied, there are
at most three intervals of qualities (0,q), (q,q) and (q,∞) such that quality specialization
is different for each interval. Moreover, if three intervals exist, assumption 2 guarantees
that qualities in (0,q) are specialized in the poor country, qualities in (q,∞) are special-
ized in the rich country and qualities (q,q) are under incomplete specialization. Next we
characterize if q and q exist and how they are determined in equilibrium.
Suppose there are three intervals of qualities, there are wP(q) and wR(q) as well as
corresponding PPq and P
R
q in each interval. In order to have a general equilibrium, P
P
q and
PRq should be continuous and differentiable across the whole range of qualities. According
to equation (4.9) and (4.12), we can find PPq and P
R
q for each interval. Take P
P
q as an
example,
PPq =

σ
δ
(
c(q)σ−1
LPφP(wP(q))+ τLRφR(wR(q))
) 1
σ
if q ∈ (0,q)
σ
δ
(
c(q)σ−1
(1+ τ1−σ )LPφP(wP(q))
) 1
σ
if q ∈ [q,q]
σ
δ
(
τσc(q)σ−1
LRφR(wR(q))+ τLPφP(wP(q))
) 1
σ
if q ∈ (q,∞)
PPq , wP(q) and wR(q) are continuous in each interval, therefore P
P
q is differentiable as well
in each interval because PPq
′
= (wP(q)−PPq )/q. At q= q and q= q, Lz˜φz˜(wz˜(q))Lzφz(wz(q)) = τ−σ and
τσ respectively. Let the income of consumers that choose qualities q and q be wP, wP
in poor country and wR, wR in rich country. In order to make P
P
q and P
R
q continuous and
differentiable at q = q and q = q, wP(q) and wR(q) should be continuous. This will pins
down the income levels at q = q and q = q by the following two sets of equations:

LRφR(wR)
LPφP(wP)
= τ−σ
wR = τwP

LRφR(wR)
LPφP(wP)
= τσ
wP = τwR
(4.14)
Under assumption 2, there will be at most one solution to each set of equations. Depend on
the existence of solutions, there exists different quality specialization in the equilibrium.
Case I: Neither sets has a solution. In this case, there are no values q and q. Therefore,
there is no mixed specialization, i.e. all qualities are under complete specialization in
poor country or rich country, or all qualities are under incomplete specialization. If the
first set does not have a solution, LRφR(τw)/LPφP(w) < τ−σ or LRφR(τw)/LPφP(w) >
τ−σ across all income levels. Likewise, if the second set does not have a solution,
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LRφR(w/τ)/LPφP(w) < τσ or LRφR(w/τ)LPφP(w) > τσ across all income levels. Given
the income distributions described in section 2 for both countries, φR(w/τ)< φR(τw) for
low income levels and φR(w/τ)> φR(τw) for high income levels.
Therefore, LRφR(τw)/LPφP(w) < τ−σ across all income levels means that q deter-
mined by the first set of equations tends to infinity. Thus all qualities are specialized
in the poor country. If LRφR(τw)/LPφP(w) < τ−σ across all income levels, the rela-
tive demand in poor country country to rich country is too large so that all qualities are
completely specialized in poor country. If LRφR(w/τ)/LPφP(w) > τσ across all income
levels, alternatively LPφP(τw)/LRφR(w)< τ−σ across all income levels, q determined by
the second set of equations tends to be zero. As a result, all qualities are specialized in
the rich country. In this case, the relative demand in rich country country to poor country
is too large so that all qualities are completely specialized in rich country.
The income-quality relationship can be solved by income-quality differential equation
(4.13). To solve the equation (4.13), we assume
Assumption 3 Lzφ ′z(w)+τ2Lz˜φ ′˜z(τw) 6= 0 across all income levels, where {z, z˜} ∈ {P,R}.
Supposed assumption 3 is satisfied, there is no feasible initial value to the differential
equation. Hence, a Pareto superior equilibrium shown in Appendix C.4 is determined as
there is no feasible initial values. This leads to the following theorem.
Theorem 15 Suppose Lz˜φz˜(τw)/Lzφz(w) < τ−σ across all income levels. Then there is
an Pareto superior equilibrium that all qualities are completely specialized in z country.
Proof: With differential equation (4.13), there are different solutions give different initial
values. Under assumption 2, there are some feasible solutions. According to proof used
in Appendix C.4, there is a Pareto superior equilibrium among these feasible solutions. 
If LRφR(τw)/LPφP(w)> τ−σ across all income levels, q determined by the first set of
equations tends to be zero. If LRφR(w/τ)/LPφP(w)< τσ across all income levels, q tends
to be infinity. Thus all qualities are incompletely specialized in both countries. In this sit-
uation, the relative demand in rich country to poor country is neither too high nor too low,
and then all qualities are under incomplete specialization. The income-quality relation-
ship can be solved by income-quality differential equation (4.11). According to theorem
2, there is a solution wz(q)with initial value (q∗z ,w∗z ), where δ (1+τ1+σ )w∗z (Lzφ(w∗z ))
1
σ =(
σ +(σ −1)q∗z c′(q∗z )c(q∗z )
)
c(q∗z )
σ−1
σ . This is summarized as:
Theorem 16 Suppose Lz˜φz˜(τw)/Lzφz(w) < τ−σ across all income levels for both coun-
tries {z, z˜} ∈ {P,R}. Then there is a unique equilibrium that all qualities are under in-
complete specialization.
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Case II: Every set has a solution. In this case, q and q exist. To see how they are endoge-
nously determined. this chapter assumes that:
Assumption 4 wz > w∗z ,z ∈ {P,R} and wR > τ2wP.
This assumption guarantees that wR > wP and wR > wP. Moreover, this assumption
guarantees that (q∗z ,w∗z ) will not be a initial value to income-quality differential equa-
tion (4.11). Therefore wz(q) for qualities under incomplete specialization varies with the
chosen initial values. However, according to Lemma 1, there is a unique solution wz(q)
with initial value (q,wz). And wz(q) can be denoted as:
wz(q) = wz+
∫ q
q
F(q,wz(q))dq
where F(q,wz(q)) is the function shown in equation (4.11). To substitute (q,wz) into
above equation,
wz = wz+
∫ q
q
F(q,wz(q))dq (4.15)
To substitute the solved wP, wP, wR and wR into equation (4.15), we have a set of two
equations with two unknowns q and q:
{
wP = wP+
∫ q
q F(q,wP(q))dq
wR = wR+
∫ q
q F(q,wR(q))dq
where F(q,wP(q)) and F(q,wR(q)) have been shown in equation (4.11). After solving
the equations, we have the values q, q as well as wP(q) and wR(q) for qualities q ∈ [q,q].
Take (q,wR) as initial value, we can solve for wR(q) for qualities q ∈ (q,∞) with differen-
tial equation (4.13), and corresponding wP(q) is equal to τwR(q). Likewise, use (q,wP)
as initial value, we can solve for wP(q) for qualities q ∈ (0,q), and wR(q) = τwP(q).
Therefore we will have an equilibrium with mixed specialization for case II:
Theorem 17 Suppose there is one solution to each set of equations, there is an equilib-
rium with mixed specialization. Low qualities are completely specialized in poor country,
medium qualities are under incomplete specialization, high qualities are completely spe-
cialized in rich country.
As shown in Fig 4.1, the qualities q ∈ (0,q) are specialized in poor country and ex-
ported to rich country, while the qualities q ∈ (q,∞) are specialized in rich country and
exported to poor country. These qualities are specialized in the country with relative large
demand. The medium qualities q ∈ [q,q] are incompletely specialized, i.e. produced by
both countries and exported to each other.
Consider distributions with bounded income wzmin and w
z
max, and let q
z
min and q
z
max de-
note the minimal and maximum qualities in the two countries. If wRmin > τwPmin, qPmin <
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Fig 4.1: Equilibrium in open economy
qRmin. The lowest qualities in poor country does not have demand in rich country, there-
fore they are non-exported. Likewise, there are non-exported qualities in rich country if
wRmax > τwPmax. This leads to following corollary:
Corollary 2 Given distributions that wRmin > τwPmin and wRmax > wPmax/τ , there is an equi-
librium of which the lowest qualities are demanded in poor country, and the highest qual-
ities are demanded in rich country if φR(wRmin) = 0 and φP(wPmax) = 0.
Proof: Market clearing is denoted as equation (4.7) for non-exported qualities. In order
to make PPq continuous and differentiable at q = q
P
min, φR(wRmin) should be zero and wP(q)
should be continuous at q = qPmin. The income of consumers that choose quality q
R
min in
poor country is wRmin/τ . We can solve income differential equation (4.8) for poor country
with the initial value (qRmin,w
P
min/τ) to get wP(q) for non-exported qualities, and then
wP(q) is continuous at q= qRmin. Likewise, we can solve wR(q) for non-exported qualities
in rich country to make wR(q) continuous at q = q
p
max. 
As shown in Fig 4.2, the lowest qualities q ∈ [qPmin,qRmin] are non-exported qualities
of poor country, while the highest qualities q ∈ [qPmax,qRmax] are non-exported qualities of
rich country. There are no demand of these qualities in the other country.
Case III: There is a solution to only one set of equations. If only the first set has a
solution wP and wR, low qualities are completely specialized in poor countries while all
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Fig 4.2: Equilibrium in open economy
high qualities are under incomplete specialization. If it is the second set that has a solution
wP and wR, all low qualities are under incomplete specialization while high qualites are
completely specialized in rich country. The cutoff quality Q can be identified if wP > w
∗
P
or wP < w∗. Take the solution to first set as an example, with initial value (Q,wP), we
can solve wP(q) for qualities that are completely specialized in poor country and under
incomplete specialization respectively. Similarly, we can solve wR(q) for these qualities
with initial value (Q,wR). Any two solutions with different Q do not cross, therefore Q is
value that gives the Pareto superior equilibrium.
In any case described above, after we identify the wz(q), z ∈ {P,R}, we can solve
Pzq and n
z
q depending on quality specialization. Labor market automatically clears within
each quality.
4.3.4 Export Price Distribution
With wz(q) z ∈ {P,R}, the reversal function gives the quality chosen by consumers with
income w in both country qz(w). qP(w) and qR(w) are different because of different
income distributions. This means the consumers with the same income level will buy
different qualities in different countries. The export price and income are then linked by
the quality. The f.o.b export price from z country to z˜ country paid by consumers with
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income w is:
pzz˜(w) =
σc(qz˜(w))
σ −1
There is a clear relationship between export price and income, and this relationship is
governed by income distributions. Let the reverse function of pzz˜(w) be w(pzz˜), that is
the income of consumes in country that pay f.o.b price pzz˜ for imported products from z
country. The export price distribution from z country to z˜ country is then:
ϒzz˜(p) =Φ(w(pzz˜))
The export price distribution is strongly related to income distributions. For mixed spe-
cialization, exported qualities serve a truncated distribution of consumers. For example,
as shown in Fig 4.1, export qualities from poor country to rich country is (0,q). Therefore
these export qualities only serve consumers with income (0,wR), so the export price dis-
tribution from poor country to rich country is adjusted by a truncated income distribution:
ϒPR(p) =
ΦR(w(pzz˜))
ΦR(wR)
We have documented that export price and price distribution are related to income distri-
butions of both countries, and the channel they are related is quality. However, reduced
form between them is absent because of the solution to income differential equation can-
not be tractably solved, even given some specific forms of income distribution and cost. I
will leave this part to a empirical study.
4.4 Empirical Study
In this section, I provide some empirical evidence of the model. Firstly, the model builds
on the non-homothetic preference over quality that leads to the income-quality relation-
ship: consumers with high income choose high quality and pay high price. Though it is
not observable that which consumers buy which imported products in the export data, it
is possible to test with domestic survey on household expenditure and income. Therefore
the first proposition tested in this section is:
Income-quality relationship Consumers with high income choose high quality and pay
high price.
Secondly, the model predicts that export price distribution is strongly related to the
destination income distribution. Though the mapping between consumer income and
price paid is not observable in the export data, export price distribution and some moments
of income distribution, e.g income per capita, Gini coefficient and income shares for
certain quantiles are observable. Therefore the second proposition tested in this section
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is:
Export price distribution and income distribution Export price distribution is strongly
related to the destination income distribution.
4.4.1 Evidence of Income-quality relationship
To test income-quality relationship proposition, I use UK Living Cost and Food Surveys
(LCF)1. LCF is constructed mainly through household questionnaire, individual ques-
tionnaire and Expenditure and Food Survey (EFS) diary. The household questionnaire
includes questions on a range of subjects including family members and relationships, em-
ployment details, expenditure that typically made by the whole households, e.g. council
tax, and some infrequently expenditure such as vehicles, holidays and housing. Individ-
ual questionnaire covers information on the income of household member from various
source, e.g. employment, benefits and assets, and forms the household level income. In
EFS diary, each individual aged 16 years and over in the household is asked to keep diary
records of daily expenditure for two weeks, including quantity of the purchase.
The advantage of this data is twofold. Firstly, the expenditure is quite disaggregated.
It is more disaggregated than Classification of Individual Consumption according to Pur-
pose (COICOP). For example, in COICOP, the most disaggregated category about bread
is ”bread and cereals”, but in LCF, there are sub categories as ”white bread”, ”brown
bread”, ”wholemeal bread” and etc. Another advantage is that the data provide the pur-
chased quantity as well as the expenditure. This allows to calculate the price (unit value)
of the product purchased by each household. As widely used, this section will use unit
values to proxy the quality. Therefore, this section can show direct evidence on the re-
lationship between income and price (quality). However, one might be concerned by the
measurement error on the quantity information, because expenditure is clearly stated in
the receipt but quantity might not in some cases. As a robust check, I use expenditure and
household composition to see if consumers with high income spend more on a product
given that the quantity is controlled.
Expenditure on food, though purchased by individuals, is household level. There-
fore, I use household income to test the relationship between price and income. However,
household income is not comparable across households because the household composi-
tion is different. Fortunately, LCF has already provided the OECD-modified equivalence
scale to adjust income for each household. OECD-modified equivalence scale is used
1EU Household Budget Surveys (HBSs) provides the expenditure and income of households. The Sta-
tistical Office of the European Union (Eurostat) releases the household consumption expenditure by income
quintile at 3 digital level for all EU countries according to Classification of Individual Consumption accord-
ing to Purpose (COICOP), and more disaggregated data is given only for Italy of year 1995 and Norway of
year 2010. However, a disadvantage of the released Eurostat data is that it does not release the correspond-
ing household size and purchasing quantity information.
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widely across Europe. To calculate the scale, single adult households are taken as the
reference group and are given a scale value of one. For larger households, each additional
adult children aged 14 and over are given a smaller value of 0.5 while children under the
age of 14 are given a value of 0.3. This is to reflect the effect of economies of scale on
reducing living costs per person, when larger households share resources such as water
and electricity. To compare the household incomes, normal disposable income divided by
OECD scale, i.e. equivalised disposable income is used.
Results
In this section, we focus on two narrowly defined products, bread and wine. They have a
large range of qualities in the market. And household of all income levels will buy these
products. For bread, there are several sub products. Therefore quantity is calculated as the
total quantity of all sub products and price is calculated by total expenditure divided by
quantity. In the analysis, I will control the expenditure on substitutes of bread, including
rice, cereals, cakes, puddings and etc, as well as substitutes of wine, e.g. beers, lagers,
ciders, champagne, spirits, fortified wine and etc. (See Appendix Table AC.5 for the
source of variables and how they are constructed). Table 4.1 presents the descriptive
results of the variables.
Table 4.1: Description of the data
Variable # obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Household
Disposable income (£) 5,144 578.68 373.46 -348.08 1566.13
OECD scale 5,144 1.59 0.53 1 4.2
Equivalised disposable income 5,144 256.70 0.66 -232.05 2028.44
Bread
Expenditure (£) 4,873 2.99 2.23 0.1 20.62
Equivalised expenditure 4,873 1.84 1.22 0.07 10.73
Equivalised expenditure of substitutes 4,873 4.77 3.27 0 25.97
Price (p/g) 4,846 0.20 0.09 0.03 1.92
Equivalised quantity (g) 4,846 923.61 585.17 21.67 5,520
Wine
Expenditure (£) 1,711 10.98 14.63 0.30 182.99
Equivalised expenditure 1,711 6.99 9.69 0.12 121.99
Equivalised expenditure of substitutes 1711 4.29 7.18 0 90
Price (p/ml) 1,698 0.69 0.26 0.05 4.00
Equivalised quantity (ml) 1,698 1,030.73 1,224.41 25.71 12,500
The measurement unit of income and expenditure is pound. There are two households that have
less than zero disposable income and 11 households that have zero disposable income. ”income”,
”expenditure” and ”quantity” are weekly numbers.
Fig 4.3 plots the price of bread and wine with deciles of equivalised household dis-
posable income. As income increases, the price of the consumption product is increasing.
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That is, richer people pay higher price for a given product than poor people, which also
means richer people buy higher quality.
Note: Price of bread is pence per gram and price of wine is pence per ml.
Fig 4.3: Price and income
Next I run regressions between price (ln price) and equivalised income (ln inceq). The
results are shown in Table 4.2. As shown in column 1 and 4, for both bread and wine, the
coefficients of equivalised income are positive and significant. I control the equivalised
expenditure on substitutes (lnexsub) in column 2 and 5, the coefficients of equivalised
income are still positive and significant. Moreover, as shown in column 3 and 6, when
controlling quantity (lnquaneq) and the expenditure on substitutes, price is still positively
related to income. Richer people are willing to pay more for each unit given the same
quantity consumed and expenditure on substitutes. This is direct evidence that rich people
choose high quality and pay high price.
Alternative robustness
There might be potential measurement error on the quantity information, because expen-
diture is clearly stated in the receipts but quantity might not in some cases. As a robust
check, I use expenditure and household composition to see if consumers with higher in-
come spend more on a product when controlling the purchased quantity.
In Fig 4.4, we plot the deciles of equivalised household disposable income and average
expenditure for bread. As income increases, the expenditure is increasing. However, this
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Table 4.2: Price and disposable income
Bread Wine
ln price ln price ln price ln price ln price ln price
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln inceq 0.125 0.118 0.101 0.129 0.144 0.153
(0.008) ∗∗∗ (0.008)∗∗∗ (0.008)∗∗∗ (0.013)∗∗∗ (0.018)∗∗∗ (0.018)∗∗∗
lnexsub 0.040 0.074 0.004 0.016
(0.007)∗∗∗ (0.007)∗∗∗ (0.010) (0.010)
lnquaneq -0.180 -0.050
(0.007)∗∗∗ (0.011)∗∗∗
cons -2.410 -2.421 -1.054 -1.196 -1.302 -1.013
(0.047)∗∗∗ (0.047)∗∗∗ (0.071)∗∗∗ (0.080) ∗∗∗ (0.106)∗∗∗ (0.122)∗∗∗
# obs. 4,836 4,729 4,729 1,697 1,017 1,017
adj. R2 0.047 0.053 0.163 0.052 0.061 0.080
Standard errors are stated in parentheses below point estimates. ***, ** and * mean 1%,
5% and 10% significance levels respectively.
relationship could be driven by the household size. The larger household spends more
given the same income. We also plot the deciles of equivalised household disposable
income and the equivalised expenditure. As income increases, the equivalised expenditure
is increasing as well. In Table 4.3, I run regressions of expenditure (lnexp) and income
(ln inc) controlling for various household composition from column 1 to 4, e.g. household
size (hs), number of children aged over 16 (Nc) number of adults aged under 45 (Na),
household composition (hc)2. The positive relationship between expenditure and income
holds.
As shown in column 1 in Table 4.4, this pattern still holds when using equivalised
expenditure. Richer people spend more on a product, and this is not because of less
consumption of substitutes (column 2). This is the evidence that rich spend more for a
given product because they choose high quality and pay high price. I use bread rather
than wine to show the alternative evidence, because income might affect the purchased
quantity for wine but plausibly do not affect the purchased quantity for for bread. This
could be tested by regressing equivalised quantity purchased between equivalised income,
shown in column 3 and 4 in Table 4.4. Income does not significantly affect quantity of
bread, but richer people drink more given that the price is controlled.
The model builds on the non-homothetic preference over quality and gives a one to
one relationship between income and quality, consequently relationship between income
and price, i.e stated in income-quality relationship proposition. In this part, it is shown
2There are 30 compositions, e.g. one man, one woman, one man and one woman, one man and one
woman plus one child, etc.
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Fig 4.4: Weekly expenditure of bread and income
that rich consumers choose high quality and pay high price. The results are consistent
with Bils and Klenow (2001) that rich people consume better goods and Faber and Fally
(2015) that richer households source their consumption from significantly larger firms and
high quality products.
4.4.2 Evidence of Export Price Distribution and Income Distribution
In this part, we will use quantile regression to test proposition on the relationship between
export price distribution and income distribution.
As commonly used in literatures (e.g. Schott, 2000; Hallak, 2006; Manova and Zhang,
2012), export price is proxied as unit value. Export value and quantity are from Chinese
Customs Trade Database (Previous literatures using this database include Manova and
Zhang (2009, 2012), Ahn et al. (2011), Wang and Yu (2012) Upward et al. (2013)). This
database reports all Chinese export and import transactional records, and each record has
information on value and quantity by product, firm and export destination/import ori-
gin. With these data, we have product-level export price distribution to each destination.
Note that the model is built on a two-country basis. Therefore to test the model in a
multi-country world, this section will choose the product whose export from China has a
relatively large share in world export.
This section will use quantile regression to study export price distributions across
countries. Therefore the chapter will select a product to construct the sample3. The prod-
3Though fixed effects quantile regression is developed (Canay, 2011; Powell, 2014), it has not been
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Table 4.3: Household expenditure of bread
lnexp lnexp lnexp lnexp
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln inc 0.313 0.148 0.265 0.136
(0.015)∗∗∗ (0.016) ∗∗∗ (0.015) ∗∗∗ (0.016)∗∗∗
hs 0.214
(0.009) ∗∗∗
Nc 0.342∗∗∗
(0.042)
Na 0.0881∗∗∗
hc 0.046
(0.002)∗∗∗
cons -1.109 -0.604 -0.900 -0.379
(0.091) ∗∗∗ (0.088)∗∗∗ (0.092)∗∗∗ (0.093)∗∗∗
# obs. 4,863 4,863 4,863 4,863
adj. R2 0.086 0.184 0.109 0.170
Standard errors are stated in parentheses below point estimates.
***, ** and * mean 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respec-
tively.
Table 4.4: equivalised household expenditure and disposable income
Bread Wine
lnexpeq lnexpeq lnquaneq lnquaneq
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln inceq 0.093 0.051 0.017 0.237
(0.015)∗∗∗ (0.015)∗∗∗ (0.015) (0.053)∗∗∗
lnexsub 0.238 0.216 0.238
(0.013)∗∗∗ (0.013)∗∗∗ (0.028)∗∗∗
ln price -0.649 -0.420
(0.026)∗∗∗ (0.090)∗∗∗
cons -0.144 -0.208 6.024 5.282
(0.089) (0.087)∗∗ (0.105)∗∗∗ (0.327)∗∗∗
4,863 4,753 4,729 1,017
0.007 0.074 0.156 0.094
Standard errors are stated in parentheses below point estimates.
***, ** and * mean 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respec-
tively.
widely used.
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uct chosen for this analysis has to be the product whose export from China has a relatively
large share in world export. Moreover, it should be 1) a final consumption product, as in-
termediate or capital products are not necessarily related to the income of consumers;
2)a product that is consumed by consumers with all levels of income, i.e. not substi-
tutable as income of consumers increases or decreases; 3) a product with large variations
of export prices within each destination, which makes export price distributions more
reliable. Based on these requirements, this chapter selects the product from textile and
clothing, ”Jerseys, pullovers, cardigans, waist-coats and similar articles, knitted or cro-
cheted” coded as HS6110 in the version of 2002 HS code. Jerseys, pullovers, cardigans,
waist-coats and similar articles are substitutable to some extent, thereby being defined as
one product4. Within this product category, there are some sub categories according to
the materials that the product is made of, e.g. of wool(611011), Kashmir(611012), cotton
(611020), man-made fibres(611030) and other materials (611090). Thus, for different sub
categories, they are essentially the same product. Therefore, price variations within the
product, i.e. HS6110, can be plausibly considered as quality differences.
Moreover, we choose the destinations from European Union to construct the sample.
The main reason is that the consumer patterns in EU are similar across countries. Sec-
ondly the currency for most countries are Euro, excluding the impacts of exchange rate
on country demand for imported products. Income data of EU countries are from Statisti-
cal Office of the European Union (Eurostat), including Gini coefficients, income share by
income quantiles. Other gravity-related data, e.g. GDP per capita, population, distance
and remoteness5 are from CEPII database. In the regression, we will limit the sample to
the countries that have more than 100 number of varieties, to allow the enough range of
quality differentiation within each country (see Appendix A C.6 for details of the country
sample and number of varieties).
Model
In order to see the relationship between export price distribution and income distribution,
quantile regression is applied:
Qη(ppd|Id,Xd) = α1η I1d +α2ηsmiddle+ γη +βηXd, I1d ∈ {spoor,srich} (4.16)
η is quantile of price distribution, and distribution of price is weighted by quantity. p
is the product and d denotes the destination. Id is the set of income distribution variables.
Xd is the set of gravity related control variables, including population, distance to China
and remoteness. When estimating the price distribution, export quantity is used as the
4The narrower the product is defined, the more preference bias can be avoid. However, the narrower
the product is defined, the less observations are for the distribution estimation. Meanwhile, for textile and
clothing, a big portion of products are classified by sex, which are appropriate for this analysis.
5Remote of a country is GDP weighted distance across all other countires.
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frequency weight. spoor + smiddle + srich = 1. This will give the effect of income distri-
bution shift. For example, if spoor and smiddle are included, the coefficient of spoor will
tell the effect of shifting one percentage point of income from the rich to the poor, while
coefficient of smiddle the effect of shifting one percentage point of income from the rich to
the middle. Table 4.5 shows the description of the data.
Table 4.5: Description of the data
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
price and quantity
Quantity 32,522 7,204.60 22,838 1 1,075,844
Price 32,522 10.61 10.63 0.18 305.00
Income of EU countries
Income per capital 20 31,721.43 16,886.73 4,052.00 66,739.18
Income share of
the poor(%) 20 8.16 1.42 4.4 10.1
the middle (%) 20 53.25 2.75 45.6 57.3
the rich (%) 20 38.59 4.01 33.4 50
Note: Income per capital is in terms of 2005 constant US$. We have exclude the countries
that have no data on income share in 2006 and countries that have less than 100 varieties.
Results
Quantile regression of equation (4.16) shows the effects of income distribution shift that
comes from income shift from the rich to the poor or from the poor to the rich. The results
are reported in Table 4.6 and the coefficients of more quantiles are plotted in Fig 4.5.
A one percentage point of income shifted from the rich to the poor increases export
price of quantiles from 0.1 to 0.9. And the scale of the effect is decreasing. When the poor
become richer, they will choose higher qualities and pay higher prices. On the contrary,
when the rich become poorer, they will choose lower qualities and pay lower prices.
These results on the prices of various quantiles suggest that the export price distribution
is squeezed from the both tails to the middle. This is consistent with the move of the
income distribution: when income is shifted from the rich to the poor, there are less poor
and less rich, therefore the income distribution is also squeezed from the both tails to the
middle .
This result is confirmed by the effects of income shift from the poor to the rich. A one
percentage point of income shifted from the poor to the rich decreases export price from
quantile 0.1 to quantile 0.85, and the scale of effect is decreasing as well. As the income
is shifted from the poor to the rich, the poor become poorer and the rich become richer.
As a result, the poor will choose lower quality and pay lower price while the rich choose
higher quality and pay higher price. This suggests that if we make income distribution
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Table 4.6: Export price distribution and income distribution
Quantile Quantile Quantile Quantile Quantile
0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9
Panel A: Income shift from the rich to the poor and the middle
spoor 0.212 0.126 0.060 0.047 -0.003
(0.0095)∗∗∗ (0.0002)∗∗∗ (0.0001)∗∗∗ (0.0000)∗∗∗ (0.0000)∗∗∗
smiddle -0.073 -0.005 -0.011 0.017 0.040
(0.0044)∗∗∗ (0.0001)∗∗∗ (0.0001)∗∗∗ (0.0000)∗∗∗ (0.00000)∗∗∗
Panel B: Income shift from the poor to the rich and the middle
srich -0.176 -0.110 -0.047 -0.024 0.028
(0.0286)∗∗∗ (0.00564)∗∗∗ (0.00135)∗∗∗ (0.00003)∗∗∗ (0.00145)∗∗∗
smiddle -0.240 -0.111 -0.055 0.001 0.077
(0.0397)∗∗∗ (0.00783)∗∗∗ (0.00188)∗∗∗ (0.00005)∗∗∗ (0.00202)∗∗∗
# obs. 234,307,867 234,307,867 234,307,867 234,307,867 234,307,867
All regressions include income per capita and gravity related control variables: population,
distance and remoteness. All regression use export quantity as the frequency weight. See
Appendix C.5 for full tables. Number of observations is the total weights. Standard errors
are stated in parentheses below point estimates. ***, ** and * mean 1%, 5% and 10%
significance levels respectively.
more flat, i.e. shift income from the poor to the rich, the export price distribution becomes
more flat as well.
However, when income is shifted from the rich to the middle, the move of export
price distribution is very similar to the result when shifting income from the poor to the
middle. The potential reason is that the middle is very broadly defined, i.e. the people
above bottom 20% and below the top 20%. When the income is shifted to the middle, it
may be the rich part of the this group that benefit rather than the poor part. As a result,
the pries of low quantiles are decreased while the prices of high quantiles are increased.
From quantile regression, we show that the shift of export price distribution is related
to the shift of income distribution. In particular, if the income distribution is squeezed
from both tails to the middle, export price distribution is also squeezed from both tails to
the middle as well; if the income distribution becomes flat, so does the export price distri-
bution. These are consistent with the proposition on export price distribution and income
distribution, i.e. export price distribution is strongly related to income distribution.
4.5 Conclusion
This chapter develops a general equilibrium model with non-homothetic preference over
a continuum of qualities. The chapter shows a one to one relationship between income of
consumers and the quality they buy. This income-quality relationship is subject to income
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Note: The graph also includes the 95% confidence level.
Fig 4.5: Coefficients of income shift
distribution. The chapter further studies how the qualities are specialized under interna-
tional trade, and finds a quality specialization pattern that follows home market effect.
In particular, low (high) qualities are completely specialized in the poor (rich) country,
while medium qualities are incompletely specialized, i.e. produced by both countries and
exported to each other. Furthermore, the chapter shows a link between export price dis-
tribution and destination income distribution through the income-quality relationship and
quality specialization, and provides the empirical evidence.
The chapter provides an alternative framework to study the interaction between ver-
tical and horizontal differentiation of products and income distribution. Unlike nested-
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logit demand, the demand in this chapter is more related to the widely used CES prefer-
ence. Therefore, this model can be applied to a wider range of trade models built on CES
preference. It is hard to have reduced form on relationship between between income of
consumers and the quality they buy under the general income distribution, and it is not
observable for the mapping between quality and income of consumers in the trade data.
However, the advantage of the present chapter to test income-quality relationship is to
link export price distribution and destination income distribution.
The chapter focus sharply on the role of demand-side difference on explaining quality
specialization pattern in international trade. However, it is straightforward to include
quality-specific cost difference, i.e. comparative advantage from supply-side difference.
Therefore, the present model can be extended to study the impact of interaction between
demand-side and supply-side difference on trade pattern, which is an interesting question
for the future study.
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Chapter 5
VAT Rebates As Trade Policy: Evidence
from China
Value-added tax rebates (VATRs) is a commonly used export-promoting policy. This
chapter exploits China’s frequent adjustments of product level VATRs and large scale
data on export transactions to estimate VATRs effects on exports. Our preferred estimates,
which take into account the potential endogeneity of VATRs adjustments, suggest that a
one percentage point increase of VATRs does not affect export price while increasing ex-
port quantity by 1.15%. We also find that VATRs effects on exports operating through
extensive margin is 2.2%. Furthermore, firm welfare is increased by 2.15%, which trans-
lates to $2.14 in revenue for a $1 additional rebate from government.
5.1 Introduction
Value-added tax rebates (VATRs) is a commonly used trade policy. Exports are exempt
from VAT and input VAT for production, distribution and sales is fully or partially re-
funded to exporters. Feldstein and Krugman (1990) show that a partial rebate on VAT
presents an export tax, which is equivalent to the difference between VAT and VATR.
This gives rise to a controversial debate on VATRs because VATRs is allowed by WTO1
while export tax is supposed to be eliminated2. For example, since a partial rebate on VAT
generating a export tax tends to increase export price, the US Department of Commerce
announced on June 19 2012 that it would deduct the non-refunded VAT from the export
price to the US when calculating anti-dumping duties against China and Vietnam3. A
natural question that follows is: does VATRs affect export price in practice?
1See the footnote of Article 1.1a of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures of WTO.
2For example, please see Accession of The People’s Republic of China to WTO, “China shall eliminate
all taxes and charges applied to exports unless specifically provided for in Annex 6 of this Protocol or
applied in conformity with the provisions of Article VIII of the GATT 1994”.
3Federal Register Volume 77, Number 118 (Tuesday, June 19, 2012), pages 36481-36485.
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In China, VATRs is used as an export-promoting tool. The total expenditure on VATRs
peaked at 1.65 billion dollars in 2012. It accounted for 2% of GDP and more than 10%
of government total tax revenue for the last decade4. It has been adjusted more than 30
times since the tax reform in 1994. However, it is unclear whether VATRs is an effective
policy for promoting exports in practice. The present chapter exploits China’s frequently
adjustments of product-level VATRs and large scale data on export transactions to under-
stand this question. In the spirit of Hummels and Klenow (2005), this chapter is the first
study on how VATRs adjustments for a product affect export prices and quantities, i.e. the
intensive margin of trade, as well as the number of firms exporting that product and the
number of destinations that the product is exported to, i.e. the extensive margins of trade.
Theoretically, Feldstein and Krugman (1990) show in a pioneering piece of research
that a partial rebate on VAT makes non-refunded VAT act as an export tax. This export tax
is lower as VATR becomes higher. As a result, VATRs is positively related to exports.5
However, empirically studying the VATRs effects on exports is hindered by the potential
endogeneity between VATRs adjustments and exports. One potential source of the endo-
geneity is that VATRs could be adjusted in response to export shocks, which happened,
for example, during the recent economic crisis. Another potential source is the correla-
tion between VATRs adjustments and various unobserved factors that are likely to affect
export performance, e.g. product characteristics and industry-level policies.
A few empirical studies tackle these endogeneity problems in various ways. Chandra
and Long (2013) construct firm-level VATRs dividing total exports by the differential be-
tween net VAT payable and VAT calculated from value added6. They argue that in regions
with higher fiscal deficit rates, exporters are less likely to obtain rebates and consequently
have lower VATRs. Hence they use the regional fiscal deficit rate as an instrument for
firms’ VATRs. However, their study suffers from measurement error. On the one hand,
they underestimate VATRs as they are not able to exclude the input exempted from VAT,
e.g. some imported materials and exports that are not eligible for VAT rebate, such as pro-
cessing trade with supplied materials; on the other hand, their indirect measure of VATRs
tends to bias the estimated effects. For example, even without VATRs adjustments, in re-
gions with higher deficit rates exporters might skew the export to the products with lower
VATRs to avoid the risk of being not rebated. This adjustment of products within the firm
may affect the firm exports, which inevitably contaminates the estimated VATRs effect
in their paper. Gourdon et al. (2014) use the interaction between product-level VATRs
and the share of exports eligible for VATRs to look at export quantities. The larger the
share is, the larger the VATRs effects on export quantities are. They use sector-level fixed
effects to control for export shocks, but they are not able to control for other unobserved
4Calculated from 2012 China Statistical Year Book compiled by National Bureau of Statistics of China.
5The effect of VAT itself on exports is neutral in theory but negative in empirical studies (e.g. see
discussions in Feldstein and Krugman (1990) and Desai and Hines (2005)).
6In their paper, NetVAT payable =Valudeadded ∗17%−Exports∗VAT R
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factors that might be correlated with VATRs adjustment and export performance.
Departing from these studies, we employ a novel identification strategy to correct
for the potential endogeneity of VATRs adjustments. To circumvent the potential reverse
causality, we restrict our sample to the period from January 2005 to December 2006. Dur-
ing this period there is no relevant economic crisis in the world markets, which makes it
inherently unlikely that VATRs is adjusted in response to export shocks. In fact, the VA-
TRs adjustments during this period were aimed at upgrading China’s economy structure,
optimizing resource consumption and reducing environmental pollution. Consequently,
these adjustments were mainly reductions of VATRs for “high energy-consuming, high
polluting and resource-based products” (“Liang Gao Yi Zi” in Chinese)7 and increas-
ing the VATRs for high-tech equipment and IT products. Additionally, we use sector-
destination-time fixed effect to control for possible export shocks to the disaggregated
4-digit HS sectors. Our multi-dimensional data, i.e. firm-product-destination-month level
export transactions, also allows us to use various further fixed effects to correct for the
potential endogeneity arising from other unobserved factors at the firm or product level.
Therefore, VATRs adjustments for our analysis are plausibly exogenous.
We provide a simple model to show how the VATRs may affect firm export price and
quantity. On the one hand, VATRs makes the non-refunded VAT act as an export tax,
which affects how much the firms earn for each unit of export, i.e tax-exclusive price; on
the other hand, VATRs affects the perceived price of the input that are exempted from VAT
because the expenditure on these input should be excluded from exports when calculating
the rebates. Therefore, VATRs is more than just a regular export tax for the firms that use
input exempted from VAT. The model shows that if all the input a firm uses are exempted
from VAT, i.e. the firm has not paid any input VAT, the effects of VATRs would be zero.
On the contrary, if a firm uses smaller portion of input exempted from VAT, the effects
would be larger. Motivated by our model, we estimate VATRs effects on export price and
quantity in reduced forms. We construct export prices as unit values, i.e. export revenue
divided by export quantity, which are commonly used in the literature (e.g. Schott, 2004;
Hallak, 2006; Manova and Zhang, 2012). Our estimates suggest that VATRs adjustment
does not affect export price significantly. This result questions the US Department of
Commerce about the changes on anti-dumping duties against China. However, we find
that a one percentage point increase of VATRs increases export quantity by 1.15%. It is
not clear why consumers would want to buy more of a product following a higher VATRs
for the producers if this did not adjust prices. One potential reason could be that firms use
these higher rebates to upgrade the products, so that consumers receive higher quality for
the same price. Combine the effects on export price and quantity, we can find the total
7For example, see Fa Gai Jing Mao[2005] 1482 Hao and 2595 Hao, Circular No 1482 and 2595 jointly
issued by National Development and Reform Commission, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Commerce,
Ministry of Land and Resources, General Administration of Customs, State Administration of Taxation and
Ministry of Environmental Protection
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VATRs effect on exports of the affected product through intensive margin. That is 1.15%
increase of export value of the product by a given firm to a given destination with a one
percentage point increase of VATRs.
Our disaggregated data allows us to explore VATRs effects operating on the extensive
margins, i.e. the number of firms exporting the product to a given destination and the
number of destinations the product is exported to by a given firm. The estimates on
extensive margins show that with one percentage point increase of VATRs 1.43% more
firms are induced to export the affected product to a given destination. Additionally,
the number of destinations that the product is exported to by a given firm is increased by
0.77%. To find the total VATRs effect on exports of the affected product through extensive
margins, we can add up these two semi-elasticities. This means that a one percentage
point increase of VATRs increases exports by 2.2% through extensive margins, which
is larger than VATRs effect through intensive margin. Combine with the effect through
intensive margin, a one percentage point increase of VATRs contributes to 3.35% growth
of exports of the affected product in total, which indicates that VATRs is an effective trade
policy.
We also investigate the VATRs effect on tax-exclusive price of firms, which allows
us to understand the VATRs effect on firm welfare. The welfare, measured as the vari-
able profit, is proportional to revenue under monopolistic competition. We find that the
tax-exclusive price is increased by 1.00% for a one percentage point increase of VATRs.
Therefore, the revenue of exporting the adjusted product by a given firm to a given des-
tination is increased by 2.15%. This translates to a $2.14 increase in revenue with a $1
increase of the rebate. The VATRs effects on firm welfare are heterogeneous across trade
modes and ownerships. In particular, private-owned firms have the largest benefit while
foreign-owned firms have the lowest benefit. The reason is that foreign-owned firms use
input exempted from VAT more intensively than private-owned firms. This result is con-
sistent with our model.
This chapter contributes to the wider literature on trade policy that aims to promote
exports by refunding exporters, typically import duty drawback (IDD) and VATRs. IDD
refers to the refund of duty on imported inputs used for exporting products and has been
studied in various aspects, e.g. its impacts on tariff reforms, trade and welfare (e.g. Pana-
gariya, 1992; Chao et al., 2001; Chen et al., 2006; Cadot et al., 2003; Ianchovichina,
2004; Athukorala, 2006; Chao et al., 2006; Mah, 2007). There are also some studies on
VATRs that do not rely on firm level data: Chao et al. (2006) simulate a simple general
equilibrium model with a rise of IDD and VATRs (although the VATRs in their paper is
the refund of VAT paid on imported intermediate inputs). The results show positive effects
between exports and IDD as well as VATRs. Chen et al. (2006) find VATRs is positively
correlated with exports by use of Chinese country-level data. There are some literature on
the motivations of adoption and adjustments of VATRs as well, e.g. environmental con-
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cern (Eisenbarth, 2014; Gourdon et al., 2015) and subsidization of downstream sectors
(Garred, 2015; Gourdon et al., 2015).
This chapter contributes to the literature on explaining Chinese export growth (e.g.
Rodrik, 2006 and Girma et al., 2009). This chapter also contributes to a wide range of
studies of effects of various trade policy on international trade, e.g. free trade agreements
(Baier and Bergstrand, 2007, 2009), anti-dumping (Lu et al., 2013), economic integra-
tion agreements (Baier et al., 2014), tariffs (Debaere and Mostashari, 2010; Buono and
Lalanne, 2012) and WTO accession (Dutt et al., 2013). In particular, some literature
dissect the effects of trade policy into different margins. Lu et al. (2013) find trade-
dampening effect of anti dumping is mainly operating on extensive margins and Dutt et
al. (2013) show that the impact of the WTO on trade is almost exclusively through ex-
tensive margins. However, Baier et al. (2014) find effects of deeper economic integration
agreements are larger through intensive margin and Buono and Lalanne (2012) find the
same pattern on effects of tariff reduction.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In section 2 we introduce the history
and implementation of China’s export VATRs. In section 3 we present the empirical
models. In section 4 we describe how to construct data. In section 5 and 6 we report the
empirical results and some robustness checks. Section 7 is the conclusion.
5.2 China’s Export VATRs
Countries often tax imported goods to ensure an equal competitiveness between them and
domestic counterparts. VATRs is adopted to let exported products enter foreign markets
at tax-excluded prices. This policy is allowed by the World Trade Organization as long
as the tax rebate does not exceed the tax levied. In this section, we briefly introduce the
history and implementation of China’s VATRs.
5.2.1 A Brief History
China’s export VATRs was introduced in 1985, and was based on industrial and commer-
cial standard tax ( “Gong Shang Tong Yi Shui” in Chinese).8 In 1994, China reformed
its tax system with VAT becoming a major tax since then. At the same time, exports were
exempt from output VAT and input VAT was fully refunded.9 The current VATRs system
stems from this reform but has experienced a number of adjustments over the years.
In 1994, the rebate from the government increased by 150 percent to 75 billion yuan
8Exported goods were exempt from industrial and commercial standard tax, See Cai Shui Di 91 Hao
(1988), i.e. Circular No. 91 (1988) jointly issued by Ministry of Finance and State Administration of
Taxation.
9See Guo Wu Yuan Ling Di 134 Hao, “Provisional Regulations on Value-added Tax of People’s Republic
Of China” issued by State Council.
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with 30 billion yuan being deferred to 1995 due to the state’s budget constraint (Cui,
2003). At the same time VATRs fraud was considered to be a serious problem. To relieve
the heavy fiscal burden and solve the fraud problem, VATRs for products with 17% VAT
was decreased from 17% to 14% in July 1995 with a further reduction to 10% in January
1996, while VATRs for products with 13% VAT was decreased to 10% in July 1995 and
subsequently to 6% in January 1996.10
China’s export dropped after these adjustments and became even lower after the shock
of the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. Rather than depreciating its currency, the Yuan, the
government chose to increase VATRs to help stabilize exports. From January 1998 to
December 1999, VATRs was adjusted more than 10 times11. During this period, textile
and clothing products were the main product categories affected by adjustments, with
VATRs initially increased to 11%, subsequently to 13% and finally to 17%. Electronic
products and machinery equipment also received higher VATRs. There was a pervasive
adjustment in July 1999, with VATRs increasing from 13% or 11% to 15% and from 9%
to 13% for products with a VAT of 17%, and with VATRs increasing to 13% for non-
agricultural products whose VATRs was less than 13% and VAT was 13%.
From 2003 to 2007, China’s VATRs experienced adjustments more than 10 times.
During this period, the main aim of these adjustments was to upgrade the economy struc-
ture, to optimize resource consumption and to reduce environmental pollution12. VATRs
was increased for agricultural products, high-tech equipment and IT products. All the
remaining adjustments were to reduce or cancel VATRs for high energy-consuming and
polluting products (e.g., steel products, pesticide, chlorine and other chemical products),
resource-based products (e.g. rare earth metals, silicon, wooden products) and products
causing trade frictions (e.g. textile, clothing, toys).
During 2008 and 2009, China’s export was influenced by the global financial crisis.
Consequently, VATRs for the products whose exports were significantly affected were in-
creased, which included textiles, clothing, furniture, toys and electromechanical products.
For example, VATRs for textile and clothing products was increased 4 times, from 11%
to 13%, then to 14%, subsequently to 15% and finally to 16%. Furniture and electrome-
chanical products also experienced three adjustments of their VATRs.
Since 2010, even though the European debt crisis had a negative impact on China’s
exports, VATRs has not been increased by much. There are two possible explanations
10See Guo Fa Ming Dian [1995] 3 Hao, Circular No.3 [1995] issued by State Council on “Reducing Rate
and Strengthening management of Export Tax Rebate” and Guo Fa [1995] 29 Hao, Circular No. 29 [1995]
issued by State Council on “Reducing Rate of Export Tax Rebate”.
11Hereafter we do not denote the relevant circulars of adjustments. All our collected circulars can be
found in appendix D.
12For example, see Fa Gai Jing Mao[2005] 1482 Hao and 2595 Hao, Circular No 1482 and 2595 jointly
issued by National Development and Reform Commission, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Commerce,
Ministry of Land and Resources, General Administration of Customs, State Administration of Taxation and
Ministry of Environmental Protection
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for this lack of activity. Firstly, the adjustments after the global financial crisis were quite
substantial and left less room to increase VATRs further. Secondly, China shifted attention
to boosting domestic consumption in recent years and might have simply accelerated this
process under the pressure of slowing export growth.
To sum up, China’s initial adoption of VATRs was to promote exports. After these
increases in exports were achieved, further adjustments of VATRs were primarily aimed
at upgrading the economy structure and responding to external export shocks. As we
are investigating the effects of VATRs on exports in this chapter, it is important to avoid
adjustments that happened in response to (negative) export shocks. Consequently, we
select adjustments of VATRs from January 2005 to December 2006, i.e., the time period
where VATRs was primarily changed to upgrade China’s economic structure.
5.2.2 Implementation
For sales in the domestic market, VAT is ultimately borne by consumers. However, VAT
cannot be collected for exported products that are bought by final consumers outside of
China, effectively exempting them from VAT. However, exporters had to pay VAT on
inputs used in the production process. As exporters cannot collect output VAT from for-
eign importers to recover input VAT, the government refunds input VAT fully or partially.
There are three implementations of VATRs in practice:
The first implementation is no eligibility for VATRs. The firms have no eligibility if
they do not pay any input VAT, which can be the case if their only inputs are, for example,
tax-exempted goods purchased from local farmers or fishermen, bonded materials or sup-
plied materials for export processing firms, or where the paid input VAT is not entitled to
refunds, for example, if purchased from small-scale taxpayers who cannot provide VAT
invoices.
The second implementation is called exemption-refund. Exports are exempted from
VAT and input VAT is partially or fully refunded. Firms that are not active in domestic
markets, e.g. export intermediaries and some processing trade firms, are usually using
this implementation.
The third implementation is exemption-credit-refund. This implementation applies to
firms that have sales in both the domestic market and foreign markets. In this model,
exports are exempted from VAT and VAT paid on input materials purchased for the pro-
duction of export goods is offset against the output VAT collected on domestic sales. After
the offsetting, any excess amount of input VAT is refundable to the exporter.
According to Circular No. 7 cai shui [2002], the net VAT payable for eligible firms
is:
NetVAT payable=(Exports−BM)∗(VAT−VAT Rs)+Domesticsales∗VAT−Input ∗VAT
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where BM denotes the input which are exempt from VAT, typically the bonded materials,
entering China without payments of duty and VAT, to be reshipped out of China after
being stored, processed or assembled. If the net VAT payable is positive, firms need to
pay VAT; otherwise, firms are refunded by the government.
5.3 Identification and Empirical Models
5.3.1 A Simple Model
Input VAT for domestic sales is effectively covered by domestic consumers, while input
VAT for foreign importers is partially or fully refunded by the government. For simplicity,
we assume firms separately organize production for export from domestic sales. Produc-
tion of exports depends on labor l, input with VAT Il (typically the input from domestic
market), and input exempted from VAT Ib (typically the imported bonded materials). The
wage, price for input with VAT and price for input exempted from VAT are exogenously
given as w, pl and pb respectively. There is a fixed cost fx for the export market. The paid
input VAT is plIl ·VAT . Therefore, combining the net VAT payable in section 2, the profit
of the firm from exporting y units of output with f.o.b. export price p is:
pi = py−(wl+ plIl+ pbIb)− fx−(plIl ·VAT +((py− pbIb) · (VAT −VAT Rs)− plIl ·VAT ))︸ ︷︷ ︸
VAT Cost
There is a VAT cost to exporters if input VAT is only partially refunded. VAT cost is
decreasing as VATRs becomes higher. Also, if more input is exempted from VAT, VAT
cost is lower leading to a smaller expected effects of VATRs adjustment. Rearranging the
above equation, we get:
pi = (1−VAT +VAT Rs)py− (wl+ plIl)− (1−VAT +VAT Rs)pbIb− fx
On the one hand, VATRs adjustment affects how much the firm earns for each unit of
export, given by the tax-exclusive price ps = p(1−VAT +VAT Rs); on the other hand,
VATRs adjustment affects the perceived price of input exempted from VAT, pb(1−VAT +
VAT Rs).
Suppose firms operate in international market under monopolistic competition and
assume that the output of exports comes from a Cobb-Douglas production function:
y = ϕ · lα
(
Iβl I
1−β
b
)γ
where ϕ is the productivity parameter, 0 < β < 1, α > 0, γ > 0 and α+γ = 1. The firm’s
problem is to maximize the profit by choosing labor l, inputs Il and Ib. In the optimum,
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the marginal cost is:
mc = k · (1−VAT +VAT Rs)(1−β )γ
where k = w
α pβγl p
(1−β )γ
b
ϕαα (βγ)βγ [(1−β )γ](1−β )γ > 0 and 0 < (1−β )γ < 1. The marginal cost is constant
as output varies, but it is increasing as VATRs becomes higher. Now assume a demand
system x = A(τ p)−σ where A is a demand parameter and τ is variable export cost, then
the demand elasticity is σ . Therefore, the tax-exclusive price and f.o.b. export price are:
ps =
k · (1−VAT +VAT Rs)(1−β )γ
1−1/σ and p =
k · (1−VAT +VAT Rs)(1−β )γ−1
1−1/σ
Note that VATRs adjustments may also affect prices through k and σ . For example, as
the perceived price of the input exempted from VAT becomes higher, firms may change
the ratio between them and the other inputs, i.e. 1−β . With different marginal cost and
input structure, the elasticity σ , markup and demand may become different. With this in
mind, we refrain from placing more structure onto the model and focus on investigating
the effects of VATRs adjustment on export price and quantity in a reduced form.
Fig 5.1: VATRs adjustments under monopolistic competition
Fig 5.1 illustrates an example where demand has a constant elasticity and demand is
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not affected by the VATRs adjustment. The increase in VATRs will shift up marginal cost
(lnmc). The tax-exclusive price is increased, therefore marginal revenue (lnmr) of the
firm is increased as well. Note that the higher the share of input exempted from VAT in
total input is, i.e. the higher (1− β )γ is, the shift of the marginal cost curve is closer
to the shift of marginal revenue, leading to lower effects on export price, quantity and
tax-exclusive price.
5.3.2 Empirical Implementation
Export Price and Quantity
To explore the VATRs effects on export price and quantity, we consider the following
reduced form equations:
ln pi∈k jdt = δVAT Rsit + ςi j + ςkdt + εi∈k jdt (5.1)
lnyi∈k jdt = ρVAT Rsit + ςi j + ςkdt + εi∈k jdt (5.2)
where ln pi j∈kdt is the logarithm of export price of product i of sector k exported by firm j
to destination d at time t from China and lnyi j∈kdt the logarithm of export quantity.
ςi j is product-firm fixed effect. The presence is motivated by the fact that in the model,
the price is affected by firm productivity ϕ , cost share of labor and input materials α and
γ , as well as wage w, input prices pl and pb. These factors can be considered as time-
invariant within a firm in a short period (e.g. two years in our sample). Therefore their
effects can be controlled by product-firm fixed effect. The export price is also influenced
by demand elasticity, markup and consumers’ willingness to pay for quality, which may
vary across time, sectors and destinations (e.g. quality differentiation across countries as
in Schott (2004), Hummels and Klenow (2005), Hallak(2006), Bastos and Silva (2010),
Baldwin and Harrigan (2011), and Manova and Zhang (2012)). We use sector-destination-
time fixed effects ςkdt to control for these effects. ςkdt can also control for the demand
parameter A and variable export cost τ in the estimation of export quantity.
To empirically study VATRs effects on export is hindered by the potential endogeneity
of VATRs adjustments. The first source is that VATRs adjustments may be responses
to export shocks. For example, China experienced frequent VATRs adjustments during
Asian economic crisis or global financial crisis. This source of endogeneity should be
fairly minor in our sample due to our focus on the period from January 2005 to December
2006, a period without a relevant economic crisis in the world market and during which
VATRs adjustments were aimed at upgrading the economy structure, optimizing resource
consumption and reducing environmental pollution. In addition, sector-destination-time
fixed effect ςkdt will control for all export shocks at 4-digit HS sector level, even when the
export shocks vary cross countries and time.
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Another source of endogeneity is the correlation between VATRs adjustments and
various factors which are likely to affect export performance. For example, there is a pos-
sibility mentioned by Chandra and Long (2013) that officials may adjust those products
with better potential export performance. Another example is that VATRs is based on
VAT and VAT itself affects export (e.g. see Desai and Hines (2005)). Product-firm fixed
effect ςi j can control for these factors, as well as all other time-invariant firm, product and
industry characteristics that are related to VATRs adjustment and export performance.
However, we cannot control for the time-variant product level policies, e.g. import or
export tariff. We believe this bias is very small as tariff is less frequently adjusted than
VATRs and currently available annual tariff data cannot allow monthly variation within
each year. Moreover, sector-destination-time fixed effect ςkdt can control for the economic
conditions of foreign markets that are correlated with VATRs adjustments, e.g. exchange
rate fluctuations, aggregate expenditure and competition in the foreign markets.
Our main interest is in estimating the VATRs effects on export price and quantity, δ
and ρ respectively. However, the export value of product i of sector k exported by firm j
to destination d at time t from China is:
lnevi∈k jdt = ln pi∈k jdt + lnyi∈k jdt
Therefore we can get the VATs effect on export value as δ +ρ if δ and ρ are significant.
δ +ρ is also VATRs effect on export through intensive margin.
Export Extensive Margins
There are two possible extensive margins of trade that could be influenced by VATRs,
namely the number of firms exporting the product to a given destination, Ni∈kdt and the
number of destinations that the product is exported to by a given firm, Mi∈k jt . We study the
effects of VATRs adjustment on export extensive margins with the following estimating
equations:
lnNi∈kdt = µVAT Rsit + ςi+ ςkdt + εidt (5.3)
lnMi∈k jt = κVAT Rsit + ςi j + ςkt + εi jt (5.4)
Let evi∈k jdt be the average export value of product i of sector k exported at time t
across firms and destinations, then the export value of product i of sector k exported at
time t from China:
lnevi∈kt = lnevi∈k jdt + lnNi∈kdt + lnMi∈k jt
If µ and κ are both significant, we can find the total effect on extensive margins, i.e.
µ + κ . Note that the effect of VATRs on average export value evi∈k jdt is also denoted
as δ +ρ . Therefore the overall VATRs effect on export value of the adjusted product is
δ +ρ+µ+κ , as in Hummels and Klenow (2005). By analogy, the total VATRs effect on
89
export quantity of the adjusted product is given ρ+µ+κ .
Firm Welfare
Since the products are exported, we analyse the (domestic) welfare effect on firms. We
define the firm welfare as the variable profit for exporting the product, i.e. the net profit
plus the fixed cost as in Melitz (2003). Because the marginal cost is constant, the variable
profit is proportional to revenue.
W =
psy
σ
Given that the demand elasticity σ is not changed by VATRs adjustments, firm welfare is
affected only through the tax-exclusive price and the export quantity. Equation (2) tells
us the effect of VATRs adjustment on export quantity, ρ . Likewise, we use the following
equation to estimate the effect on the tax-exclusive price:
ln psi∈k jdt = λVAT Rsit + ςi j + ςkdt + εi∈k jdt (5.5)
Therefore the effect on the firm welfare (lnW ) is approximately given as ρ+λ .
5.4 Data
In this section we describe how we construct data and report some descriptive character-
istics of our data. Our data involves two sources. One is product-level data on VATRss,
the other is transaction-level data on exports from the Chinese Customs Trade Database.
We link the two data sets on the product level for the purpose of our empirical study.
5.4.1 VATRs
There is no public database recording all the product-level VATRs in monthly or yearly
frequency 13. The VATRs of all products after the last adjustment (included in our sam-
ple) in September 2006 are available on some websites, e.g. China’s Export Tax Rebate
Consulting Website14. We supplements this by collecting all the circulars on adjustments
of VATRs between January 2005 and December 2006 in SAT Taxation Law Database15.
In our analysis, products are defined as 8-digit HS products. For very few 8-digit HS
products, the adjustments affect subcategories of product at the 10 or 11-digit level. Be-
cause our data on exports is at 8-digit product-level, we drop the products where sub-10
13The State Administration of Taxation (SAT, http://www.chinatax.gov.cn ) provides the latest product-
level VATRs, recorded by HS code.
14http://www.taxrefund.com.cn, or http://cws.mofcom.gov.cn/accessory/200703/1174376723900.xls ac-
cessed on 12 February 2016.
15See Appendix Table A D.1 for details.
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(or 11)-digit HS products have different VATRs or are affected differently by VATRs ad-
justments. This exercise provides us with monthly VATRs information for 7,308 8-digit
HS products, covering the years 2005 and 2006. Table 5.1 reports the descriptive statistics
of adjustments.
Table 5.1: Descriptive statistics of adjustments on VATRs
Time Percentage points Number of
of adjustments adjusted products
April 2005 -13 17
-11 3
May 2005 -13 6
-8 2
-5 45
-3 11
-2 25
August 2005 -13 1
September 2005 -13 1
-11 1
January 2006 -13 67
-8 16
-5 27
-3 19
+11 1
+13 1
March 2006 -13 1
-11 1
September 2006 -13 136
-11 30
-8 64
-5 210
-4 2
-2 881
+2 2
+4 140
+8 32
At least adjusted once 1,692
Note: ”-” means that VATRs is reduced and ”+” means that
VATRs is increased.
Between 2005 and 2006, VATRs is adjusted 7 times. The adjustments in May 2005,
January 2006 and September 2006 involve 89 products, 131 products and 1,497 products
respectively. 1,692 products (23% of all products) are adjusted at least once. The scale
of adjustments varies from 2% to 13%. Taking into account that the maximum VATRs is
17%, the scale of these adjustments is fairly substantial.
A potential worry is that firms adjust exports in anticipation of future VATRs adjust-
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ments. Fortunately, during our observation period, the time between announcement of
VATRs and them coming into effect are very close, ranging from one day to ten days (see
Table A D.1), which makes potential anticipation effects highly unlikely.
5.4.2 Transaction-level Exports
Our transactional export quantities and prices are from Chinese Customs Trade Database
collected by the General Administration of Customs of China16. This database reports ex-
port (and import) transactional values and quantities by product-firm-destination (source
country for imports) at a monthly frequency. We use the unit values, i.e. export value
divided by quantity, to approximate prices, which is a common approach used in the lit-
erature (e.g. Schott, 2004; Hallak, 2006; Manova and Zhang, 2012).
The database also reports registry information of firms, including identifier, name,
ownership and the region the firm is situated in. These are time invariant and are cap-
tured by the product-firm fixed effects. For every transaction, this database also reports
the trade mode. There are 18 possible trade modes, but more than 90 percent of exports
are under “ordinary trade (OT)”, “processing trade with purchased materials (PTPM)”
or “processing trade with supplied materials (PTSM)”. PTPM, also known as import-
assembly trade, refers to “business activities in which the operating enterprise imports
materials/parts by paying foreign exchange for their processing and exports finished pro-
cessed products for sale abroad”. PTSM, also known as pure assembly trade, refers to
“the business activities in which the imported materials are supplied by the overseas en-
terprise, and the operating enterprise need not pay foreign exchange for the import, but
just carries out processing or assembling in accordance with the requirements of the over-
seas enterprise, and charges for the processing, with the finished products being marketed
by the overseas enterprise”17. Both PTPM and PTSM are eligible for some preferential
tariff and tax policies, while OT refers to trade under normal tariff regimes. Regarding
VATRs, there is a substantial difference between PTPM and PTSM. Under PTSM, op-
erating enterprises only get assembly fees and do not pay any input VAT, thus products
exported under PTSM are not eligible for VATRs. By contrast, under PTPM, operating
enterprises purchase materials from abroad and/or from the domestic market, and have
to pay input VAT, thus the products under PTPM are eligible for VATRs. Therefore we
only use exports under OT and PTPM. The database also records the modes of shipment,
including by air, highway, railway, sea and post. We aggregate the data across shipment
modes and trade modes, constructing a product-firm-destination-time level sample.
16Previous literatures exploiting this database include Manova and Zhang (2012) and Ahn et al. (2011).
17The definitions of PTPM and PTSM come from Order No.113 of the General Administration of Cus-
toms of the People’s Republic of China “Measures of the Customs of the Republic of China on the Super-
vision of Processing Trade Goods”.
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5.4.3 Merged Data
We link the two data sources at the product-month level and delete observations with
missing values to construct our final sample. Table 5.2 reports descriptive statistics of our
final data.
Table 5.2: Descriptive statistics of data
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
ln price 19,425,067 1.12 1.94 -11.33 18.08
ln quantity 19,425,067 7.82 2.60 0 21.92
ln tax-exclusive price 19,411,053 1.08 1.94 -11.42 18.08
VATRs(%) 19,448,390 12.50 2.66 0 17
VAT(%) 19,434,262 16.91 0.61 13 17
# Products 6,952
# Products at least adjusted once 1,581
# Firms 178,102
# Product-firm pairs 3,490,009
# Product-firm-destination pairs 7,615,698
In the final sample, we have more than 19 million observations on export price, quan-
tity, tax-exclusive price, VATRs and VAT. The merged sample covers 6,952 products, with
1,581 products for which VATRs are adjusted at least once. These products are exported
by 178,102 firms, leading to more than 3 million product-firm pairs and more than 7
million product-firm-destination pairs.
5.5 Empirical Results
5.5.1 Export Price and Quantity
We begin by looking at the effects of VATRs on export price and quantity. The results are
shown in Table 5.3.
Changes to VATRs do not significantly affect export price. The point estimate is
also small at 0.09 and precisely estimated, suggesting a negligible impact of VATRs on
prices. However, export quantity increases significantly with a rise of VATRs: A one
percentage point increase of VATRs, leads to an increase in export quantity by 1.15%.
Together these results imply that the firms export higher quantities at the same price after
an increase in VATRs. This indicates that demand for the product becomes larger. This
overall effect is of the expected direction. However, it is not clear why consumers would
want to buy more of a product following a higher VATRs for the producers if this was not
used to adjust prices. One potential reason could be that firms use these higher products
to upgrade products, so that consumers receive higher quality for the same price, or that
they engage in more aggressive marketing activities. This means the firms are potentially
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Table 5.3: VATRs effects on export price and quantity
Export price: ln p Export quantity: lny
VATRs(%) -0.09 1.15
(0.15) (0.54)**
product-firm
√ √
sector-destination-time
√ √
#product-firm pairs 1,732,336
# clusters 6,533
# observations 17,659,758
Standard errors are clustered at the product level and stated in parentheses be-
low point estimates. ***, ** and * mean 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels
respectively.
credit constrained. With the increase of VATRs, the firms become less constrained and
then invest in quality upgrading or marketing activities. This is consistent with the studies
that document the presence of credit constraints of Chinese firms (e.g. Poncet et.al., 2010)
and, more specifically, exporters (e.g. Manova and Yu, 2016).
Combining the effects on export price and quantity, export value increases by 1.15%
(the effect on export price is treated as zero as it is not significant). This is total effect
on exports through the intensive margin. We will assess the overall effects of VATRs
adjustment on exports after discussing the effects on the extensive margins.
5.5.2 Extensive Margins
Table 5.4 presents the estimation results for the extensive margins, measured as the num-
ber of firms exporting the product to a given destination and the number of destinations
that the product is exported to by a given firm.
Table 5.4: Effects of VATRs adjustments on extensive margins
Number of Firms: lnN Number of destinations: lnM
VATRs(%) 1.43 1.42 0.77 0.78
(0.24)*** (0.25)*** (0.21)*** (0.21)***
product
√ √
sector-destination-time
√ √
product-firm
√ √
sector-time
√ √
Products all continuously all continuously
products exported products exported
# clusters 6,773 4,977 6,575 4,977
# observations 3,337,687 3,260,803 10,185,366 9,994,870
Standard errors are clustered at the product level and stated in parentheses below point
estimates. ***, ** and * mean 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively.
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The effects of VATRs adjustment on the number of firms are reported in the first two
columns while the effects on number of destinations in the last two columns. In order
to avoid potential biases due to the development of new product and the cessation of
production of products, we also estimate both effects using only those products that are
continuously exported throughout the whole period. As shown in Table 5.4, the effects in
both specifications are practically identical.
We find that the effects of VATRs adjustment on extensive margins are significant.
If the VATRs of a product is increased, it will be exported by more firms to a given
destinations and it will be exported to more destinations by a given firm as well. In
particular, a one percentage point rise of VATRs increases the number of firms exporting
this product by 1.43% while the number of destinations that the product is exported to
is increased by 0.77%. By adding these two semi-elasticities, the total VATRs effect on
exports through extensive margins is then 2.2%. This effect is attributed to the entry of
new firms into the product market and then entry of new destinations of the product.
5.5.3 VATRs effects on Exports
We have estimated the VATRs effects on export price, quantity and extensive margins.
A one percentage point increase of VATRs increases export by 1.15 % along intensive
margin and by 2.2% along extensive margins. It is straightforward that extensive margins
play a larger role for VATRs to adjust export. Indeed the effects through extensive margins
are almost twice of the effects through intensive margin. In total, export of the product is
increased by 3.35%. According to statistics from World Bank, the average growth rate of
export for China is 23.5% in 2005 and 2006. That is to say, one percentage point increase
of VATRs can contribute one seventh of the growth. Moreover, the average growth rate for
East Asia and Pacific countries, Europe and central Asia countries and OECD countries
are 12.4%, 7.57% and 7.32% respectively. In this sense, VATRs is a fairly effective trade
policy to adjust export.
In our analysis, because the VATRs effect on export price is negligible, a one percent-
age point increase of VATRs increases export quantity by 3.35%. Using product-level
data, Gourdon et. al (2014) estimate VATRs effect on export quantity by use of interac-
tion term between VATRs and share of eligible export for VATRs in total exports, as well
as interaction term between VATRs and share of non-eligible export. The coefficient of
interaction term between VATRs and share of eligible export is around 7%. They argue
that this is the effect of VATRs on export quantity. Indeed this is the upper bound of the
VATRs effect, when the share of eligible export is one. However the share is less than one,
thus VATRs effect on export quantity should be smaller. Moreover, their estimates could
is biased because their data is not as disaggregated as ours, making it impossible to con-
trol for firm-level and destination-level factors that are correlated to VATRs adjustments
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and export performance.
Chandra and Long (2013) construct firm level VATRs dividing total exports by the
differential between net VAT payable and VAT calculated from value added. They argue
that in regions with high deficit rate exporters are less likely to obtain rebate and have
lower VATRs. Hence they use regional fiscal deficit rate as an instrument of firm VATRs
and find a one percentage point increase of VATRs raises firm export value by 13%. In
our analysis, the export value of the adjusted product by a given firm is increased by
1.92% (i.e. 1.15%+0.77%). The reason that their effect is much larger is twofold. Firstly,
their study suffers from measurement error. On the one hand, they underestimate VATRs
by including the input exempted from VAT and the non-eligible export for VAT rebate
in the total export; on the other hand, their indirect measure of VATRs tends to bias the
estimated effects. For example, even without VATRs adjustments, in regions with higher
deficit rates exporters might skew the export to the products with lower VATRs to avoid
the risk of being not rebated. This adjustment of products within the firm may affect the
firm exports, which inevitably contaminates the estimated VATRs effect. Secondly, our
analysis cannot capture the effects that a firm exports multiple products that are adjusted
or that the firm may add products.
5.5.4 Firm Welfare
To investigate the effect of VATRs on the change in firm welfare arising from exporting a
given product, we first estimate equation (5) to get the VATRs effect on the tax-exclusive
price. The results are shown in the first column of Table 5.5. A one percentage point
increase of VATRs raises the tax-exclusive price by 1.00%. As noted in section 3, firm
welfare measured as the variable profit is proportional to export revenue under monopo-
listic competition. Therefore, combined with the effect on export quantity 1.15%, a one
percentage point increase of VATRs raises firm welfare by 2.15%.
As shown in section 3, the rebate from the government to the firm exporting the prod-
uct is −((py− pbIb)(VAT −VAT Rs)− plIlVAT ). In order to approximately quantify the
change of revenue for a $1 rebate, we assume there is no input exempted from VAT Ib. Let
the export value and VATRs before adjustment be ev0 = p0y0 and VAT Rs0 respectively.
The export value is increased by 1.15%. Ignore the change of input that are entitled VAT
Il , then change of VATRs refunded by government with one percentage point increase of
VATRs:
ev0× (VAT −VAT Rs0)− ev0× (1+1.15%)× (VAT −VAT Rs0−1%)
The firm revenue r0 = ps0y0 = ev0(1−VAT +VAT Rs) is increased by 2.15%:
ev0(1−VAT +VAT Rs)×2.15%
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Taking the average rates of VAT and VATRs, 16.9% and 12.5% respectively, into the
above equations, we can calculate the ratio between change in revenue and rebate, which
is 2.14. This means on average a one percentage point increase of VATRs translates to
a $2.14 increase in revenue of the adjusted product with a $1 additional rebate from the
government.
The VATRs effects on firm welfare vary across trade modes and ownerships, as shown
in other columns in Table 5.5. The effect on firms that export under OT is almost three
times larger than the effect on firms that export under PTPM. The effect on private-owned
firms is the largest while the effect on foreign-owned firms is the smallest. The reason
is that input exempted from VAT are more prevalent in PTPM than OT, and also more
dominant in foreign-owned firms than in private- and state-owned firms. These hetero-
geneity are consistent with the results derived in section 3, i.e. the higher the share of
input exempted from VAT is, the smaller is the effect of VATRs adjustment.
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5.6 Robustness Check
One potential concern is that the data in monthly frequency does not allow time for firms
to react to VATRs adjustment. We use the lagged VATRs by 3 months as a robustness
check. The results are shown in the first column in Table 5.6. The effects are quite
consistent with previous results.
Table 5.6: Robustness check
Export price: ln p
VATRs(%) 0.08 0.20 0.24
(0.15) (0.36) (0.27)
Export quantity: lnx
VATRs(%) 0.98 0.89 0.87
(0.41)** (1.00) (0.87)
Tax-exclusive price: ln ps
VATRs(%) 0.85 1.24 0.94
(0.12)*** (0.36)*** (0.27)***
Firm welfare: lnW
ρ+λ 1.83 1.24 0.94
Number of firms: lnN
VATRs(%) 1.53 1.33 1.54
(0.26)*** (0.47)*** (0.49)***
Number of destinations: lnM
VATRs(%) 0.77 0.95 1.00
(0.19)*** (0.18)*** (0.20)***
lagged VAT Rst−3
√ √
6-digit sector
√ √
Standard errors are clustered at the product level and stated in
parentheses below point estimates. All regressions include firm-
product and sector-destination-time fixed effects. If the ρ or λ is
not significant, it is treated as zero when adding ρ and λ . ***, **
and * mean 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively.
Given that VATRs adjustments are in 8-digit HS product level, we have used 4 digit
HS sectors to control export demand shocks. To allow strict control on export shocks, we
also report the results using 6 digit HS sectors as a robustness check in the second and
third column. The effect on export quantity disappears. However, it is not clear that this
specification is actually preferable: Though more disaggregated sectors allow for stricter
control of export demand shocks, it also soaks up more of the variation in the data, which
might lead to attenuation bias .
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5.7 Conclusion
This chapter exploits China’s frequent adjustments of product level VATRs and large scale
data on export transactions to estimate VATRs effects on exports. Based on corrections
for the potential endogeneity of VATRs adjustment, this chapter finds non-trivial VATRs
effects on export, with the effects along extensive margins larger than the effects along
intensive margin. We find that the export price is not affected by VATRs adjustment. This
result suggests that to deduct the non-refunded VAT from the export price to the US when
calculating anti-dumping duties against China might not be justified. Moreover, export
quantity is increased with higher VATRs. This indicates that an increase of VATRs may
push firms to upgrade the quality of exports.
We also find the tax-exclusive price is increased by an increase of VATRs. Conse-
quently the firm welfare is increased as well. On average VATRs effect on firm welfare
translates into a $2.14 increase in revenue of the adjusted product with a $1 additional
rebate from the government. This means an increase of VATRs will benefit the society as
a whole.
VATRs effects on firm welfare are heterogeneous across trade modes and ownerships.
In particular, the effect on firms that export under OT is larger than the effect on firms that
export under PTPM, while the effect on private-owned firms is larger than the effects on
state-owned and foreign-owned firms. This suggests a possibility for the government to
make best use of expenditure on rebates by choosing specific products to allocate more
benefit to some groups, e.g. choosing products that are pervasively exported by specific
firm ownership or under certain trade mode.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
6.1 Summary
This thesis analyses firm exporting behaviour and trade policy of export VATRs in China.
In chapter 2, pure exporters are studied in a general equilibrium model with heteroge-
neous firms in terms of productivity, entry cost and demand in both domestic and foreign
market. Hardly surprising, a pure exporter faces lower demand-adjusted foreign entry cost
than demand-adjusted domestic entry cost; and, its productivity allows it to earn profit in
the foreign market, but its productivity is not high enough for it to earn profit in the domes-
tic market. Non-exporters, pure exporters and ordinary exporters co-exist in equilibrium.
For any given demand-adjusted domestic entry cost, the productivity of pure exporters is
lower than productivity of non-exporters. Therefore, the presence of a large portion of
pure exporters can make the average productivity of exporters lower than average pro-
ductivity of non-exporters. The move from autarky to trade on the one hand pushes firms
with low productivity and high demand-adjusted foreign entry cost out of the market; on
the other hand induces some firms with even lower productivity and low demand-adjusted
foreign entry cost into the market as pure exporters. Therefore given a large portion of
pure exporters the move from autarky to trade can result in lower average productivity.
Furthermore, this chapter studies the effects of trade liberalization in terms of changes of
the conditional distribution of foreign entry cost and variable export cost. Similarly the
chapter studies the effects of innovation in terms of a change of the conditional distribu-
tion of productivity. A decrease in foreign entry cost raises the cut-off productivity for
both domestic and foreign market. Therefore among firms with any given combination of
demand-adjusted domestic and foreign entry costs, the least productive firms are pushed
out of the market while the least productive ordinary exporters become pure exporters or
non-exporters. A decrease in variable export cost raises the cut-off productivity to serve
the domestic market and decreases the cut-off productivity to serve the foreign market.
Hence some non-exporters are pushed out of the market, some non-active firms and or-
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dinary exporters become pure exporters. Innovation has the same effects as an decrease
in foreign entry cost. The effects of trade liberalization and innovation are channelled
through labor markets, where competition for labor becomes more intensive resulting in
higher real wage.
In chapter 3, pure exported products are studied a general equilibrium model with
multiproduct firms, where products within a firm are heterogeneous in productivity and
fixed export cost. Indeed, firms benefit from existing exported products to export a new
product. In the model, firms endogenously choose the number of products produced and
exported. High productive firms can manage more products in export than in domestic
market due to pure exported products. This chapter then examines the reallocation across
firms and within firms from autarky to trade. Exposure to trade forces the least productive
firms out of the market, and induces high productive firms to export. All firms drop the
least productive products from domestic market after trade. Across exporters, low pro-
ductive exporters export a subset of left products. Medium productive exporters export all
left products and switch domestic-dropped products to pure exported products. All these
firms manage less products after exposure to trade. However, high productive exporters
export all left products, switch all domestic-dropped products to pure exported products
and introduce new products as pure exported products. High productive exporters manage
more products from autarky to trade. In general, trade decreases the number of products
managed by low productive firms but increases the number of products managed by high
productive firms. This chapter also explores the impact of trade liberalization in terms of
decreases in fixed and variable export cost on the number of products produced and ex-
ported. Both decreases in trade cost have similar effects. Least productive firms are forced
out of the market while more firms are induced to export. Firms shrink in domestic mar-
ket along both intensive margin (how much of a given product) and extensive margin, but
expand in export market along both margins. More firms manage export-only products,
which means more firms have higher extensive margin of export than of domestic market.
Similar to the effect from autarky to trade, for low productive firms, trade liberalization
decreases the number of products managed; but for high productive firms otherwise.
Chapter 4 develops a general equilibrium model with non-homothetic preference over
product quality. In the model, there is a one to one income-quality relationship, which
gives rise to a continuum of qualities under a general income distribution. Moreover, the
quality-income relationship generates a non-homothetic demand for any product of any
quality. Given a quality, the quality-income relationship reveals the income of consumers
that choose this quality. Because each consumer buys one unit of composite of the quality,
total units of the composite are the number of the consumers that choose this quality,
which is given by income distribution and total labor in the country. Then the demand
for each product within that quality is derived as in the CES preference. The income-
quality relationship is subject to the income distribution, i.e. the consumers with the same
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income will choose different qualities under different income distribution. In the open
economy, the model considers two countries, the poor and the rich. The ratio of number
of consumers that choose the same quality in the rich country to the poor country, i.e. the
relative demand of a quality, is increasing with quality. When the two countries trade with
each, the paper finds a quality specialization pattern between them and the pattern follows
home market effect. If the relative demand is very high (low) compared with the trade cost
across all qualities, all qualities are completely specialized in the rich (poor) country, i.e
produced in the rich (poor) country and exported to the other. If the relative demand is
neither high enough nor low enough across all qualities, all qualities are incompletely
specialized, i.e. produced in both countries and exported to each other. If the relative
demand is increasing from low enough to high enough, there is a mixed specialization.
That is, low (high) qualities are completely specialized in the poor (rich) country, while
medium qualities are incompletely specialized. This model builds a link between export
price distribution and destination income distribution. This chapter further provides two
evidence of the model. The first evidence is that rich people do choose high quality and
pay high price. The second evidence is that export price distribution is strongly related to
destination income distribution by use of quantile regression. In particular, when income
is shifted from the rich (poor) people to the poor (rich) people, export prices of low (high)
quantiles are increased (decreased) while export prices of high quantiles decreased.
In chapter 5, the trade policy of export VATRs is analysed. The potential endogene-
ity is corrected with various strategies. To circumvent the potential reverse causality,
we restrict our sample to the period from January 2005 to December 2006. During this
period there is no relevant economic crisis in the world markets, which makes it inher-
ently unlikely that VATRs is adjusted in response to export shocks. In fact, the VATRs
adjustments during this period were aimed at upgrading China’s economy structure, opti-
mizing resource consumption and reducing environmental pollution. Consequently, these
adjustments were mainly reductions of VATRs for “high energy-consuming, high pol-
luting and resource-based products” (“Liang Gao Yi Zi” in Chinese) and increasing the
VATRs for high-tech equipment and IT products. Additionally, we use sector-destination-
time fixed effect to control for possible export shocks to the disaggregated 4-digit HS
sectors. Our multi-dimensional data, i.e. firm-product-destination-month level export
transactions, also allows us to use various further fixed effects to correct for the potential
endogeneity arising from other unobserved factors at the firm or product level. There-
fore, VATRs adjustments for our analysis are plausibly exogenous. Motivated by a simple
model, the estimates suggest that VATRs adjustment does not affect export price signifi-
cantly. However, a one percentage point increase of VATRs increases export quantity by
1.15%. That is 1.15% increase of export value of the product by a given firm to a given
destination with a one percentage point increase of VATRs. Moreover the estimates on ex-
tensive margins show that with one percentage point increase of VATRs 1.43% more firms
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are induced to export the affected product to a given destination. Additionally, the number
of destinations that the product is exported to by a given firm is increased by 0.77%. This
means that a one percentage point increase of VATRs increases exports by 2.2% through
extensive margins, which is larger than VATRs effect through intensive margin. Com-
bine with the effect through intensive margin, a one percentage point increase of VATRs
contributes to 3.35% growth of exports of the affected product in total, which indicates
that VATRs is an effective trade policy. It is also found that the tax-exclusive price is
increased by 1.00% for a one percentage point increase of VATRs. Therefore, the revenue
of exporting the adjusted product by a given firm to a given destination is increased by
2.15%. This translates to a $2.14 increase in revenue with a $1 increase of the rebate. The
VATRs effects on firm welfare are heterogeneous across trade modes and ownerships. In
particular, private-owned firms have the largest benefit while foreign-owned firms have
the lowest benefit. The reason is that foreign-owned firms use input exempted from VAT
more intensively than private-owned firms.
6.2 Policy Implications
The analysis on pure exporters and pure exported products in chapter 2 and chapter 3 show
that firms may benefit from pure exporting behaviour, especially those low productive
firms with low foreign entry cost. In the traditional research, low productive firms loose
from international trade because they are forced out of the market. However, if the foreign
entry cost is low enough, these firms can survive in foreign markets. Moreover, some
non-active firms become pure exporters under international trade and liberation of trade.
This means trade policy that decrease trade barriers could lead to a positive effect on
these low productive firms, acting as a “protecting” tool. In China, there exists some
policy favouring pure exporting behaviour. For example, corporate income tax rates for
Chinese firms is 30%, however foreign-invested enterprises that export more than 70%
of their output have a lower income tax rate of 15%. Firms that located in some specific
locations, e.g. free trade zone or coastal zone, will have a lower income tax rate 10% if
they export more than 70% of their output (15% or 24% if they export less than 70% of
their output). These policy benefit the pure exporting behaviour, however, to access the
welfare of these policy is complicated. One the one hand, in chapter 2 and 3, models
assume symmetric countries, which means both countries have the pure exporters. If one
country has more pure exporters, it will have more pure imported products as well, then
the overall varieties are increased, leading to a higher welfare. In reality, the countries are
not symmetric. In particular, China purely exports to developed countries, but developed
countries do not purely export to China. In this case, the policy favouring pure exporters
may reduce the domestic varieties, leading to a low welfare. On the other hand, these
favouring policy may distort the firm export behaviour. In the models of chapter 2 and 3,
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firms self select to become pure exporters or manage pure exported products. However,
given these policy on corporate tax, firms may scarify the domestic market in return of
a lower tax. This distortion may reduce the number of varieties in domestic market and
lead to a lower welfare. In conclusion, these policy benefit some firms, especially those
low productive firms with low foreign entry cost, they may hurt domestic consumers by
reducing the number of varieties.
In chapter 4, we depart from the research that have focused on the effects of supply-
side factors on international trade, e.g. productivity, comparative advantage, factor en-
dowments. These studies favour the policy that are related to productivity innovation,
skilled labor training or human capital accumulation. These policy will increase the com-
petition of export or upgrade the bundle of export. However in our analysis, we provides
an alternative mechanism that quality specialization is purely driven by demand-side fac-
tor, i.e. income distribution. In order to export a product or become the net exporter of
a product, the country should have larger domestic demand than foreign demand. There-
fore, the policy that increases the income will nurture an industry and increase the export
quality. Moreover, the policy that increases the income of all people will upgrade the
quality of the export. Furthermore, the policy that redistribute the income across people,
e.g. from the rich to the poor will also shift the qualities of export and increase the overall
quality. Chapter 4 shows a quality specialization pattern that rich countries specialize in
high qualities and poor countries specialize in poor qualities. Both countries will benefit
from trade. However, if rich countries impose an importing duty on the low qualities im-
ported from the poor country, the welfare could be worse. On the one hand, the increase
of the importing price force the consumers that choose these qualities before the duty is
imposed to buy lower qualities; on the other hand, this importing duty can have general
equilibrium effect on consumers that choose high qualities: there would be more varieties
with high quality if the employment that is occupied by producing low qualities due to
the protecting duty is released to produce high qualities.
Chapter 5 studies the trade policy of export VATRs, and it is found that the policy is
quite effective in promoting export, i.e. a one percentage point increase of VATRs increase
the export of the affected product by 3.35%. Moreover, on average a one percentage point
increase of VATRs translates to a $2.14 increase in revenue of the adjusted product with a
$1 additional rebate from the government. Though the rebate from government is higher,
the revenue for firms is increased by much more. This means an increase of VATRs will
benefit the society as a whole. Therefore, export VATRs could be adjusted to curb or
promote export. VATRs effects on firm welfare are heterogeneous across trade modes
and ownerships. In particular, the effect on firms that export under OT is larger than the
effect on firms that export under PTPM, while the effect on private-owned firms is larger
than the effect on state-owned and foreign-owned firms. This suggests a possibility for
the government to make best use of expenditure on rebates by choosing specific products
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that are pervasively exported by specific firm ownerships or under certain trade modes.
For example, if the government selects products for which private-owned firms have the
largest export share, then private-owned firms will benefit the most. Likewise, if the gov-
ernment selects products for which the export share is the largest under OT, then the firms
that export under OT will benefit more than firms under PTPM. Another implication of
VATRs is that it may provide the credit to the firms. Those firms that are credit constrained
will benefit. As shown in chapter 5, with the same price, export quantity is increased with
the increase of VATRs. This result suggests that with the additional credit from VATRs
firms may upgrade the quality or engage in more aggressive marketing. In China, private
Chinese firms are credit constrained while state-owned firms and foreign-owned firms are
not (e.g. Poncet et.al, 2010). This is consistent with our results that welfare of private
firms are increased most. Consider the large number of private firms and their contribu-
tion to employment and economic growth, VATRs may have big impacts to the whole
economy in China. VATRs effects are far more than adjusting export and are worthy of
further exploration.
6.3 Future Studies
One direction of future studies is to introduce more factors into the models. Currently the
models in chapter 2, 3 and 4 assume only one factor as the input of firms, i.e. labor. It is
interesting to introduce two factors, e.g. labor and capital or skilled labor and unskilled
labor. With two factors, the model is able to allow the effects of factor endowment and to
include multi-sectors with different intensity of capital/labor ratio and skilled/unskilled. It
will show the potential sector-specific effects. Moreover, to introduce two factors can also
contribute to the studies of the wage premium. Especially, the skill-biased technology can
be introduced into firms as another source of heterogeneity.
Another direction of future studies is to analyse quality specialization with interaction
of demand-side difference and supply-side difference. The chapter 4 focus sharply on
the role of demand-side difference on explaining quality specialization pattern in interna-
tional trade. However, it is straightforward to include quality-specific cost difference, i.e.
comparative advantage from supply-side difference. If the rich country has comparative
advantage in high qualities, i.e. the marginal cost ratio between the rich and the poor
country is decreasing as the quality becomes higher, this supply-side comparative advan-
tage will reinforce our quality specialization pattern. However, if the relative demand of
quality between the rich and the poor country is decreasing as the quality becomes higher,
e.g. with Pareto income distribution in both countries, then the supply-side comparative
advantage will offset the relative demand, and the quality specialization can even be re-
versed. That is, the model in chapter 4 can be extended to study the impact of interaction
between demand-side and supply-side difference on trade pattern, which is an interesting
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question for the future study.
The third direction of future studies is to analyse the various effects of export VATRs.
In chapter 5, it is found that VATRs makes firms export more quantity with the same
export price. One potential reason is that firms are upgrading the quality of export with
higher rebates. This could be used to estimate the quality of exports. VATRs is product-
specific, therefore the adjustments of VATRs gives the cost variations of products within
a firm. This can be used to study the reallocation effects between products within a
firm. We can also study the VATRs effects on employment and wage of firms. Firm-
level VATRs can be constructed as exports-weighted product-level VAT rebates within
the firm. As we know that the exports under processing trade with supplied materials
are no eligible for VAT rebates while other exports are eligible. Thus, we have a natural
treatment group and control group. Difference-in-difference can be applied to identify the
effects on employment and wage, and to other interesting topics related to export VATRs.
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Appendix A
Appendix of Chapter 2
A.1 All Variables in the Equilibrium
Let ϒ be the probability of an entrant becoming active, then
ϒ=
∫
η
∫
ϕ∗(η)
λ (ϕ,η)d(ϕ,η)
where ϕ∗(η) = min{ϕ∗d (P, fd,Ad),ϕ∗x (P, fx,Ax)}. For ( fi,Ai), zi = f 1/(σ−1)i /Ai. It fol-
lows from equation (2.2) that ϕ∗(η) = ϕ∗d (P, fd,Ad) if zd < τzx and ϕ
∗(η) = ϕ∗x (P, fx,Ax)
if zd > τzx.
LetΠp be the average profit earned by incumbents. In equilibrium we useΠ to denote
the expected profit per date, so Π should be equal to the profit earned conditional on
successful entry, i.e. Π= ϒΠp.
Let Me denote the amount of entrants and M the amount of incumbents. Since suc-
cessful entrants will replace the dead firms, we have Mδ = Meϒ. Labor L is used for
production by incumbents Lp and investment by entrants Le. The labor for entrants is
Le = MeFe. With equation (2.3), we have
Le = MeFe =
δM
ϒ
Π
δ
= M
Π
ϒ
= MΠp
MΠp is the total profit eared by all incumbents, therefore we have R = Lp +MΠp =
Lp + Le = L. Total revenue is fixed as the total labor. Let r¯ and f¯ be the average rev-
enue and fixed cost of incumbents respectively. Then Πp = r¯/σ − f¯ . It follows that
r¯ = σ(Πp + f¯ ) = σ(δFe/ϒ+ f¯ ). With ϒ, we can also denote the distribution of incum-
bents as λ (ϕ,η)/ϒ. f¯ is the average market entry cost of incumbents,
f¯ =
∫
η
∫
ϕ∗d (P, fd ,Ad)
fd
λ (ϕ,η)
ϒ
d(ϕ,η)+
∫
η
∫
ϕ∗x (P, fx,Ax)
fx
λ (ϕ,η)
ϒ
d(ϕ,η)
109
In equilibrium, we have found the price index and cut-off productivities. So ϒ and f¯
are known. Then the amount of incumbents M can be determined by:
M =
R
r¯
=
L
σ(δFe/ϒ+ f¯ )
Appendix 1.1 contains an alternative route to above equation using labor market.
Let the Sd denote the area {η |zd < τzx} and Sx the area {η |zd > τzx}. Non-exporters
are located in the Sd area and the amount is determined by:
Mne = M
∫
Sd
∫ ϕ∗x (P, fx,Ax)
ϕ∗d (P, fd ,Ad)
λ (ϕ,η)
ϒ
d(ϕ,η)
Pure exporters are located in Sx area and amount of pure exporters is determined by:
Mpe = M
∫
Sx
∫ ϕ∗d (P, fd ,Ad)
ϕ∗x (P, fx,Ax)
λ (ϕ,η)
ϒ
d(ϕ,η)
An alternative way to find number of incumbents
For a firm (ϕ, fd, fx,Ad,Ax), let q be the output in the domestic market, labor used to serve
the domestic market is fd +q/ϕ = fd +ρ p(ϕ)q= fd +σρ(pid(P,ϕ, fd,Ad)+ fd) = (σ−
1)pid(P,ϕ, fd,Ad)+σ fd . By analogy, the labor used to export is (σ −1)pix(P,ϕ, fx,Ax)+
σ fx.
With ϒ, the distribution of incumbents is λ (ϕ,η)/ϒ. Then the total labor for incum-
bents Lp is
Lp = M
∫
η
∫ ∞
ϕ∗d (P, fd ,Ad)
((σ −1)pid(P,ϕ, fd,Ad)+σ fd) λ (ϕ,η)ϒ d(ϕ,η)
+M
∫
η
∫ ∞
ϕ∗x (P, fx,Ax)
((σ −1)pix(P,ϕ, fx,Ax)+σ fx) λ (ϕ,η)ϒ d(ϕ,η)
Combine with equation (2.4) and (2.5), we get
Lp =
M
ϒ
· ((σ −1)Π+σ ϒ f¯ )
where f¯ has been shown in Appendix A.1. The labor for entrants Le is:
Le = Me ·Fe = δMϒ ·
Π
δ
=
MΠ
ϒ
Then total labor L is:
L = Lp+Le =
M
ϒ
· (σΠ+σ ϒ f¯ )
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With equation (2.3), we have the number of incumbents:
M =
R
r¯
=
L
σ(δFe/ϒ+ f¯ )
This equation has been shown in Appendix A.1.
A.2 Average Productivity of Exporters and Non-exporters
Let ϕ∗d (zd) = ϕ
∗
d (P, fd,Ad) and ϕ
∗
x (zx) = ϕ∗x (P, fx,Ax) denote the cut-off productivities.
Let ϕ∗(zd,zx) =min{ϕ∗d (zd),ϕ∗x (zx)}. Then the probability of an entrant becoming active
ϒ is determined as:
ϒ=
∫
zd ,zx
∫
ϕ∗(zd ,zx)
g(ϕ)γ(zx)ψ(zd)d(ϕ,zd,zx)
According to equation (2.2), ϕ∗(zd,zx) = ϕ∗d (zd) if zd < τzx and ϕ
∗(zx,zd) = ϕ∗x (zx) if
zd > τzx. The distribution of incumbents is then g(ϕ)γ(zx)ψ(zd)/ϒ.
Therefore the average productivity of exporters can be denoted as:
Ψe =
∫
zd ,zx
∫ ∞
ϕ∗x (zx)
ϕ
g(ϕ)γ(zx)ψ(zd)
ϒ
M d(ϕ,zd,zx)∫
zd ,zx
∫ ∞
ϕ∗x (zx)
g(ϕ)γ(zx)ψ(zd)
ϒ
M d(ϕ,zd,zx)
=
∫
zd
∫
zx
∫ ∞
ϕ∗x (zx)
ϕg(ϕ)γ(zx)ψ(zd)dϕdzxdzd∫
zd
∫
zx
(1−G(ϕ∗x (zx)))γ(zx)ψ(zd)dzxdzd
In equilibrium, P is determined. Together with equation (2.2), we can get:
Ψe =
θ
θ −1 ·
∫
zx
ϕ∗x (zx)
1−θ γ(zx)dzx∫
zx
ϕ∗x (zx)
−θ γ(zx)dzx
=
θ
θ −1 ·
θ +β
θ +β −1 ·
Θ
P
· τZx
Let Sd denote the area {(zd,zx) |zd < τzx} and Sx the area {(zd,zx) |zd > τzx}. Average
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productivity of non-exporters is :
Ψne =
∫
Sd
∫ ϕ∗x (zx)
ϕ∗d (zd)
ϕ
g(ϕ)γ(zx)ψ(zd)
ϒ
M d(ϕ,zd,zx)∫
Sd
∫ ϕ∗x (zx)
ϕ∗d (zd)
g(ϕ)γ(zx)ψ(zd)
ϒ
M d(ϕ,zd,zx)
=
∫
zd
∫ ∞
zd/τ
∫ ϕ∗x (zx)
ϕ∗d (zd)
ϕg(ϕ)γ(zx)ψ(zd)dϕdzxdzd∫
zd
∫ ∞
zd/τ
(G(ϕ∗x (zx))−G(ϕ∗d (zd)))γ(zx)ψ(zd)dzxdzd
In equilibrium, P is determined. Together with equation (2.2), we can get:
Ψne =
θ
θ −1 ·
∫
zd
∫ ∞
zd/τ
(ϕ∗d (zd)
1−θ −ϕ∗x (zx)1−θ )γ(zx)ψ(zd)dzxdzd∫
zd
∫ ∞
zd/τ
(ϕ∗d
−θ −ϕ∗x−θ )γ(zx)ψ(zd)dzxdzd
=
θ +β
θ +β −1
θ +β +α
θ +β +α−1 ·
Θ
P
·Zd
A.3 Average Productivity in Autarky and under Trade
In autarky, the probability of an entrant becoming active ϒa is determined as:
ϒa =
∫
zd
∫
ϕ∗d (zd)
g(ϕ)ψ(zd)d(ϕ,zd)
The average productivity in autarky is:
Ψa =
∫
zd
∫ ∞
ϕ∗d (zd)
ϕ
g(ϕ)ψ(zd)
ϒa
M d(ϕ,zd)
M
=
∫
zd
∫ ∞
ϕ∗d (zd)
ϕg(ϕ)ψ(zd)dϕdzd∫
zd
(1−G(ϕ∗d (zd)))ψ(zd)dzd
=
θ
θ −1 ·
θ +α
θ +α−1 ·
Θ
Pa
·Zd
With trade the average productivity after trade can be expressed as:
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Ψ =
∫
zx,zd
∫ ∞
ϕ∗(zd ,zx)
ϕ
g(ϕ)γ(zx)ψ(zd)
ϒ
M d(ϕ,zd,zx)
M
=
∫
Sd
∫ ∞
ϕ∗d (zd)
ϕg(ϕ)γ(zx)ψ(zd)dϕdzxdzd +
∫
Sx
∫ ∞
ϕ∗x (zx)
ϕg(ϕ)γ(zx)ψ(zd)dϕdzxdzd∫
Sd
(1−G(ϕ∗d (zd)))γ(zx)ψ(zd)dϕdzxdzd +
∫
Sx
(1−G(ϕ∗x (zx)))γ(zx)ψ(zd)dϕdzxdzd
=
θ
θ −1 ·
∫ ∞
Zd
∫ ∞
zd/τ
ϕ∗d (zd)
1−θ γ(zx)ψ(zd)dzxdzd +
∫ ∞
Zd
∫ zd/τ
Zx
ϕ∗x (zx)
1−θ γ(zx)ψ(zd)dzxdzd∫ ∞
Zd
∫ ∞
zd/τ
ϕ∗d (zd)
−θ γ(zx)ψ(zd)dϕdzxdzd +
∫ ∞
Zd
∫ zd/τ
Zx
ϕ∗x (zx)
−θ γ(zx)ψ(zd)dϕdzxdzd
=
θ
θ −1 ·
θ +β
θ +β −1 ·
α(θ−1)
θ+β+α−1Zd(
τZx
Zd
)
θ+β
+βτZx
αθ
θ+β+α (
τZx
Zd
)
θ+β
+β
· Θ
P
A.4 A Decrease in Foreign Entry Cost
λ ′( fx |ϕ,Ad,Ax) is the conditional distribution of foreign entry cost, and λ ( fx |ϕ,Ad,Ax)
is the conditional distribution with a decrease of foreign entry cost. Λ′( fx |ϕ,Ad,Ax) and
Λ( fx |ϕ,Ad,Ax) are the corresponding cumulative distributions. The change of condi-
tional profit ∆pi(P |ϕ,Ad,Ax) is then:
∆pi(P |ϕ,Ad,Ax) =
∫ f ∗x (P,ϕ,Ax)
0
( f ∗x (P,ϕ,Ax)− fx)(λ ( fx |ϕ,Ad,Ax)−λ ′( fx |ϕ,Ad,Ax))d fx
= ( f ∗x (P,ϕ,Ax)− fx)(Λ( fx |ϕ,Ad,Ax)−Λ′( fx |ϕ,Ad,Ax))| f
∗
x (P,ϕ,Ax)
0
−
∫ f ∗x (P,ϕ,Ax)
0
(−1)(Λ( fx |ϕ,Ad,Ax)−Λ′( fx |ϕ,Ad,Ax))d fx
=
∫ f ∗x (P,ϕ,Ax)
0
(Λ( fx |ϕ,Ad,Ax)−Λ′( fx |ϕ,Ad,Ax))d fx
With property of LEFC, i.e. Λ( fx |ϕ,Ad,Ax)≥Λ′( fx |ϕ,Ad,Ax), ∆pi(P |ϕ,Ad,Ax)≥ 0.
Therefore pi(P |ϕ,Ad,Ax) becomes higher.
A.5 Innovation
λ ′(ϕ |η) denotes the conditional distribution of productivity and λ (ϕ |η) denotes the
conditional distribution with innovation. Λ′(ϕ |η) and Λ(ϕ |η) are the corresponding
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cumulative distributions. The change of k(x) is:
∆k(x) =
∫ ∞
x
(
(
ϕ
x
)σ−1−1
)(
λ (ϕ |η)−λ ′(ϕ |η))dϕ
=
(
(
ϕ
x
)σ−1−1
)
(Λ(ϕ |η)−Λ′(ϕ |η)) |∞x −
∫ ∞
x
(σ −1)ϕσ−2
xσ−1
(Λ(ϕ |η)−Λ′(ϕ |η))dϕ
= −
∫ ∞
x
(σ −1)ϕσ−2
xσ−1
(Λ(ϕ |η)−Λ′(ϕ |η))dϕ
With property of HP, i.e. Λ(ϕ |η)≤ Λ′(ϕ |η), ∆k(x)≥ 0. Therefore k(x) is increased.
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Appendix B
Appendix of Chapter 3
B.1 Existence of Closed Economy Equilibrium
With equations (3.4), (3.5), (3.6) and (3.7),we define a function f (ϕ∗) such that equilib-
rium is determined by f (ϕ∗) = δ fefd , where
f (ϕ∗) =
∞
∑
i=1
∫ ϕ∗i+1
ϕ∗i
(
i
∑
j=1
β j−1k(ϕ)− i
)
g(ϕ)dϕ
We prove the existence of equilibrium by showing that f (ϕ∗) is monotonically decreasing
from infinity to zero as ϕ∗ approaches to infinity from zero. The derivative of f (ϕ∗) is:
f ′(ϕ∗) =
∞
∑
i=1
∫ ϕ∗i+1
ϕ∗i
i
∑
j=1
β j−1
dk(ϕ)
dϕ∗
g(ϕ)dϕ+
∞
∑
i=1
{(
i
∑
j=1
β j−1k(ϕ∗i+1)− i
)
g(ϕ∗i+1)
dϕ∗i+1
dϕ∗
−
(
i
∑
j=1
β j−1k(ϕ∗i )− i
)
g(ϕ∗i )
dϕ∗i
dϕ∗
}
To rewrite the above equation, we can get:
f ′(ϕ∗) =
∞
∑
i=1
∫ ϕ∗i+1
ϕ∗i
i
∑
j=1
β j−1
dk(ϕ)
dϕ∗
g(ϕ)dϕ+
∞
∑
i=1
(
1−β i−1k(ϕ∗i )
)
g(ϕ∗i )
dϕ∗i
dϕ∗
where β j−1k(ϕ∗i ) = β j−1(
ϕ∗i
ϕ∗ )
σ−1
= 1. So The derivative of f (ϕ∗) is:
f ′(ϕ∗) =
∞
∑
i=1
∫ ϕ∗i+1
ϕ∗i
i
∑
j=1
β j−1
dk(ϕ)
dϕ∗
g(ϕ)dϕ
where dk(ϕ)dϕ∗ < 0. So f
′(ϕ∗) < 0. As ϕ∗ approaches to zero (infinity), k(ϕ) approaches
to infinity (zero), as a result f (ϕ∗) approaches to infinity (zero). f (ϕ∗) is monotonically
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decreasing from infinity to zero. There must be a unique ϕ∗ such that:
f (ϕ∗) =
δ fe
fd
There exists a unique equilibrium in closed economy.
B.2 Existence of Open Economy Equilibrium
With equations (3.6), (3.7), (3.13), (3.14) and (3.15), we assume a function f (ϕ∗) such
that equilibrium is determined by f (ϕ∗) = δ fe, where:
f (ϕ∗) = f1(ϕ∗)+ f2(ϕ∗x )
where
f1(ϕ∗) = fd
∞
∑
i=1
∫ ϕ∗i+1
ϕ∗i
(
i
∑
j=1
β j−1k(ϕ)− i
)
g(ϕ)dϕ
f2(ϕ∗x ) = fx
∞
∑
i=1
∫ ϕ∗i+1,x
ϕ∗i,x
(
i
∑
j=1
β j−1kx(ϕ)− (i−1)γ
)
g(ϕ)dϕ
We prove the existence of equilibrium by showing that f (ϕ∗) is monotonically decreasing
from infinity to zero as ϕ∗ approaches to infinity from zero. According to appendix on
the existence of closed economy, f ′1(ϕ
∗)< 0. The derivative of f2(ϕ∗x ) is:
f ′2(ϕ
∗
x ) =
∞
∑
i=1
∫ ϕ∗i+1,x
ϕ∗i,x
i
∑
j=1
β j−1
dkx(ϕ)
dϕ∗
g(ϕ)dϕ+
∞
∑
i=1
{(
i
∑
j=1
β j−1kx(ϕ∗i+1,x)− (i−1)γ
)
g(ϕ∗i+1,x)
dϕ∗i+1,x
dϕ∗
−
(
i
∑
j=1
β j−1k(ϕ∗i,x)− (i−1)γ
)
g(ϕ∗i,x)
dϕ∗i,x
dϕ∗
}
To rewrite the above equation, we can get:
f ′2(ϕ
∗
x ) =
∞
∑
i=1
∫ ϕ∗i+1,x
ϕ∗i,x
i
∑
j=1
β j−1
dkx(ϕ)
dϕ∗
g(ϕ)dϕ− kx(ϕ∗x )g(ϕ∗x )
dkx(ϕ∗x )
dϕ∗
+
∞
∑
i=2
(
γ−β i−1k(ϕ∗i,x)
)
g(ϕ∗i,x)
dϕ∗i,x
dϕ∗
where dkx(ϕ
∗
x )
dϕ∗ < 0, kx(ϕ
∗
x ) = 0, γ − β i−1k(ϕ∗i,x) = (γ + β i−1)(1− fx/τ1−σ fd) < 0 and
dϕ∗i,x
dϕ∗ > 0. So we can get f
′
2(ϕ
∗
x )< 0. Therefore:
f ′(ϕ∗)< 0
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As ϕ∗ approaches to zero (infinity), k(ϕ) approaches to infinity (zero), as a result f (ϕ∗)
approaches to infinity (zero). f (ϕ∗) is monotonically decreasing from infinity to zero.
There must be a unique ϕ∗ such that:
f (ϕ∗) = δ fe
There exists a unique equilibrium in open economy.
B.3 From Autarky to Trade
We use prime to denote the state after exposure to trade. ϕ∗ and ϕ∗i denote cut-off pro-
ductivity in autarky, and ϕ ′∗ and ϕ ′∗i denote cut-off productivity for domestic in open
economy. According to appendix on the existence of equilibrium in closed economy and
open economy, ve and v′e are decreasing functions and v′e > ve. The curve ve is below e v′e.
So in equilibrium, ϕ ′∗ > ϕ∗ and ϕ ′∗i > ϕ∗i .
B.4 Trade liberalization
We use prime to denote the state after trade liberalization. As for decrease in variable
export cost, according to appendix on existence of open economy equilibrium, ϕ∗ is de-
termined by F(ϕ∗,τ) = f1(ϕ∗)+ f2(ϕ∗x ) = δ fe. So:
dϕ∗
dτ
=− ∂F(ϕ
∗,τ)/∂τ
∂F(ϕ∗,τ)/∂ϕ∗
From appendix on existence of open economy equilibrium, we can get
∂F(ϕ∗,τ)
∂τ
=
∞
∑
i=1
∫ ϕ∗i+1,x
ϕ∗i,x
i
∑
j=1
β j−1
dkx(ϕ)
dτ
g(ϕ)dϕ+
∞
∑
i=2
(
γ−β i−1k(ϕ∗i,x)
)
g(ϕ∗i,x)
dϕ∗i,x
dτ
where dkx(ϕ
∗
x )
dτ and
dϕ∗i,x
dτ are partial derivatives in respect to τ . So
dkx(ϕ∗x )
dτ < 0 and
dϕ∗i,x
dτ < 0.
We can get ∂F(ϕ
∗,τ)
∂τ < 0.
∂F(ϕ∗,τ)
∂ϕ∗ < 0 as shown in appendix on existence of open economy
equilibrium. Therefore, we have
dϕ∗
dτ
< 0
As variable export cost decreases, ϕ∗ and ϕ∗i increase.
ϕ∗x is determined by Γ(ϕ∗x ,τ) = f1(ϕ∗)+ f2(ϕ∗x ) = δ fe. So:
dϕ∗x
dτ
=− ∂Γ(ϕ
∗
x ,τ)/∂τ
∂Γ(ϕ∗x ,τ)/∂ϕ∗x
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From appendix on the existence of closed economy equilibrium, we can get
∂Γ(ϕ∗x ,τ)
∂τ
=
∞
∑
i=1
∫ ϕ∗i+1
ϕ∗i
i
∑
j=1
β j−1
dk(ϕ)
dτ
g(ϕ)dϕ
where dk(ϕ)dτ is partial derivative in respect to τ . Partial derivative
dk(ϕ)
dτ > 0. So
∂Γ(ϕ∗x ,τ)
∂τ >
0. ∂F(ϕ
∗
x ,τ)
∂ϕ∗x
< 0. So
dϕ∗x
dτ
> 0
As variable export cost decreases, ϕ∗x and ϕ∗i,x decrease.
As for the decrease in fixed export cost, the proof is similar. The result is:
dϕ∗
d fx
< 0
dϕ∗x
d fx
> 0
As variable export cost decreases, ϕ∗ and ϕ∗i increase while ϕ∗x and ϕ∗i,x decrease.
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Appendix C
Appendix of Chapter 4
C.1 Existence of Solutions with Initial Value
Firstly I describe the theorem on existence and uniqueness of solution to first order differ-
ential equation. Given a general first order differential equation:
y′ = F(x,y) with an initial value (x0,y0) (∗)
Suppose a region R:
R = {(x,y)|x0−a≤ x≤ x0+a,y0−b≤ y≤ y0+b}
contains (x0,y0).
Picard’s Existence Theorem Suppose that both F(x,y) and ∂F∂y are continuous functions
defined in the region R, then there is a positive number ε ≤ a so that a unique solution to
(∗) exists for the x0− ε < x < x0+ ε .
Secondly I prove the existence of the solution to income-quality differential equaiton.
Differential equation is w′ = F(q,w), where
F(q,w) =
φ(w)
qφ ′(w)
(
σ +(σ −1)qc
′(q)
c(q)
− δw(Lφ(w))
1
σ
c(q)
σ−1
σ
)
and
∂F(q,w)
∂w
=
σ
q
+
(σ −1)c′(q)
c(q)
− (1+ 1
σ
)
δw(Lφ(w))
1
σ
qc(q)
σ−1
σ
− φ(w)
q
f (q,w)
where
f (q,w) =
φ ′′(w)
(
σ +(σ −1)qc
′(q)
c(q)
)
+
δL
1
σ
c(q)
σ−1
σ
(
φ(w)
1
σ φ ′(w)−wφ(w) 1σ φ ′′(w)
)
φ ′(w)2
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According to Picard’s existence theorem, for any given initial value (q0,w0) where
q0 > 0 and w0 ∈ [wmin,wmax], there is a positive number ε2 that a unique solution to (*)
exists in the open interval (w0− ε2,w0 + ε2). Here w(q) should be continuous across
qualities, so we assume ε2 is as large as [wmin,wmax] ∈ (w0−ε2,w0+ε2). That is, there is
a unique solution across [wmin,wmax].
If φ(w) is not continuous around wmax but φ(wmax) = 0, there still is a unique solution
across [wmin,wmax). Because there are no consumers with income wmax, this solution on
[wmin,wmax) is feasible.
C.2 Equilibrium of Closed Economy
Because φ ′(w∗) = 0, In order to let F(q,w) be continuous at w∗. The quality consumed
by consumer with income w∗, denoted as q∗, is determined as:
δw∗(Lφ(w∗)
1
σ =
(
σ +(σ −1)q
∗c′(q∗)
c(q∗)
)
c(q∗)
σ−1
σ
In this case,
lim
w→w∗
F(q,w) =− lim
w→w∗
φ(w)δL
1
σ
qφ ′′(w)
·
(
φ(w)
1
σ +φ(w)
1
σ−1φ ′(w)w/σ
c(q)
σ−1
σ
)
As long as φ ′′(w) 6= 0,
lim
w→w∗
F(q,w) =− δL
1
σ φ(w∗)
1
σ+1
φ ′′(w∗)q∗c(q∗)
σ−1
σ
Therefore, we asset the point (q∗,w∗) into the function F(q,w) and
F(q,w) =

φ(w(q))
qφ ′(w(q))
(
σ +(σ −1)qc
′(q)
c(q)
− δw(q)(Lφ(w(q)))
1
σ
c(q)
σ−1
σ
)
if w 6= w∗
− δL
1
σ φ(w∗)
1
σ+1
φ ′′(w∗)q∗c(q∗)
σ−1
σ
if w = w∗
is continuous. And
∂F(q,w)
∂w
is continuous because
lim
w→w∗
∂F(q,w)
∂w
=
δw∗(Lφ(w∗))
1
σ
2q∗
(
φ ′′′(w∗)φ(w∗)
w∗φ ′′(w∗)2
− 1
σc(q∗)
σ−1
σ
)
6=±∞
Therefore F(q,w) and ∂F(q,w)/∂w are continuous for w ∈ [wmin,wmax]. According to
Appendix C.1, there exists a unique equilibrium with the initial value (q∗,w∗).
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C.3 Uniform Distribution
The Closed Economy
Suppose the income distribution density is φ(w) = 1/(wmax−wmin).
Theorem 18 Given a uniform distribution, there is a unique equilibrium in closed econ-
omy.
Proof: With uniform distribution,
Pq =
σ
δ
(
Wmax−Wmin
L
) 1
σ
c(q)
σ−1
σ
With equation (4.4), we can find the income-quality relationship w(q). Then then the
number of firms producing quality q is determined as nq =
(
(σ−1)Pq
σc(q)
)1−σ
. The labor
used in differentiated products of quality q is then LPq/(wmax−wmin). The labor used in
homogeneous products that are consumed by consumers choosing quality q is L(w(q)−
Pq)/(wmax−wmin). Therefore labor market clears.
The Open Economy
With uniform distribution, we can solve equation (4.9) and get the price index for qualities
under incomplete specialization:
Pzq =
σ
δ
(
W zmax−W zmin
Lz(1+ τ1−σ )
) 1
σ
c(q)
σ−1
σ
The relative demand between country z and country z˜ for all qualities under incomplete
specialization is ρ = L
z(W z˜max−W z˜min)
Lz˜(W zmax−W zmin) . Therefore, all qualities are under incomplete special-
ization if τ−σ < ρ < τσ and all qualities are completely specialized in z(z˜) country if
ρ > τσ (< τ−σ ). The price index is then determined as in equation (4.12), e.g. under
complete specialization in z country:
Pzq =
σ
δ
(
Lz
W zmax−W zmin
+
τLz˜
W z˜max−W z˜min
)− 1σ
c(q)
σ−1
σ
There cannot exist the mixed specialization, i.e. some qualities are under complete spe-
cialization and some qualities are under incomplete specialization.
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C.4 Pareto Distribution
The Closed Economy
A family of distribution: φ ′(w)< 0 for all w ∈ [wmin,wmax]. φ(wmin)> 0, φ(w) is contin-
uous and differentiable around wmin. φ(wmax)≥ 0 and if φ(wmax) 6= 0, φ(w) is continuous
and differentiable around wmax.
Examples of distributions of this family include Pareto, truncated Pareto and exponen-
tial distributions. Given a distribution φ(w) of the family, according to C.1 and assump-
tion 1, there exists a unique solution w(q) that meets the conditions P′q > 0 and w′(q)> 0
for any given initial value (q0,w0) that belongs to set O. For different initial values that
belong to set o, there are different solutions. However, they can be ranked by all con-
sumers. Only one solution of them is preferred by consumers of all income levels than all
the others, and the equilibrium with this solution is Pareto Superior equilibrium.
Theorem 19 Given a distribution of the family described above, there is a Pareto Supe-
rior equilibrium.
Proof: Any two solutions to equation (4.8) do not cross. This means solutions can
be ranked. The solution which determines the largest quality consumed by any given
w ∈ [wmin,wmax] is Pareto superior. 
Example 1 Pareto distribution φ(w)= λwλm/wλ+1, where λ+1<σ . c(q)=ϕqθ , θ > 0.
Let κ = 1+ θ(σ−1)α(σ−λ−1) and Ξ =
σσϕσ−1
Lδσλwλm
, the solution to the income-quality differential
equation is:
Pq =
(
Ξκλ+1
) 1
σ−λ−1 q
θ(σ−1)
σ−λ−1(
1+ γq
α(σ−λ−1)+θ(σ−1)
λ+1
) λ+1
σ−λ−1
where γ is an constant. Different values of γ mean different initial values. This corre-
sponds to the Lemma 1 that for each value γ there is a solution. However, only the values
of γ that satisfy conditions P′q > 0 and w′(q)> 0 are feasible. Given a maximum quality q
that consumers can choose, the condition of γ is that γ < θ(σ−1)(λ+1)(ασ+θ(σ−1))(σ−λ−1)q
−α(σ−λ−1)−θ(σ−1)
λ+1 .
Therefore there exists a set of initial values that correspond to the feasible values of γ to
satisfy Assumption 1.
As a matter of utility of consumers, the lower price level is, the higher utility for
consumers. Therefore there is a γ that all consumers prefer, i.e. the largest feasible γ ,
which determines the Pareto superior equilibrium. Because income is not upper bounded
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in Pareto income distribution, possible highest quality is infinity. Therefore the pareto
superior γ is zero. The price index is then
Pq = (Ξκλ+1)
1
σ−λ−1 q
θ(σ−1)
σ−λ−1
The Open Economy
With Pareto distribution, it will be Case I or Case III. Firstly consider the situation
λP = λR = λ , assumption 2 is not satisfied, which means the relative demand is not
increasing but fixed. However we can still apply Case I. According to Theorem 15, if
LRφRwRm
λ
/(LPwPm
λ
)≤ τλ+1−σ (LRφRwRmλ/(LPwPmλ )≥ τσ−λ−1) (here we add the relation-
ship of equality, it is straightforward to verify this), all qualities are completely specialized
in poor (rich) country. The price index of the country z that all qualities are specialized is
determined by the differential equation (4.12):
Pzq =
(
Ξczκλ+1/(1+ τ1−σ )
) 1
σ−λ−1 ·q θ(σ−1)σ−λ−1(
1+ γzqα(σ−λ−1)+θ(σ−1)λ+1
) λ+1
σ−λ−1
where where Ξcz =
σσϕσ−1z
(Lzϖλz +τ
−λ
z˜ Lz˜ϖ
λ
z˜ )λδσ
and γz is determined as
γz =
θ(σ −1)(λ +1)
(ασ +θ(σ −1))(σ −λ −1)q
−α(σ−λ−1)−θ(σ−1)
λ+1
and q is the maximum quality under incomplete specialization. According to income-
quality relationship (4.2) and above price index, under complete specialization, the quality
chosen by the consumers with infinite income is infinity, i.e. limw→∞ q(w) = ∞. That is,
the maximum quality in both countries are infinite, i.e. q = ∞. Therefore according to
Lemma 1, the Pareto superior γz is zero. The price index is then
Pzq = (Ξ
c
zκ
λ+1)
1
σ−λ−1 q
θ(σ−1)
σ−λ−1
The price index in the other country is then Pq = τPzq . The condition (4.3) is satisfied
in both countries given the above price index. However according to Theorem 16, if
τλ+1−σ < LRφRwRm
λ
/(LPwPm
λ
) < τσ−λ−1, all qualities are under incomplete specializa-
tion. To solve the differential equation (4.12), we have
Pzq =
(
Ξzκλ+1/(1+ τ1−σ )
) 1
σ−λ−1 ·q θ(σ−1)σ−λ−1(
1+ γzqα(σ−λ−1)+θ(σ−1)λ+1
) λ+1
σ−λ−1
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where Ξc = σ
σϕσ−1
Lzδσλwzmλ
. And by analogy, q = ∞ and γz = 0. The price index is then
Pzq = (Ξzκ
λ+1
z )
1
σ−λ−1 q
θ(σ−1)
σ−λ−1
The condition (4.3) is satisfied in both countries given the above price index.
Now consider the situation λP 6= λR, it will be the Case III. Then there is one value q∗
that Pz˜q/P
z
q = τz˜ where Pzq and Pz˜q are determined as in equation (4.12) and{z, z˜} ∈ {P,R}.
Now I denote the price index under incomplete specialization in equation (??) as Pzq(γ iz)
and Pz˜q(γ iz˜). Under complete specialization in z country, I denote price index in z country
as Pzq(γcz ) and price index in z˜ country as τz˜Pzq(γcz ). If Pz˜q/Pzq = τz˜ at q∗, there is a change
between incomplete specialization and complete specialization in z country. Because
price index should be continuous and differentiable in both countries, we have
Pz˜q∗(γ
i
z˜)/P
z
q∗(γ
i
z) = τz˜
Pzq∗(γ
i
z) = P
z
q∗(γ
c
z )
Pzq
′(γ iz)|q=q∗ = Pzq ′(γcz )|q=q∗
Pz˜q
′
(γ iz˜)|q=q∗ = τz˜Pzq ′(γcz )|q=q∗
We have four equations four unknowns q∗, γ iz, γ iz˜ and γcz . After solving the equations, we
can know which interval of quality is specialized P country, R country or both countries.
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C.5 Other Tables
Table C.1: Variables and description
Variable Code Source and description
Household
Disposable in-
come
P389p Derived household characteristics data: 2013 dvhh ukanon
OECD scale OECDSc Derived household characteristics data: 2013 dvhh ukanon
Equivalised
disposable
income
EqIncDOp Derived household characteristics data: 2013 dvhh ukanon
Bread
Expenditure C11121t Derived household characteristics data: 2013 dvhh ukanon
Equivalised
expenditure
C11121t/OECDSc
Equivalised
expenditure of
substitutes
Derived household characteristics data: 2013 dvhh ukanon; Includes ex-
penditure on Rice (C11111t), Buns, crisp bread and biscuits (C11122t) Pasta
products (C11131t), Cakes and Puddings (C11141t),Pastry(C11142t) and
Other breads and cereals(C11151t); then divided by OECD scale
Equivalised
quantity
LCF food diary: restricted familyfood2013; Include quantity of White
bread, standard, unsliced (20102), White bread, standard,sliced (25202),
White bread, premium, sliced and unsliced (25701), White bread, soft grain,
sliced and unsliced (25801), Brown bread, sliced and unsliced (25901),
Wholemeal and granary bread, sliced and unsliced (26001), Rolls - white,
brown or wholemeal(26302), Malt bread and fruit loaves (26303), Vienna
and French bread (26304), Starch reduced bread and rolls (26305) and Other
breads(26308); then divided by OECD scale
Price Expenditure of above products divided by quantity of above products
Wine
Expenditure C21211t Derived household characteristics data: 2013 dvhh ukanon
Equivalised
expenditure
C21211t/OECDSc
Equivalised
expenditure of
substitutes
Derived household characteristics data: 2013 dvhh ukanon; Includes ex-
penditure on Spirits and liqueurs (C21111t), Fortified wine (C21212t),
Ciders and Perry (C21213t), Alcopops (C21214t), Champagne and
sparkling wines (C21221t), Beer and lager (C21311t); then divided by
OECD scale
Equivalised
quantity
38403 LCF food diary: restricted familyfood2013; quantity of 38403 divided by
OECD scale
Price 38403 Expenditure of 38403 divided by quantity
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Table C.2: Country samples and number of varieties
Country number Percent Cum.
Germany 5,377 14.51 14.51
France 4,288 11.57 26.08
Italy 4,107 11.08 37.16
United Kingdom 3,642 9.83 46.99
Romania 3,369 9.09 56.08
Norway 2,906 7.84 63.92
Spain 1,973 5.32 69.25
Netherlands 1,828 4.93 74.18
Denmark 1,647 4.44 78.63
Sweden 1,294 3.49 82.12
Bulgaria 1,027 2.77 84.89
Belgium 942 2.54 87.43
Turkey 872 2.35 89.78
Croatia 807 2.18 91.96
Poland 706 1.91 93.87
Finland 464 1.25 95.12
Austria 372 1.00 96.12
Greece 261 0.70 96.83
Ireland 261 0.70 97.53
Czech Republic 231 0.62 98.15
Portugal 215 0.58 98.73
Hungary 109 0.29 99.03
Latvia 98 0.26 99.29
Slovenia 41 0.11 99.40
Malta 39 0.11 99.51
Estonia 35 0.09 99.60
Slovak Republic 34 0.09 99.70
Lithuania 33 0.09 99.78
Luxembourg 30 0.08 99.87
Iceland 28 0.08 99.94
Cyprus 22 0.06 100.00
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Table C.3: Income shift from the rich to the poor and middle
Quantile Quantile Quantile Quantile Quantile
0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9
spoor 0.212 0.126 0.060 0.047 -0.003
(0.0095)∗∗∗ (0.0002)∗∗∗ (0.0001)∗∗∗ (0.0000)∗∗∗ (0.0000)∗∗∗
smiddle -0.073 -0.005 -0.011 0.017 0.040
(0.0044)∗∗∗ (0.0001)∗∗∗ (0.0001)∗∗∗ (0.0000)∗∗∗ (0.00000)∗∗∗
ln ipc 0.034 0.243 0.076 -0.029 -0.096
(0.0106)∗∗∗ (0.0002)∗∗∗ (0.0001)∗∗∗ (0.0001)∗∗∗ (0.0000)∗∗∗
ln pop 0.116 0.087 0.106 0.107 0.147
(0.0057)∗∗∗ (0.0001)∗∗∗ (0.0001)∗∗∗ (0.0000)∗∗∗ (0.0000)∗∗∗
lndist 3.099 1.395 0.042 -0.013 0.529
(0.0818)∗∗∗ (0.0014)∗∗∗ (0.0010)∗∗∗ (0.0004)∗∗∗ (0.0001)∗∗∗
lnrem 2.475 1.653 1.483 2.166 1.153
(0.226)∗∗∗ (0.0040)∗∗∗ (0.0029)∗∗∗ (0.0011)∗∗∗ (0.0002)∗∗∗
cons -92.60 -60.31 -40.15 -57.55 -36.21
(5.977)∗∗∗ (0.105)∗∗∗ (0.0758)∗∗∗ (0.0283)∗∗∗ (0.0051)∗∗∗
# obs. 234,307,867 234,307,867 234,307,867 234,307,867 234,307,867
Standard errors are stated in parentheses below point estimates. ***, ** and * mean
1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively.
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Table C.4: Income shift from the poor to the rich and middle
Quantile Quantile Quantile Quantile Quantile
0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9
rich -0.176 -0.110 -0.047 -0.024 0.028
(0.0004)∗∗∗ (0.0001)∗∗∗ (0.0014)∗∗∗ (0.0000)∗∗∗ (0.0055)∗∗∗
middle -0.240 -0.111 -0.055 0.001 0.076
(0.0006)∗∗∗ (0.0002)∗∗∗ (0.0019)∗∗∗ (0.0000)∗∗∗ (0.0076)∗∗∗
ln ipc 0.182 0.241 0.076 -0.027 -0.094
(0.0005)∗∗∗ (0.0002)∗∗∗ (0.0016)∗∗∗ (0.0000)∗∗∗ (0.0065)∗∗∗
ln pop 0.044 0.085 0.105 0.107 0.143
(0.0003)∗∗∗ (0.0001)∗∗∗ (0.0009)∗∗∗ (0.0000)∗∗∗ (0.0035)∗∗∗
lndist 2.347 1.422 0.058 0.018 0.521
(0.0041)∗∗∗ (0.0013)∗∗∗ (0.0125)∗∗∗ (0.0003)∗∗∗ (0.0504)∗∗∗
lnrem 2.686 1.504 1.359 2.055 1.029
(0.0111)∗∗∗ (0.0035)∗∗∗ (0.0338)∗∗∗ (0.0008)∗∗∗ (0.137)∗∗∗
cons -74.15 -44.84 -32.33 -52.72 -35.81
(0.277)∗∗∗ (0.0872)∗∗∗ (0.844)∗∗∗ (0.0204)∗∗∗ (3.419)∗∗∗
# obs. 234,307,867 234,307,867 234,307,867 234,307,867 234,307,867
Standard errors are stated in parentheses below point estimates. ***, ** and * mean
1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively.
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Table C.5: Export price distribution and income distribution
Quantile Quantile Quantile Quantile Quantile
0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9
Panel A: Income per capita
ln ipc 0.268 0.347 0.161 -0.016 -0.063
(0.0164)∗∗∗ (0.0002)∗∗∗ (0.0001)∗∗∗ (0.0107) (0.0001)∗∗∗
Panel B: Gini coefficient
Gini 0.014 -0.006 0.009 -0.016 -0.027
(0.0086)∗∗∗ (0.0005)∗∗∗ (0.0001)∗∗∗ (0.0004)∗∗∗ (0.0000)∗∗∗
# obs. 40,6515,124 406,515,124 406,515,124 406,515,124 406,515,124
All regressions include gravity related control variables: population, distance and remote-
ness. All regression use export quantity as the frequency weight. See Appendix C for full
tables. Standard errors are stated in parentheses below point estimates. ***, ** and * mean
1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively.
Note: The graph also includes the 95% confidence level.
Fig C.1: Coefficients of income per capita and Gini
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Table C.6: Export price distribution and income per capita
Quantile Quantile Quantile Quantile Quantile
0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9
ln ipc 0.268 0.347 0.161 -0.016 -0.063
(0.0164)∗∗∗ (0.0002)∗∗∗ (0.0001)∗∗∗ (0.0107) (0.0001)∗∗∗
ln pop 0.109 0.199 0.220 0.142 0.138
(0.0097)∗∗∗ (0.0001)∗∗∗ (0.0001)∗∗∗ (0.0063)∗∗∗ (0.0001)∗∗∗
lndist 1.671 0.246 -0.929 -0.184 0.602
(0.145)∗∗∗ (0.0014)∗∗∗ (0.0010)∗∗∗ (0.0947)∗ (0.0011)∗∗∗
lnrem 2.430 1.096 1.056 0.521 -0.002
(0.292)∗∗∗ (0.0029)∗∗∗ (0.0021)∗∗∗ (0.190)∗∗ (0.0023)
cons -83.03 -36.75 -23.06 -12.14 -4.56
(7.791)∗∗∗ (0.077)∗∗∗ (0.055)∗∗∗ (5.087)∗ (0.061)∗∗∗
N 406,515,124 406,515,124 406,515,124 406,515,124 406,515,124
Standard errors are stated in parentheses below point estimates. ***, ** and * mean 1%,
5% and 10% significance levels respectively.
Table C.7: Export price distribution and Gini coefficient
Quantile Quantile Quantile Quantile Quantile
0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9
Gini 0.014 -0.006 0.009 -0.016 -0.027
(0.0086)∗∗∗ (0.0005)∗∗∗ (0.0001)∗∗∗ (0.0004)∗∗∗ (0.0000)∗∗∗
ln pop 0.150 0.240 0.214 0.168 0.172
(0.0283)∗∗∗ (0.0017)∗∗∗ (0.0004)∗∗∗ (0.0012)∗∗∗ (0.0001)∗∗∗
lndist 2.776 1.796 -0.150 -0.398 0.280
(0.345)∗∗∗ (0.0209)∗∗∗ (0.0044)∗∗∗ (0.0149)∗∗∗ (0.0008)∗∗∗
lnrem -1.863 -3.702 -2.015 1.846 2.762
(0.729)∗∗ (0.0441)∗∗∗ (0.0092)∗∗∗ (0.0315)∗∗∗ (0.0017)∗∗∗
cons 21.61 76.89 52.23 -45.25 -74.83
(19.71)∗∗∗ (1.193)∗∗∗ (0.249)∗∗∗ (0.853)∗∗∗ (0.0466)∗∗∗
N 406,515,124 406,515,124 406,515,124 406,515,124 406,515,124
Standard errors are stated in parentheses below point estimates. ***, ** and * mean 1%,
5% and 10% significance levels respectively.
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Appendix D
Appendix of Chapter 5
D.1 Circulars of VATRs Adjustments
Circulars in 1998 and 1999:
Guo Shui Ming Dian[1998] 004 Hao issued by State Administration of Taxation; Cai
Shui Zi [1998] 28 Hao, Cai Shui [1998] 102 Hao and Cai Shui [1998] 107 Hao issued
jointly by Ministry of Finance and State Administration of Taxation; Guo Shui Fa [1998]
118 Hao issued by State Administration of Taxation; Cai Shui Ming Dian [1998] 2 Hao
issued by Ministry of Finance; Guo Shui Fa [1998] 152 and [1998] 207 issued by State
Administration of Taxation; Cai Shui [1999] 17 Hao, Cai Shui [1999] 225 Hao, Cai Shui
Zi [1999] 200 Hao, Cai Shui Zi [1999] 227 Hao and Cai Shui Zi [1999] 289 Hao issued
jointly by Ministry of Finance and State Administration of Taxation.
Circulars from 2003 to 2007:
Cai Shui [2003] 222 Hao, Cai Shui Ming Dian [2004] 1 Hao, Cai Shui Ming Dian
[2004] 2 Hao, Cai Shui Ming Dian [2004] 3 Hao, Cai Shui [2004] 200 Hao, Cai Shui
[2004] 201 Hao, Cai Shui [2004] 214 Hao, Cai Shui [2004] 224 Hao, Cai Shui [2005] 51
Hao, Cai Shui [2005] 57 Hao, Cai Shui [2005] 75 Hao, Cai Shui [2005] 93 Hao, Cai Shui
[2005] 119 Hao, Cai Shui [2005] 133 Hao, Cai Shui [2005] 184 Hao, Cai Shui [2006] 6
Hao, Cai Shui [2006] 42 Hao, Cai Shui [2006] 139 Hao, Cai Shui [2006] 145 Hao, Cai
Shui [2006] 1263 Hao, Cai Shui [2007] 39 Hao, Cai Shui [2007] 64 Hao, Cai Shui [2007]
90 Hao and Cai Shui [2007] 97 Hao jointly issued by Ministry of Finance and State Ad-
ministration of Taxation for details.
Circulars from 2008 to 2009:
Cai Shui [2008] 111 Hao, Cai Shui [2008] 138 Hao, Cai Shui [2008] 144 Hao, Cai
Shui [2008] 177 Hao, Cai Shui [2009] 14 Hao, Cai Shui [2009] 43 Hao and Cai Shui
[2009] 88 hao jointly issued by Ministry of Finance and State Administration of Taxation.
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D.2 Adjustments Details
Table D.1: Adjustments on Export Tax Rebate in 2005 and 2006
Circular Title Release at Adjustments
Effective from
Cai Shui [2005] 57
Hao
28/03/2005
01/04/2005
Cancel VATRs of steel primary products (HS code:
7203-,7205,7206-,7207-,7218- and 7224-)
Cai Shui [2005] 75
Hao
29/04/2005
01/05/2005
Reduce VATRs of Coal products, Tungsten, Tin,
Zinc, Antimony and their processed products and
so on to 8%; Cancel VATRs of fuel wood, Sili-
con,Rare earth metals, Magnesium,Natural steatite,
Natural fluorine minerals and so on
Cai Shui [2005]
119 Hao
21/07/2005
01/08/2005
Cancel VATRs of Manganese, articles thereof, waste
or scrap (HS code 81110010)
Cai Shui [2005]
133 Hao
25/08/2005
01/09/2005
Cancel VATRs of Aviation spirit (HS code 27101110
and 27101120) until 31st December 2005
Cai Shui [2005]
184 Hao
23/12/2005
01/01/2006
Reduce VATRs of 25 kind of pesticide, Tungsten,
Tin, Zinc, Antimony and their processed products
and so on to 5%; Cancel VATRs of raw hides and
skins,raw furskins, tar from coal, lignite or peat,
other mineral tars and so on
Cai Shui [2006] 42
Hao
21/03/2006
14/03/2006
Cancel VATRs of Aviation spirit (HS code 27101110
and 27101120)
Cai Shui [2006]
139 Hao
14/09/2006
15/09/2006
Cancel VATRs of 25 kind of pesticide, coal, gas,
paraffin, silicon, non-ferrous metals, primary wood
products and so on; Reduce VATRs of steel products
from 11% to 8%; Reduce VATRs of ceramic, cement,
glass products and so on from 13% to 11% or 8%;
Reduce VATRs of some non-ferrous metal materi-
als from 13% to 11%, 8% or 5%; Reduce VATRs
of extiles, furniture, plastics, lighters, a few wood
products from 13% to 11%; Reduce VATRs of non-
mechanical vehicles and their intermediary inputs
from 17% to 13%; Increase VATRs of major tech-
nical equipment, bio-pharmaceutical products, some
IT products, supported high-tech products and so on
from 13% to 17%; Increase VATRs of processed
products with agricultural goods from 5% or 11% to
13%
Source: The Taxation Law Database of State Administration of Taxation,
http://www.chinatax.gov.cn
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